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ABSTRACT
NEGLECTING THE ‘RIGHT ON WHICH ALL OTHER RIGHTS
DEPEND’: PRESS FREEDOM IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Wiebke Lamer
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

Historically and philosophically, press freedom has closely been linked to the
fight against tyranny and the advancement of human rights. But coverage o f press
freedom as a distinct human right is surprisingly absent from scholarship and the human
rights agenda. This dissertation fills this gap in the academic literature by examining why
press freedom has not become part of the established international human rights debate,
despite its centrality to democratic theory.
It does so in three steps: First, it outlines the distinction between press freedom
and other human rights to which it is usually subjugated, like free speech and freedom of
information, thus highlighting the importance of press freedom as a distinct human right.
Second, it examines in detail how press freedom is treated at the UN, and traces the
historical path of the freedom of the press debate at the UN to determine how and why
press freedom is neglected. Third, the dissertation examines the roles o f transnational
actors, the media and NGOs, in the context of the international promotion o f press
freedom.
The dissertation finds that, despite the popularity of ideational explanations in the
field of human rights studies, in the case of promoting press freedom, considerations of
power and strategic interests rather than ideas dominate state behavior. No state, not even
Western liberal ones, goes out of its way to promote press freedom, because it

undermines state power. The dissertation further finds that there is no domestic
constituency for press freedom and that human rights NGOs as well as the media
themselves do surprisingly little to promote press freedom.
These findings imply that the current place of press freedom in the human rights
discourse needs to be rethought. The findings also have implications for the idea of
democracy and human rights and for their future not only in developing countries, but in
liberal democracies as well. If the goal is to implement these ideas, the ‘right on which all
other rights depend’ should be at the center of human rights advocacy at home and
abroad.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The sense of optimism in the early 1990s surrounding the future of Western
liberal democracy and human rights was overwhelming. The Soviet Union collapsed and
the world was supposedly witnessing the ‘end of history’ that would mark the final
triumph of Western liberalism and the universalization of its norms and values. As some
observers have pointed out, the media in both democratic and democratizing countries,
along with new developments in information and communication technologies were
greeted with similar confidence and optimism.1 Liberal theory holds, after all, that a free
press, meaning a press that is free from government control, is vital not only to political
processes, but also to the development and maintenance of personal autonomy and the
right to self-determination.
Twenty years later it has become obvious that this confidence about the bright
global future of Western ideals and institutions was premature, particularly in regard to
freedom of the press. Press freedom around the world has increasingly come under attack
in recent years. The latest Freedom House report found that the proportion of the global
'j

population that enjoys a free press fell to its lowest level in over a decade. Less than 14
percent of the world’s population now live in countries with a press that earns the
Freedom House status ‘Free.’3

1 Thomas Dine, "Free Media in Unfree Societies," H arvard International Review 23, no. 1 (2001). Paul
Starr, "An Unexpected Crisis: The News Media in Postindustrial Democracies," The International Journal
o f Press/Politics 17, no. 2 (2012).
2 Karin Deutsch Karlekar and Jennifer Dunham, "Press Freedom in 2012: Middle East Volatility Amid
Global Decline," (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2013), 1.
3 Ibid., 2.
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Despite this somber reality, press freedom has received very little attention in the
context of international human rights. The benefits of a free press for economic and
political development have been documented.4 But coverage of press freedom as a human
right per se are absent from the academic literature. This dissertation will fill this gap by
examining why press freedom has not become part of the established international human
rights discourse, despite its centrality to democratic theory. It argues that press freedom is
the cornerstone of human rights and democracy and should be treated as such in the
academic literature and the international human rights debate. It submits that an
unrestricted press is not just an important economic actor, but also an influential power in
the political process, a status that interferes with government interests of sustaining their
own power and influence. Consequently, states undermine press freedom at home or its
promotion on the international stage.

Press Freedom in the West

Press freedom is not easy to define. Lawyers and constitutional scholars have
been grappling with this challenge for centuries. Instead of rehashing the intricacies of
this debate, this dissertation will work with the definition that press freedom constitutes a
press free from government interference. The mention of government interference brings
up another set of complications since government interference can come in different
ways. For the purposes of this project, however, it shall mainly refer to government
censorship, intimidation (or attempts thereof) of journalists and news media workers by
4 See for example: Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999). Pippa
Norris, Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008). Marina et al. Guseva, "Press Freedom and Development," (Paris: UNESCO, 2008).

government officials, and attempts at regulating the news media. In other words, it refers
to any government action that thwarts efforts of the news media to report freely on public
affairs, whether they are political, economic or otherwise. In this context, government or
taxpayer subsidies to broadcasting institutions will not be considered a form of
government interference. Many Western European news broadcasters, like the BBC,
receive such government subsidies but are nonetheless considered independent, because
they are allowed to report freely even if it is critical of the government.
While violent suppression o f journalists and media workers is not common in the
West, even in countries that according to Freedom House have a free press, governments
are no strangers to curtailing press freedoms. Instances in which Western governments
attempt to intimidate or regulate the news media are on the rise. Canada fell dramatically
in the rankings because of its poor handling of student protests in 2012.5 Across the
Atlantic, the UK is still embroiled in a crisis over media regulation following the
revelations of the Murdoch phone hacking scandals. Several other European countries
saw a weakening of press freedom in 2012, most notably Greece, which even dropped
from Free to Partly Free in the Freedom House Press Freedom rankings due to its
continued economic downturn and a resulting hostile environment for the press.6 And
while press freedom is being curtailed across the continent, the EU is seriously
entertaining the introduction of legislation that would install media councils with
enforcement powers to impose fines, order apologies and fire journalists.7

5 World Press Freedom Index 2013 (2013)"World Press Freedom Index 2013," (Paris: Reporters Without
Borders, 2013).
6 Deutsch Karlekar and Dunham (2013) 3.
7 High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, "A Free and Pluralistic Media to Sustain European
Democracy," (Brussels: European Commission, January 2013), 7.

Even the U.S., historically the poster child for press freedom, has seen
administrations crack down on rights that secure a free press. For example, only a few
years after the First Amendment was passed, the Alien and Sedition Acts o f 1798 came
into force. Publishing “false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States” became a crime under these acts and lead to the
prosecution of 14 people.8 Primary targets were editors and owners of the leading
Republican newspapers that supported their political party and criticized President John
Adams’ Federalist government. The laws expired only a few years later, but even
Thomas Jefferson, a strong opponent of the acts, could not resist the temptation to use
them to prosecute several of his own critics.9 The Sedition Act of 1918 followed a similar
pattern, stating that whoever shall “willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal,
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United
States... shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both.. .”10 The 1918 Sedition Act only applied to times o f war,
and was repealed in 1920, but it continued the pattern of restricting free press and free
speech under the guise of national security concerns to the detriment of writers,
journalists, editors and publishers.
More recently, the Patriot Act that was passed shortly after the September 11
terrorist attacks has resulted in changes to the legislation leading to more government
secrecy. The news media have been considerably affected by these new laws, as their task
of informing citizens on government activities has become increasingly difficult since

8 Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (New York: Random House,
1991). 63.
9 Ron Chemow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 667-8.
10 United States Congress, "Sedition Act," (1918).

9/11. In the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, the U.S. government and military
have gone to unprecedented lengths to limit unflattering media coverage by banning
interviews with soldiers or taking photos o f coffins of U.S. military personnel who died
overseas.11 On December 6, 2011, the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press
reports, “Marines locked reporters and photographers in a warehouse to prevent them
from covering a story about American troops killed or injured by a stray bomb north of
Kandahar.”

Such interferences are not exclusive to media abroad; they also extend to

journalists at home. As the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press report puts
it: “U.S. journalists face an increased likelihood of being seen as government informants
with no constitutional right to keep sources confidential or to withhold unpublished
materials from prosecutors.”13 The George W. Bush administration also cracked down on
government leaks, and this trend has been continued under President Obama.
In 2012, the U.S. fell 27 ranks in the Reporters Without Borders World Press
Freedom Index due to the treatment of journalists covering the Occupy Wall Street
protests.14 A report by seven U.S. law school clinics on the police response to the
movement in New York recounts alarming details of obstructions of press freedom
including physical violence directed at journalists, threats of arrests and arrests of
journalists, and the willful obstruction of witnessing or recording events, most notably
during the Zuccotti Park eviction on November 15, 2011.15 The U.S. ranked 47th on the

" "Homefront Confidential: How the W ar on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public's
Right to Know," ed. Lucy A. Dalglish and Gregg P. Leslie (Arlington, VA: The Reporters Committee for
Freedom o f the Press, 2005), 41.
12 Ibid., 22.
13 Ibid., 51.
14 "World Press Freedom Index 2011-2012," (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2012), 2.
15 Sarah Knuckey, Katherine Glenn, and Emi MacLean, "Suppressing Protest: Human Rights Violations in
the U.S. Response to Occupy Wall Street," (The Global Justice Clinic and the Walter Leitner International
Human Rights Clinic, 2012), 84-90.

World Press Freedom Index, after countries like South Africa, Ghana, and El Salvador.
To make matters worse, New York authorities do not seem to have learned their lesson
and instead continued to arrest journalists and photographers on the anniversary o f the
beginning of the protests in September 2012.16
In 2013, the U.S. moved up several ranks to position 32 in the Reporters Without
Borders World Press Freedom Index, but recent revelations that the Department of
Justice seized confidential phone records of reporters and editors of the Associated Press,
have once more highlighted how serious the U.S. government is about controlling the
flow of information.17
It is quite obvious then, that “the right on which all other rights depend” as the
liberal European theorist and Napoleon opponent, Mme de Stael, described press
freedom, has and still is experiencing more than its fair share of suppression and neglect.
It has also received very little attention in the context of human rights. At first glance, this
might strike readers as an odd observation, considering that Freedom House and several
other nongovernmental organizations dedicate substantial resources to compiling periodic
reports on press freedom violations across the globe. There also seems to be an ever
present debate on topics relating to the Internet and other new information technologies
in the broader context of international relations.
However, discussing the role of the Internet on social movements or tallying the
incidents in which journalists or Internet bloggers have been deprived of their right to

16 "Journalists Arrested During Occupy Wall Street Anniversary Protests," The Huffington Po5t(September
17, 2012), http://www.hufFingtonpost.com/2012/09/17/joumalists-arrested-occupy-wallstreet_n_1891068.html.
17 Charlie Savage and Leslie Kaufman, "Phone Records o f Journalists Seized by U.S.," New York Times
May 14, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/phone-records-of-joumalists-of-the-associatedpress-seized-by-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

free expression is distinct from addressing press freedom as a human right. Press freedom
is not the same as freedom of information. Neither is press freedom the same as freedom
of expression or speech. Certainly, these concepts and rights overlap (as will be discussed
in more detail in chapter 2), but they quite substantially differ on the fact that protecting a
free press also protects a - if not the -vital institution in a democratic society. In
Jefferson’s words: “were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government
without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a
moment to prefer the latter.”18

Press Freedom at the UN

The political aspect of press freedom, however, is seldom taken into consideration
in the context of human rights in the international discourse. Press freedom lacks legal
institutionalization in international human rights law. Unlike the French revolutionaries
and the American Founding Fathers of the 18th century, the creators of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights did not include an explicit provision for the freedom o f the
press. For the UN, press freedom falls under Article 19: “Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.” Some might argue that the phrasing does not matter, that in
principle Article 19 preserves the same right as the First Amendment: “Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...” But given the lack of

18 Thomas Jefferson, "To Edward Carrington 1," Federal ed., vol. 5, The Works o f Thomas Jefferson (New
York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904-5), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/802/86653.

focus on press freedom at the international level, the phrasing is instructive. One
explicitly stresses the freedom of the press - as a group, an institution. The other
guarantees the individual right to expression through all media. In the latter, the media
are an afterthought, a mere tool, to secure the right to freedom of expression, rather than
an entity worthy of protection itself.
General usage trends of terms such as “press freedom” and “freedom of
expression” also confirm that historically debates about the latter have garnered more
attention. Figure 1 shows the rise of the phrase “press freedom” compared to the phrase
“freedom of expression” in the English language from 1900 to 2008 based on the Google
Books database of more than eight million digitized books. Interestingly, while the usage
of the term “human rights” has increased drastically and steadily since 1945, usage of
press freedom did not grow. This gap is highlighted in Figure 2.
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19 Data collected from Google Books, "Ngram Viewer," https://books.google.com/ngrams.
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Consequently, it is hardly unexpected that the UN framework does not treat press
freedom as an end in itself. Instead, the media are treated as a means to an end, and that
end comes in different variations: to protect the right to information; to guarantee
freedom of expression; to foster understanding and friendly cooperation among people
and states; to publicize and mitigate humanitarian disasters; or to promote human and
economic development. In other words, the media or press freedom are treated as a
channel to secure other human rights. They are not treated as an institution that requires
its own protection. This reality of the UN discourse is reflected in the academic literature
on human rights. In fact, press freedom is virtually absent in the discussion of human
rights.

20 ibid.
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Press Freedom in the Human Rights Literature

A surprising number of prominent human rights volumes do not feature any
references to press freedom. Jack Donnelly’s Universal Human Rights in Theory and
Practice does not mention press freedom or free press at all, and free speech only once.

1

Similarly, David Forsythe’s latest edition of Human Rights in International Relations
does not bring up freedom of the press, or expression or anything on media more
generally.

-j'j

Sohn and Buergenthal’s 1973 classic International Protection o f Human

Rights only addresses press freedom violations in Haiti, while freedom of expression and
information receive considerably more prominent coverage.23 There are plenty o f other
human rights texts that do not mention press freedom at all like L.J. MacFarlane’s The
Theory and Practice o f Human Rights from 1985, Human Rights in the World
Community by Claude and Weston from 2006, Haas’ Improving Human Rights from
1994, and Philip Alston’s The United Nations and Human Rights from 1992, for
example.24
As far as human rights reference works are concerned, press freedom fares only
marginally better. Lawson’s Encyclopedia o f Human Rights counts a handful of
references to press freedom and a free press or media. However, the discussion o f the

21 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2003).
22 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
23 Louis B. and Thomas Buergenthal Sohn, International Protection o f Human Rights (New York: BobbsMerrill, 1973).
24 L.J. MacFarlane, The Theory and Practice o f Human Rights (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
Richard Pierre Claude and Bums H. Weston, Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Actions
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2006). Michael Haas, Improving Human Rights
(Westport, CT:: Praeger, 1994). Philip Alston, ed. The United Nations a n d Human Rights: A Critical
Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Alston mentions freedom o f information.
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topic is far from comprehensive. Press freedom is mentioned four times in direct relation
to the 1992 Declaration of Windhoek on promoting an independent and pluralistic press
in Africa; three times it cites NGO reports on press freedom in Sudan, Jordan and on the
topic of press law in European countries respectively; once it comes up in the context of
Hungarian protesters in the 1980s who carried signs demanding “press freedom;” and
once in reference to freedom of information. To compare, freedom of expression is
mentioned 79 times in the book.25
The 2000 International Encyclopedia o f Human Rights by Maddex features a
short entry on press freedom that places it within the general context of the media’s
responsibilities and shortcomings for the protection of human rights.26 Again, freedom of
expression occupies a much more prominent role, however. The 2009 Encyclopedia o f
Human Rights edited by David Forsythe addresses whether the right to a free press is a
human right, but does so only briefly.27 Mostly because this point is featured under the
entry “Media” that quickly moves on to concerns of how the advent of the Internet is
affecting traditional media potential for political socialization, and how the media exert
influence through agenda setting and framing. In fact, the media entry is striking a
cautionary note overall, warning of the dangers of the media rather than highlighting its
necessity for democracy and human rights.
Other notable human rights books that mention press freedom superficially are
Which Rights Should Be Universal by William Talbott, who makes the case that press
freedom should be one of nine universal rights but at no point in the book elaborates on

25 Edward Lawson, Encyclopedia o f Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 1996).
26 Robert L. Maddex, International Encyclopedia o f Human Rights: Freedoms, Abuses, and Remedies
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000).
27 David P. Forsythe, Encyclopedia o f Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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why press freedom is on his list.28 Another is Beth Simmons’ Mobilizing fo r Human
Rights. While she acknowledges the importance of a free press for democratic
governance and government adherence to human rights domestically, she has nothing
explicit to say about press freedom as a human right per se.29
Alfred Zinnos’ 2007 bibliography cataloguing the latest works in human rights
research offers no entry on press freedom and only two on media and one on information
technology.

Most likely, this circumstance stems from the lack of attention on press

freedom in human rights journals.
From 2002 until 2011 only three articles on press freedom appeared in the
Journal o f Human Rights, and these focused on media coverage of human rights.
Between 1981 and 2012 Human Rights Quarterly published only six articles directly
related to press freedom. Five of these are case studies of the status of press freedom in
developing countries, while one addresses the question whether free speech and press is
an absolute right.31 With the exception of one article on confining press freedom in
Singapore, all of these articles date back to the 1980s. Even worse is the record of Human
Rights Review, which did not feature a single article on press freedom between 1999 and
2012, and only one on free speech.32
An analysis of the nearly 7,000 academic articles written on the topic of “human
rights” from Web of Science, the Social Science Citation Index and the Arts and
Humanities Citation Index (1975-present) and ranking them according to the number of
28 William J. Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
29 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing fo r Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 270.
30 Albert A. Zinnos, Human Rights: A Bibliography With Indexes (New York: Nova Publishers, 2007).
31 Anthea J. Jeffery, "Free Speech and Press: An Absolute Right?," Human Rights Quarterly 8, no. 2
(1986).
32 The search was limited to articles from these three journals that were available from online databases,
which accounts for the different date ranges.
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times these articles have been cited also shows astonishing results.33 Out of these nearly
7,000 articles only one carries the term press freedom in its title and is only cited twice.34
Freedom of expression or free speech comes up eight times. A search for ‘media’ returns
17 results, although some of those overlap with related search terms

like

journalism/journalists (three), news/newspapers (two) and fourth estate (one). Out o f all
media and press freedom related human rights articles the highest score goes to “Shaping
the Northern media’s human rights coverage, 1986-2000” with 19 citations.35 It provides
a case study of the human rights reporting of The Economist and Newsweek, overall
drawing positive conclusions with regard to the media being a potentially useful ally in
the fight against human rights violations, but also highlighting the media’s gatekeeper
role.
On the whole, however, what these findings show is that older texts on human
rights do not feature much discussion on press freedom, free press or the media. In the
cases that they do, it is in the context of the right to free speech and mostly perfunctory.
Newer texts acknowledge the importance of the media and particularly the Internet, but
do not address press freedom in depth, if at all. The general emphasis is on taking the
power of the press for granted in the context of other human rights on the one hand, and
on highlighting the drawbacks of the media and how they do not adequately report on
human rights abuses on the other. However, this approach is undermining the vital role of
the press in preserving civil and political rights.

33 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Human Rights Citation Database," (Old Dominion University2013). The ten most
prominent human rights articles have between 100 and 492 citations each.
4 The article in question is Dursun Peksen, "Coercive Diplomacy and Press Freedom: An Empirical
Assessment o f the Impact o f Economic Sanctions on Media Openness," International Political Science
Review 31, no. 4 (2010).
35 Howard Ramos, James Ron, and Oskar N. T. Thoms, "Shaping the Northern Media's Human Rights
Coverage, 1986-2000," Journal o f Peace Research 44, no. 4 (2007).
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The Fourth Estate

Why, critics might ask, does it matter that press freedom is not addressed
sufficiently in human rights works and at the UN? The literature mentions it here and
there; there are plenty of accounts available of press freedom violations in all parts o f the
world; there are human rights organizations that work on behalf of threatened journalists
and against censorship measures; and the Internet has received a lot of attention in this
context. Why then, is it a problem that press freedom is largely absent in these
discussions? It matters because by ignoring or reducing press freedom to debates about
the influence of the Internet, or what the media can and cannot do about foreign policy
we are conflating it with other rights and consequently miss the point of press freedom
altogether.
Most importantly, a free press is central to the relationship between governing
authorities and the people. Furthermore, the protection of a free press should not be
confined to states that are no strangers to human rights violations, but to all states. All
governments are interested in sustaining themselves and their power. Take the example
of former German President, Christian Wulff, who resigned early in 2012 after a
prolonged controversy over corruption claims. One day after he gave a speech on the
values of freedom of expression and press freedom to an audience in Qatar, he left the
editor-in-chief of the leading German tabloid Bild an angry voicemail, threatening the
paper with legal action and a “final break” in relations with the paper’s publishing house,
should they not refrain from publishing a story on a controversial private loan the
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President received from an entrepreneur friend when he was governor.36 To this day, the
full transcript of his voicemail has not been published, even though it is not difficult to
make the case that the voicemail of a German president threatening editors and publishers
with “war” is anything but private.37 Such information is clearly in the public’s interest,
particularly if the public figure in question serves as a moral authority for the nation.
This story highlights the power dynamics between governments and the so-called
Fourth Estate. The term goes back to the English constitutional theorist Edmund Burke
who used it to refer to the British press as the most important estate in Parliament,
watching over the others.
Indeed, the institution of a free press is the greatest safeguard the public has
against government abuses, and for ensuring that they receive the information they need
in order to make government accountable to them. This is the basis o f democracy, as
James Madison put it: “The people, not the government, possess the absolute
sovereignty.”39 As a result, they have “the right o f freely examining public characters and
measures,” he argued in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.40 Of course it
is important that each individual is able to speak their mind on-line and off. What is
equally, if not more important, however, is that journalists, editors and publishers are
allowed to use their channels of mass communication freely to reach the wider public,

36 "President Accused o f Threatening Tabloid Newspaper," Spiegel Online Internationa^January 2, 2012),
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/angry-call-president-accused-of-threatening-tabloidnewspaper-a-806665 .html.
37 Melissa Eddy, "German President Retreats on Openness," New York 77wes(January 5, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.eom/2012/01/06/world/europe/germany-president-christian-wulff-stops-publication-ofthreatening-call-to-bild.html.
38 The term was first attributed to Edmund Burke by Thomas Carlyle in his book Heros and Hero Worship
in History (1841) 141
39 Lewis (1991) 60-1.
40 Ibid.
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providing a political institution that has the power to ensure that the government
continues to work for the people.
Whether this lack of attention on the benefits of a free press in the literature is
intentional or accidental is difficult to determine. Most likely it is both. If there are no
international legal statutes or conventions, it is difficult to find literature that covers them.
Likewise, if the UN debate focusses on everything but press freedom, books will reflect
that. In the 1970s and 1980s, when the UN was preoccupied with the debate surrounding
the New World Information and Communication Order, for example, accounts and
analysis of the issue abounded.
The debate back then was also fueled by the polarization of the Cold War, and the
media were framed by Third World countries and the East as tools of Western global
dominance and exploitation that needed to be curtailed. This explains why the nonWestem world tends not to focus on the advantages of a free press too much and why the
human rights literature tends to highlight the drawbacks of the press rather than its
virtues. But what is less clear is why there is silence on the subject from Western states as
well, and why their Cold War attitude towards press freedom prevails, even decades after
the end of the ideological East-West clashes.
This dissertation argues that promoting a free press as a right in itself undermines
government interests because the press is a powerful force in the political process if it is
allowed to function freely. It is also an influential economic actor. As a result, states Western and non-Westem alike - tend not to promote press freedom in the context of
international human rights. Treating press freedom as a means to an end, rather than an
end in itself in the international framework of human rights protects the interests of
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governing authorities. This explains the current state of the press freedom debate at the
international level and it also explains why the way we think about the place of press
freedom in the human rights framework requires dramatic reinterpretation. If the goal is
to promote Western liberal ideals, and democracy according to Madison’s premise, press
freedom should be the centerpiece of human rights advocacy and democracy promotion
in international relations.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 addresses the relationship between press freedom and freedom of
expression in more detail. It will make the case that press freedom matters as a right in
itself due to its government oversight capacity, and that the right to freedom of
expression is in fact meaningless without a free press. Since the free press fulfills several
vital political and social functions, while also having access to a mass audience, it has a
powerful influence on the govemment-citizen relationship. The chapter also highlights
the importance o f press freedom for promoting and protecting human rights.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed case study of the treatment of press freedom within
the UN framework over the last ten years, highlighting in particular the absence of press
freedom in the UN human rights debate. The UN is the setting for establishing and
upholding international norms on human rights. Due to its inclusive nature it can form
internationally agreed norms that are politically legitimate. Furthermore, the UN monitors
states’ commitments and adherence to these norms, while also carrying the moral
authority to admonish those that engage in norm violations. Consequently, the UN is the
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logical place to investigate how states treat press freedom in the context of international
relations and to what extent, if any, press freedom has reached the status of accepted
international norm.
The chapter also examines indicators for the state driven nature of the UN
discourse and actions on press freedom. Among those is the funding of UN bodies like
UNESCO and initiatives that deal with press freedom. The lack of funding and
prominence of UN actors that work on behalf of press freedom indicates that the issue is
rather low on the UN and state agenda. The fact that most of these actors only engage in
monitoring violations of press freedom is also characteristic of a lack of focus on the
issue of a free press.
Chapter 4 examines the politics of press freedom, arguing that when it comes to
promoting press freedom, power and state interests carry more weight than ideas and
norms. The emphasis here is on Western states in particular, since they are the most
ideational driven ones. The U.S., France, Norway and Sweden were chosen because they
represent four most-likely cases. France and the U.S. have placed a historically strong
emphasis on liberal ideals and the liberal democracies Norway and Sweden tend to have
the most friendly domestic environment for press freedom. One would expect to
therefore, that these countries promote press freedom in the context of the UN human
rights agenda. Yet, evidence suggests that their efforts are also minimal and largely
rhetorical. To further prove the point that strategic interests, rather than ideas, determine
Western state action on the issue of press freedom, the chapter also examines the
historical trajectory of press freedom at the UN.
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The 1950s and 1960s were marked by Western efforts to promote the “free press”
model at the UN. Following the decolonization period, the 1970s brought on what is now
called the “Great Global Media Debate.” During the early years of that decade, the idea
of information colonialism took hold among the newly decolonized states.41 They joined
with the Soviet Union in promoting the New World Information and Communication
Order (NWICO) which was aimed at curbing what they saw as the global Western
dominance over information flow and content. By the mid-1970s, the West organized a
counter-offensive in cooperation with influential media interests. The World Press
Freedom Committee was founded and UNESCO’s Mass Media Declaration was
successfully stalled.
The end of the decade saw a truce between both sides and was followed by a
Western offensive during the 1980s. The Declaration of Talloires rallied Western
governments and media and journalism organizations against a restriction of press
freedom. The U.S. and the UK withdrew from UNESCO in 1984, UNESCO’s Director
General M’Bow was unseated and the New World Information and Communication
Order concept died. The end of the global media debate coincided with the end o f the
Cold War and reflected the apparent triumph of Western liberalism.
The 1990s were marked by concerns over the digital divide, globalization and the
impact of multinational media coiporations on cultural heritage and civil society. This
debate culminated with the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 in
Geneva and in 2005 in Tunis, but its impact was minimal. The “Great Global Media
Debate,” it seemed, had become marginalized in UN circles. Instead, the last decade has
41 Robin Mansell and Kaarle Nordenstreng, "Great Media and Communication Debates: WSIS and the
MacBride Report," Information Technologies and International Development 3, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 212.
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seen worrying actions by some countries that seem to be aimed at undermining the
promotion and protection of press freedom.
Chapter 5 focuses on who might promote press freedom if not states or the UN.
The chapter examines the efforts of non-governmental organizations that work on behalf
of press freedom issues, but also looks at what role the media itself play with regard to
the press freedom debate. The marginal role of the media as an actor at the international
level supports the argument that press freedom does not gamer sufficient attention in the
context of democracy and human rights promotion. Despite some successes in countering
the New World Information and Communication Order plans to restrict the free flow of
information during the 1980s, the influence of the media on the press freedom debate
these days seems to be minimal. And even back then, the successful opposition to the
information order was mostly due to efforts by the U.S. and UK governments.
Given that the media at the international level are an economic player, but not
necessarily a political one that exercises oversight, the absence of a well-organized,
global media lobby might not come as a surprise. Yet, media influence stems, to a great
extent, from being a cultural force that shapes identities and values. Since the dominant
media organizations originate in the West, they are likely to spread Western, democratic
values. This leads to the contradiction that on the one hand, the media help promote press
freedom through other means than politics. On the other hand, the media’s status as a
political and economic player undermines efforts to promote press freedom, as states are
tempted to avoid advocating press freedom out of fear that an independent press will
eventually undermine their own interests and power. The chapter also makes the case that
anti-press freedom measures are indirectly supported by Western publics that seem to
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have lost their trust in the press as an independent political institution aimed at
representing the voice of the people. This is a result mostly of the changing news media
landscape and economic pressures on the press, which are discussed in this chapter as
well. Whatever the reasons, the absence of a strong lobby for press freedom at the UN
and at home suggests that the media should take on more than simply its cultural and
economic role and become more of a political actor.
Chapter 6 will examine press freedom in the context o f increased political activity
by new media outlets and Internet companies. The focus here will be on the future of
press freedom in the age of the Internet, as this medium has become the most central to
the global debate, particularly since the Arab Spring. A 2012 report by Google
Transparency showed a drastic increase in requests to censor political web content over
the previous two years by authoritarian and democratic governments alike.42 This
highlights the new challenges the world faces with regard to the state-society balance in
the 21st century. This chapter thus contends that promoting and protecting press freedom
is of vital importance in the digital age.
Chapter 7 provides a conclusion discussing the future of press freedom, as well as
the implications of the findings of the study.

Conclusion

The importance of a free press as the basis for democracy and human rights seems
universally acknowledged, but curiously press freedom has not become part o f the

42 Dominic Rushe, "Google Reports 'Alarming' Rise in Censorship by Governments," Guardian, June 17,
2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/18/google-reports-alarming-rise-censorship

established human rights discourse. This project contributes to the existing scholarship in
three important ways: First, it places press freedom at the center of how we think about
democracy and human rights promotion. Second, it provides the first detailed account on
the treatment of press freedom at the UN. Third, it offers a useful addition to those
concerned with policy prescriptions for the human rights community. If the goal is to
promote Western liberal ideals, press freedom should be the centerpiece of human rights
advocacy and democracy promotion in international relations, not merely a side note to
freedom of expression or freedom of information.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CASE FOR PRESS FREEDOM AS A HUMAN RIGHT

Introduction

The International Bill of Rights does not feature a protection of press freedom, or
even a mention of it. Those concerned with promoting and protecting a free press usually
point to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that states that
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Clearly though, the focus here is not
on safeguarding the press, or even the media, but rather to ensure every individual’s right
to express themselves freely. Yet, “the press is not everyone; everyone is not the press.” 1
This chapter will focus on the difference between press freedom and freedom of
expression, while exploring the functions of the press that are not easily replaced by
granting everyone the right to freely express themselves. The roles of the press as a
political institution, provider of information as well as context, and as a social necessity
are not fully developed within the human rights framework. As this chapter will outline,
however, press freedom should be of central concern to human rights promoters because
it is nothing less than the ‘right on which all other rights depend.’
The absence of press freedom from the international human rights framework is
historically striking for several reasons. First, throughout history, thinkers and

1 Sonja R. West, "Awakening the Press Clause," UCLA Law Review 58, no. 4 (2011): 1070.
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practitioners have made the case for the necessity of press freedom as the basis for human
rights and self-government, values to which the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights
is clearly committed. Second, securing a free press emerged as a constitutional concern in
the U.S. and France at the end of the 18th century, when revolutionaries fought to
overcome tyranny and establish equality, values that are also fundamental to UN
objectives.
Third, press freedom was a key talking point during the early deliberations on
drafting the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In 1946, the Commission on
Human Rights even recommended that the Economic and Social Council create a SubCommission on Freedom of Information and o f the Press.2 What is more, the Draft
Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man, formulated by the InterAmerican Juridical Committee and submitted to the UN General Assembly, explicitly
included “the special and highly privileged right to freedom of the press” under Article
III on the right to freedom of speech and of expression.3 Article 17 of the subsequent
Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights does not mention press freedom specifically,
but states that “[cjensorship shall not be permitted.”4 But despite the fact that press
freedom was an issue at these early stages of drafting the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, any reference to it or even to censorship did not make it into the final
version of the document.

2 "Report o f the Commission on Human Rights to the Second Session of the Economic and Social
Council," (United Nations Economic and Social Council 21 May 1946), 7. The Sub-Commission was
established in 1947, but was short-lived, and suspended in 1952
3 "Draft Declaration o f the International Rights and Duties o f Man ", (Inter-American Juridical Committee
8 January 1947), 3.
4 "Draft Outline o f International Bill o f Rights," (Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, 4
June 1947), 6.
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The debate over the legal status of press freedom has long been fraught with
difficulties. In the U.S. the First Amendment clearly states “Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...” Nonetheless, legal experts
continue to debate whether the press clause is redundant, or whether the press indeed
deserves constitutional protection.5 The difficulty mostly stems from the close
relationship between the concepts of free speech and free press. Indeed, it is no easy task
to disentangle freedom of expression from freedom of the press, which is underlined by
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court did not touch the subject of press freedom in any
significant way until 1919, and has continued to deflect decisions on the status of press
freedom vis-a-vis freedom of expression.
Some historians even argue that the Founding Fathers did not differentiate
between the two either, that they equated free speech with free press. But, as Melville
Nimmer points out: “As nature abhors a vacuum, the law cannot abide a redundancy. The
presumption is strong that language used in a legal instrument, be it a constitution, a
statute, or a contract, has meaning, else it would not have been employed.”6 Indeed, there
is plenty of evidence that suggests that the Founding Fathers were well aware o f the
connection between guaranteeing a free press and preventing the abuse of power, or even
overthrowing tyranny.
Originally, British censorship practices were exported to the American colonies
and the early American newspapers fell victim to printing restrictions by the colonial

5 For an excellent recent overview of the debate see West (2011).
6 Melville B. Nimmer, "Introduction - Is Freedom o f the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to
Freedom o f Speech?," Hastings Law Journal (1975).
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government.7 The reason for this was twofold: First, there were only a small number of
printers operating in the colonies, making it easier for the colonial government to control
them. Second, the printers were dependent on governmental printing like official
documents, money and legislative proceedings for their primary income. As a result, the
printing of anything that would challenge the authorities was a rare occurrence.8
Printing limitations remained a staple of the American societal and political
landscape throughout the 17th century. The early stance of American officials was that
any kind of debate had to be curtailed because it “inevitably endangered the moral and
social values that government protected, the public peace it sought to maintain and the
institutions it erected and protected to serve those ends.”9 The end of the British licensing
law in 1694, however, resulted in a dramatic rise in the numbers o f newspapers both in
England and in the colonies. Control over what was being published became thus ever
more difficult for the government authorities.
But the influence of the newly flourishing printing business on political events in
the British colonies did not stop there. Leonard Sussman argues that the arrival of the
printing press was the central factor that eventually led to the revolution. He contends
that back then, the people of Boston - where the first American newspapers originated saw themselves as good Englishmen who came to America to resist harsh civil and
religious rule. He continues: “The press, however, served to build solidarity among the
colonists of differing European backgrounds.”10 Or, in John Adams’ words: “The

7 Leonard R. Sussman, Press Freedom in Our Genes: A Human N eed (Reston, VA: World Press Freedom
Committee, 2001). 23.
8 David A. Copeland, The Idea o f a Free Press: The Enlightenment and Its Unruly Legacy (Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2006). 108.
9 Larry Eldridge, quoted in ibid., 119.
10 Sussman (2001) 24.
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Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds
and hearts of the people.”11 The newspapers, Sussman writes, “were the real revolution,
in Adam’s view.”12
It seems quite far-fetched, then, to assume that the people who were at the
forefront of the revolution, who in some cases were journalists or publishers themselves
and who later went on to oppose the Alien and Sedition Acts, were not aware o f the
unique democratic functions of a free press. Even though the debate continues over what
the Founding Fathers meant by the press clause, a strong case can be made in favor o f the
argument that they intended to specifically protect it with the First Amendment. After all,
the fourth article of the original draft of the Bill of Rights states: “The people shall not be
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, write, or to publish their sentiments; and the
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”
First Amendment historian Leonard Levy even argues that the free speech clause
was a result of the perceived importance of an unrestricted press: “It developed as an
offshoot of freedom of the press, on the one hand, and on the other, freedom of religion the freedom to speak openly on religious matters.” 13 Rather than being an addition to the
free speech clause, there is a strong case to be made that the press was important to the
Founding Fathers from the beginning. According to Levy, they might not have had a
clear idea of what precisely they were doing by including the press clause, but they were

11 John Adams quoted in ibid., 25.
12 Ibid.
13 Leonard W. Levy, Legacy o f Suppression: Freedom o f Speech and Press in Early American History
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 1960). 5.
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nonetheless implying that the press should have a Fourth Estate function as an unofficial
part of the checks and balance system.14
Whether the press clause debate in the U.S. is settled or not, it is clear that there is
a strong link between free press and state-society relations that was recognized by the
American drafters of the two documents that are commonly seen as the most
comprehensive attempt at translating the values of the Enlightenment into a constitutional
blueprint. Consequently, the question that arises is not so much whether press freedom is
a vital ingredient for democracy and human rights, because that the press is important in
this regards is more or less accepted.
The more important - but less discussed - issue in the context of democracy and
human rights is how to distinguish between freedom of expression and freedom o f the
press. Within the current debate, freedom of expression or free speech carries more
weight, while press freedom is often not more than an afterthought. As a result, what is
forgotten are the functions that are unique to the press, which cannot be fulfilled by
simply guaranteeing everyone the right to freely express themselves. To come back to
this chapter’s initial quote: “The press is not everyone; everyone is not the press.” 15
The unique roles of the free press can be divided into three broad categories: a
political institution, provider of information and context, and the press as social glue.
While these different roles overlap to a certain degree, it is nonetheless important to
distinguish between them in order to discuss them vis-a-vis freedom of expression and
make the case that press freedom is equally, if not more, important than free speech

14 Ibid., 273.
15 West (2011) 1070.
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The Press as a Political Institution

The Founding Fathers were not the only ones to recognize the value of a free
press as a government oversight mechanism that complimented the system of checks and
balance. The term that is today often used to describe this political role of the press - the
Fourth Estate - is attributed to the English constitutional theorist Edmund Burke. Thomas
Carlyle describes its use in a parliamentary speech by Burke:
Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but in the Reporter’ Gallery
yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important than they all. It is not a figure of
speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact - very momentous to us in these times.
Literature is our Parliament too. Printing, which comes necessarily out o f Writing,
I say often, is equivalent to Democracy; invent Writing, Democracy is inevitable
... Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a
branch of government, with inalienable weight in lawmaking, in all acts of
authority. It matters not what rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the
requisite thing is that he have a tongue which others will listen to; this and
nothing more is requisite. The nation is governed by all that has tongue in the
nation. Democracy is virtually there.16
Indeed, the institution of a free press is the greatest safeguard the public has
against government abuses, and for ensuring that they receive the information they need
in order to make government accountable to them. This is the basis of democracy, as
James Madison put it: “The people, not the government, possess the absolute
sovereignty.”17 As a result, they have “the right of freely examining public characters and
measures,” he argued in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.18
Vincent Blasi coined the term “checking value” in reference to the First
Amendment, arguing that the speech, assembly and press clauses were designed to check

16 The term was first attributed to Edmund Burke by Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The
Heroic in History (London: James Fraser, 1841). 141.
17 Lewis (1991) 60-1.
18 Ibid.
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“the inherent tendency of government officials to abuse the power entrusted them.19
Official misconduct is particularly dangerous, he writes, because the government can
employ legitimized violence and other “investigative capabilities” like subpoena power
or the accumulation of data that governments require citizens to submit on a regular
basis.

On the other hand, there is no concentrated and easily mobilized checking system

to ensure the government does not abuse its powers. Hence, Blasi concludes, public
opinion needs to act as a check on official power. Even more so since public officials are
expected to fulfill the moral duties o f serving the general welfare.21 Blasi cites the
Watergate scandal as an example of how profoundly society can be shaken by official
betrayal of the public tmst, much more than any wrongdoing on the part o f private power
by corporations, for example.22 Consequently, the government needs to be checked by the
public, and the most reliable way to do so is via the press.
Furthermore, a government that is checked by a free press is more accountable
and less likely to become corrupt.23 This goes back to the likes of Kant and Montesquieu,
who argued in favor of the principle o f publicity to prevent the abuses o f power. Or, to
put it in Justice Brandeis’ words, “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.”24 It is the press that has the facilities to shine the light on those
in power. The individual right to freedom of expression, on the other hand, does not

19 Vincent Blasi, "The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory," American B ar Foundation Research
Journal 2, no. 3 (1977): 538.
20 Ibid., 538-9.
21 Ibid., 540.
22 Ibid.
23 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading o f the American Constitution (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1996). 199-200.
24 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money: A n d How the Bankers Use It (New York: F.A. Stokes, 1914).
92.

automatically grant access to public institutions. A free press endowed with investigative
rights can make information available to the public that it otherwise would not have. For
example, it does not make much sense (or even be possible) to allow every citizen access
to criminal trials or prisons, when there are representatives of the press who are much
better positioned to attend such events and then make the information public.25
If one person expresses a view critical o f the government, this exercise o f free
speech is unlikely to cause public officials to take note. If, however, the mass media
publicize the same issue, the government faces more pressure than from one person or a
small group of people. In fact, the importance o f press freedom vis-a-vis free speech is
today more pronounced than it was at the time the Bill o f Rights was drafted. Yes,
newspapers were a driving force behind the revolution, but it was also easier for a person
in the market square of Philadelphia to reach a critical audience.
The key to understanding press freedom in its own right is the fact that it makes
information available to the masses. In an age of ever expanding government
bureaucracies and capabilities, and changing social fabrics, the press holds a bigger
responsibility for ensuring government oversight than ever. Critics may point out that the
rise of the Internet is reversing this trend, but recent events in the Arab world tell a
different story. To reach and mobilize the masses, traditional news outlets are still
indispensable. The Arab Spring originated with a few hundred or thousand activists that
organized protest movements through new and social media, but only after A1 Jazeera
and other traditional media outlets started reporting about the protests, did the movement

25 Eric Barendt, Freedom o f Speech (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 72.
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scale upwards to mobilize millions.26 The trajectory of the protests that erupted on
September 11, 2012 in the Middle East in response to the controversial video The
Innocence of Muslims tells a similar story. The video was published on YouTube in July
2012 without garnering much attention. Only after the video was sent to reporters in the
U.S., Egypt and elsewhere on September 6, did it become widely publicized and caused
outraged responses from Muslims.27
The fact that everyone can express himself or herself through whichever media
they like does not guarantee a government oversight mechanism. But the role of the press
as a political institution reaches farther than simply providing a check on those in power.
According to Walter Lippmann:
A free press is not a privilege but an organic necessity in a great society. Without
criticism and reliable and intelligent reporting, the government cannot govern. For
there is no adequate way in which it can keep itself informed about what the
people of the country are thinking and doing and wanting.
Given the fact that the people possess the absolute sovereignty in a democracy,
that the elected officials are mere representatives o f the public will, their government
needs a way of staying in touch with the wants and needs of the citizenry. Simply
granting free expression to every citizen does not fulfill this vital function. Norberto
Bobbio reminds us that it is the press through which public opinion - “the public
expression of agreement or dissent concerning institutions” - circulates after all.28

26 Jon B. Alterman, "The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted," The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (Fall
2011): 104-10.
27 Sarah Chayes, "Does 'Innocence o f Muslims' M eet the Free-Speech Test?," Los Angeles Times 18
September 2012. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/l 8/opinion/la-oe-chayes-innocence-of-muslims-firstamendment-20120918
28 Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits o f State Power (Minneapolis:
University o f Minnesota Press, 1989). 26.
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This process is not unique to press freedom, however. It goes back to Alexander
Meiklejohn’s broader free speech argument based on its necessity for the implementation
of self-government:
The First Amendment is not, primarily, a device for the winning of new truth,
though that is very important. It is a device for the sharing of whatever truth has
been won. Its purpose is to give to every voting member of the body politic the
fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which
the citizens of a self-governing society must deal. 9
Others have argued, though, that this democratic dialogue function is best served
by the press, since it is difficult to imagine other forms of speech to offer the same kind
of contribution to the democratic dialogue than the “informing and opinion-shaping”
influence of the press.30 More recently, further evidence has emerged that supports the
case for highlighting the key role of the press for the democratic process even in light of
changes in the media landscape.
Eleanor Townsley and Ronald Jacobs argue that the traditional media outlets are
“increasingly central to the large and densely networked public sphere” because blogs or
other alternative media pick up the debates that are conducted in the opinion sections of
the elite national newspapers and by commentators of the mainstream television
programs.31 A recent Pew survey finds, for instance, that it is not true that large
percentages of Americans now get their news mainly from recommendations from their
friends via social media.32 Online news consumption has increased dramatically over the
last few years, but the top news sites continue to be legacy news outlets.33

29 Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers o f the People (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965). 75.
30 Nimmer (1975) 653.
31 Ronald N. and Eleanor Townsley Jacobs, The Space o f Opinion: Media Intellectuals and the Public
Sphere (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 14.
3 Amy Mitchell, Tom Rosenstiel, and Leah Christian, "What Facebook and Twitter Mean for News," The
Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/mobile-
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Despite a greater availability of channels of communication, politicians still turn
primarily to the newspapers and major TV networks to sell their policies to the people.
The Internet offers a place for everyone to voice their opinions and thus serves a selffulfilling purpose. It is also easy to find like-minded people online who share the same
political opinions, however rare they might be. But in terms of serving the political
process, new media cannot that easily replace the press, because the latter also acts as a
facilitator of forming majorities.34 “Democratic government,” Patrick Garry writes, “must
come from what is common among its citizens.”

The press is well suited to pick up the

central debates that are of concern to everyone and presenting them to a wider audience,
because they are:
well-organized, well-financed, professional critics to serve as a counterforce to
government - critics capable of acquiring enough information to pass judgment
on the actions of government, and also capable of disseminating their information
and judgments to the general public.36
Indeed, the notion that press involvement in political reporting and debate leads to
political participation and progress of democratic politics is not hew. Thomas Leonard
contends that it was not necessarily the republican style of government that created the
democratic process in the U.S. Instead it was the press because it created a “common
language in both words and pictures for political interests to be expressed and shared.”37

devices-and-news-consumption-some-good-signs-for-joumalism/what-facebook-and-twitter-mean-fornews/.
33 Amy Mitchell and Tom Rosenstiel, "The State o f the News M edia 2012: Key Findings," The Pew
Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/overview-4/keyfindings/.
34 Patrick M. Garry, The American Vision o f a Free Press (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc.,
1990). 76.
35 Ibid., 81.
36 Blasi (1977) 541.
37 Thomas C. Leonard, The Power o f the Press: The Birth o f American Political Reporting (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986). 4.
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To this day, this is true of the press as it dominates the way public debate and opinion is
framed.
At the same time, some philosophers - John Stuart Mill and de Tocqueville
among them - have been wary o f the “tyranny o f the majority.”

I D

Consequently, a just

society needs many factions, and preferably a system of checks and balances, but also a
free press because it “is a powerful protection against the influence of oppressive and
tyrannical factions.”39

The Press as Provider o f Information and Context

The second key role of the press is closely related to the first. For the democratic
process to function, the public needs to be informed not only about its government’s
conducts and policies, but also about important issues and debates. The press aides the
democratic dialogue in this context, but it does more than simply providing information.
If its only purpose were to make relevant information accessible to the people, the press
could be easily replaced by new technology.
These days, governments have ways of making information public directly
through their websites or social media channels. But the availability of information does
not automatically increase the number o f informed citizens. Most people do not have time
to spend hours online going through hundreds o f pages of meeting minutes or draft
legislation. The press is needed to make sense of the sheer amount of information that the
government and other institutions release every day. According to Jay Rosen: “Journalists
38 J. Herbert Altschull, From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas behind American Journalism (New York:
Longman, 1990). 170.
39 Ibid., 112.
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build up the world because their reports about it contain more than “information,” that
superabundant commodity. Headlines and the stories that follow are guides to what’s
important, cues to what’s current.. .”40
The press thus plays an important role not just in informing the public and the
government, but also by putting this information into context. Granting the right to
freedom of expression does not automatically safeguard this vital democratic function.
Herbert Altschull argues:
[Technology itself does not inform anyone... someone or something must
produce the constant stream of information in a form that provides an accurate
representation of what is happening, in a form that the audience can
comprehend... and this information must be what its audience needs to know.. .41
It is therefore also vital to distinguish between the right to freedom of information
and the right to a free press. Without the latter a lot of information might end up in the
vast depths of the Internet even in the unlikely case that a government is fully transparent
and informs its citizens about all of its activities.

The Press as Social Glue

In addition to its political role, the press also fulfills a social function. The social
and political are closely intertwined, of course, particularly when it comes to concepts
such as the democratic dialogue or the opinion-shaping purpose of the press. De
Tocqueville was convinced not only of the political influence of the press, but o f its
social function as well:

40 Jay Rosen, What Are Journalists For? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 3.
41 Altschull (1990) 14.
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To suppose that they only serve to protect freedom would be to diminish their
importance: they maintain civilization. I shall not deny that in democratic
countries newspapers frequently lead the citizens to launch together into very illdigested schemes; but if there were no newspapers there would be no common
activity. The evil which they produce is therefore much less than that which they
cure.42
Indeed, one of the functions of the press is to foster a sense of community, much
like Adams described the effect of the newspapers in creating solidarity among the
settlers of the American colonies. Jay Rosen writes that the press helps people develop a
stake in community affairs, particularly through local news outlets. This trend has
continued to this day, as the 2011 National Newspaper Association community
newspaper readership survey reflects. It found that three-quarters of respondents read a
local newspaper every week.43 Their primary reason to do so is to find out about local
news or local information.44 The appeal of the community paper is clear:
Of course, most of these newspapers are not uncovering major scandals on a
regular basis. That's not what keeps them selling at such a good clip; it's the
steady stream of news that readers can only get from that publication —the births,
deaths, crimes, sports and local shenanigans that only matter to the 5,000 or so
souls in their circulation area.45
After all, democracy starts at the grassroots level, where the press is counteracting
what Rosen calls the “disappearing public” through community newspapers and local TV
and radio news 46 With social fabrics changing and more and more of our day-to-day
interaction replaced by online activities, the threat of the disappearing citizen is becoming
more troubling. The argument about declining social capital and the loss of a sense of

42 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Isaac Kramnick, trans. Henry Reeves, Norton Critical
Editions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1840 (republished 2007)). 455-6, Vol II, Ch. VI.
43 "2011 Community Newspaper Readership Survey," (National Newspaper Association, 2011), 5.
44 Ibid., 8.
45 Judy Muller, "Where Newspapers Thrive," Los Angeles Times September 13, 2011.
http://articles.latimes.com/2011 /sep/13/opinion/la-oe-muller-weeklies-20110913
46 Rosen (1999) 24.
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community in Western societies has been made for some time now.47 It is thus
particularly important to highlight the values of the press both for sustaining democracy
at home and in our efforts at promoting it internationally.
There are two other arguments in favor of promoting a free press. On the one
hand, keeping the public channels of communication open will enable society to be able
to adapt to changing circumstances and develop new ideas 48 On the other hand, allowing
all forms of speech, even the extremist kind, fosters a sense of tolerance, which is vital
for a free society.49 Both of these are arguments highlighting the role of the press as
promoting a certain type of society that goes beyond the notion of the pi;ess as a political
watchdog.50 Accordingly, the 1947 Commission on Freedom of the Press framed the role
of the press in broad terms:
Today our society needs, first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account
of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for
the exchange of comment and criticism; third, a means of projecting the opinions
and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; fourth, a method of
presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society; and, fifth, a way of
reaching every member of the society by the currents of information, thought, and
feeling which the press supplies.51
The role of the press in democratic societies is thus varied. It functions as a
political institution that checks public officials for abuses of power; it also provides
information and content that contributes to the democratic dialogue between citizens and
their government representatives; and it plays an important role in fostering social
cohesion. However, the right of the individual to be able to say and write whatever he or
47 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival o f American Community (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2000).
48 Garry (1990) 85.
49 Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
50 Garry (1990). Garry’s overall argument is that the watchdog rationale is too narrow a prism through
which to evaluate the merits of the free press.
51 Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1947). 20-1.
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she wants does not protect from tyranny, corruption or incompetence by itself. Only if
there is a press able to report without restrictions to the public at large can government
oversight by the people truly be guaranteed.
The importance of the press therefore stems from a combination o f two things: the
press holds power due to its mass audience and as a result carries out vital social and
political functions. As pointed out in this section, both of these factors underscore the
difference between free speech and free press. The fact that governments have a different
relationship with the Googles, Facebooks and Verizons of the media landscape further
highlights the distinction between press freedom and freedom of expression. These
companies, although providing people with the tools to freely express themselves and
access information, are not tasked with providing a government oversight role and can
even be abused by the government, as recent revelations surrounding American and
British data surveillance programs have shown. The very idea behind having a free press,
on the other hand, is to safeguard the people’s interests by widely publicizing government
policies and behavior. Freedom of expression is not necessarily a thorn in the side of
governments that aim to pursue their interests, but press freedom is. Even in advanced
democracies government interests and promoting a free press are at odds, since the very
goal of press freedom is to keep the government in check and protect civil and political
liberties.
In fact, when it comes to recognizing the political power of the press,
governments have been beating the human rights community to the punch for decades.
They are apt at drawing distinctions between freedom o f expression and press freedom on
a regular basis, thus able to circumvent the more damaging effects of press freedom on
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their own power, while claiming to uphold the cherished human right to freedom of
expression. Russia under Putin has provided ample evidence of this.
In a 2010 article on the status of press freedom in Russia, Maria Lipman makes
the case that freedom of expression is possible without a free press. “Today’s Kremlin,”
she writes, “doesn’t mind free and critical voices as long as they remain politically
irrelevant and have no impact on decision-making.”52 She concludes that Russia enjoys
freedom of expression but no press freedom, if one understands press freedom “as one of
the elements in an institutionalized democratic polity.”53 More recently, President Putin
summed up his government’s approach to freedom of expression: “Citizens’ right to
freedom of speech is unshakable and inviolable — however, no one has the right to sow
hatred, to stir up society and the country, and put under threat the life, welfare and peace
of millions of our citizens.”54 In other words, speech is free until it poses dangers to the
state as defined by the government. Putin draws a clear distinction between the right to
free speech, which every Russian citizen is granted, and the channels that can render
speech politically relevant, in this case the Internet: “It is necessary to block attempts by
radical groups to use information technologies, Internet resources and social networking
Web sites for their propaganda,” Putin justifies his position.
This definition of free expression is, of course, a very narrow one. People have to
live in fear of saying something that might become politically relevant are less likely to
say anything at all. At the very least they are more likely to self-censor what they are

52 Maria Lipman, "Rethinking Russia : Freedom o f Expression without Freedom o f the Press," Journal o f
International Affairs 63, no. 2 (2010).
53 Ibid.
54 Ellen Barry, "Russia Seeks the Arrest o f a Politician From Georgia," N ew York Times February 14, 2013.
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saying. Neither of these scenarios is in accordance with the idea of free speech, that lets
people express themselves without fear, whatever the political repercussions might be.
What is more, none of this is in line with the idea that people are the masters of their
government.
Because authoritarian regimes draw these distinctions, the human rights
community needs to distinguish between freedom of expression and press freedom as
well. Only if the vital political functions and power of the free press are appreciated to
their full extent, can press freedom be promoted accordingly in the context of human
rights.

Press Freedom as a Human Right

Clearly, press freedom and freedom of expression or of information are different
in many ways. What is more, the functions of a free press in a just society go beyond the
protection of the individual’s right to free speech. Yet, international law neglects the
issue of press freedom almost completely. In 1762, John Wilkes declared in England:
“the liberty of the press is the birth-right of a Briton, and is justly esteemed the finest
bulwark of the liberties of this country.”55 This birth-right should not be confined to
Britons. Everyone should be able to benefit from the right to a free press. The first step
towards this goal is to anchor press freedom more firmly in the international human rights
framework.
Free press supporters point to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a home for press freedom. As outlined in the previous section, however, the
55 John Wilkes, The North Briton, vol. 1 (London: W. Bingley, 1769). 1-2.
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benefits of press freedom extend far beyond the realms of guaranteeing free speech as a
channel of individual self-fulfillment. In fact, most human rights actually depend on a
right to a free press.
Human rights are first and foremost aimed at protecting the individual from
abuses of government power. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
protects “freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman treatment or punishment.” Article 9
grants “the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” Article 12 states
that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.” But who is most likely to
interfere with these freedoms is the government. It holds the monopoly on legalized
violence and thus, as Blasi points out, requires a checking mechanism that can protect
citizens from undue exercise of such government power.56
Like the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is an attempt at safeguarding against tyranny. But unlike the Founding Fathers, the
makers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ignored the ‘great bulwark of
liberty.’ Westerners might think that this does not affect them very much, since our
constitutions tend to prescribe systems of checks and balance to prevent the abuse of
power. But even in these systems, action against the government is taken only if there is a
high level of public dissatisfaction with official actions and a demand to look into the
actions of one branch of government.

c*7

Whether it is the president or a congressman that

is guilty of misconduct, they are subject to the same kind of power dynamics and have
access to subpoena powers, citizen data, or law enforcement personnel. In the absence of

56 Blasi (1977) 538.
57 Ibid.
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any other channel through which public dissatisfaction can be expressed in a way that
puts pressure on those in government, the press remains the only viable protection
mechanism against official misconduct.
This fact alone justifies a more central role of press freedom in the human rights
debate than it currently holds. Everyone who is not a journalist, publisher, or owner o f the
press deserves the right to benefit from the advantages of a free press and the work of
these individuals. To frame the debate within the context of freedom of expression
ignores the wider social and political consequences of protecting the free press as a
structural necessity of the modem state, and underestimates its significance as the basis of
other political and civil rights.
Although the significance of the free press as the basis for human rights is
neglected in international law, scholars have recognized the checking value of the free
press in recent years. In 2008, a statistical report found that there is a good correlation
between press freedom and different indicators of development, poverty and
governance.58 Amartya Sen makes the powerful case that a free press encourages good
governance and emphasizes public concerns. He finds that “in the terrible history of
famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and
democratic country with a relatively free press.”59
Similarly, several studies have shown that a free press has positive effects on
human development.60 More recently, Mohamed Keita from the Committee for the
Protection of Journalists made a similar case for the importance of journalistic oversight
on issues like malnourishment and other humanitarian crises. Not only does a lack of
58 Guseva (2008).
59 Sen (1999).
60 Summarized in Norris (2008) 187.
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reporting on such matters prevent the local government from adequately taking action, it
also hinders the ability of aid groups to quickly and effectively provide support.61
Indeed, press freedom is more important than simply establishing multi-party
elections. A 2009 study, for example, found that impunity, that is, failure of governments
to guarantee that their representatives comply with the same laws that apply to the rest of
the citizenry, drastically decreases in the presence of higher levels of press freedom.62
“Formal democracy,” the author contends, “results in episodic rather than constant
pressure on abusive and poorly controlled military and police forces.”63
In this context, the democratic dialogue function of the press is also important.
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has the
right to take part in the government of his country” and that “The will of the people shall
be the basis of the authority of the government.” Elections are not the only mechanism
through which the public will is expressed, and if it is, it happens only in intervals. On the
other hand, the public expresses its will constantly through the channels of the free press
thus aiding the democratic dialogue. If everyone is entitled to participate in the collective
decision-making process, everyone is entitled to a free press.
Observers have increasingly pointed out that the global wave of democratic
reversal is due to the fact that democracy promotion has been focused on establishing
institutions like elections at the expense of supporting initiatives that help people value
the practice of democracy itself. Many countries today are democracies on paper, but in
practice the citizens in many of these states do not trust their institutions. This is because
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they are familiar with the organization side of democracy, but not with the democratic
processes that help them to insure that their governments are implementing citizens’
interests.64 According to Marina Ottaway:
Democratic consolidation can only take place if citizens become convinced that
they can further their demands through democratic mechanisms-that is, if they
think that there are political parties and pressure groups that represent their
particular interests. It is only at this point that citizens will not be tempted to
applaud military coups d'etat and support populist leaders with weak democratic
credentials.65
A free press is the key prerequisite to facilitate democratic consolidation. It
uniquely helps citizens to understand that they can further their interests through
democratic means. It gives people the tools to make their demands heard and the
oversight capacity to ensure their government works for them. With a press in place that
provides the necessary political information and context, facilitates the dialogue between
the governed and the governing, and checks government policies and agencies, it is much
more difficult for officials to abuse their power. These functions also underline the
importance of establishing a free press in order to secure human development.
The societal role of the press cannot be left out in this context, as Ottawa indicates
when she emphasizes the role of civil society as a basis for healthy and just societies. A
recent study examining the relationship between civil society and press freedom in the
fight against corruption concludes that “claims of civil society’s anticorruption impact
must acknowledge its significant dependence on civil society’s ability to generate public
pressure against corruption and that, in turn, the public pressure mechanism is strongly

64 Marina Ottaway, "Democratic Reversals," Georgetown Journal o f International Affairs 1, no. 2
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conditioned by the extent of press freedom.”66 In other words, corruption stands a much
better chance of being weeded out if civil society is strong, which depends on the
presence of a free press.
To be fair, the relationship between civil society and a free press is one o f the few
aspects to which the UN draws attention in the rare case press freedom is brought up at
all, most often in the context of World Press Freedom Day. But as this chapter outlines,
there is more to press freedom than simply being a means to secure the right to freedom
of expression. Despite the vital social and political functions a free press fulfills, his idea
of press freedom as a common or human right, has not taken hold in the established
discourse.
This might ultimately go back to the assumption that because the right to freedom
of expression covers journalists and other media workers just like every other individual,
a specific protection for the press is not necessary. While this might be an acceptable
notion in theory, the reality looks very different. The fact that journalists are more
prominent precisely because they have more power as a result of reaching a bigger
audience than regular citizens means that they are the first ones to get arrested or killed.
The many reports on journalist mistreatment seem to suggest that the international
community recognizes this circumstance to some degree, but plans to anchor press
freedom more firmly within the human rights framework are nonetheless lacking. Surely,
the fact that journalists in theory enjoy the same right to freedom o f expression should
not detract from extending special safeguards for press freedom. Equal rights for women
are not specifically spelled out in most domestic legislation, and yet the human rights
66 Nuno S. Themudo, "Reassessing the Impact o f Civil Society: Nonprofit Sector, Press Freedom, and
Corruption," Governance: An International Journal o f Policy, Administration, and Institutions 26, no. 1
(January 2013): 82.
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community considers it a priority to promote equal rights for women and to monitor and
admonish those that violate them. Press freedom, however, enjoys a neglected status at
the international level and often has to give way to human rights considerations of
Internet freedom, despite the fact that those two concepts diverge as well.

Press Freedom vs. Internet Freedom

In his 1991 book Images o f the First Amendment Lee Bollinger makes the point
that freedom of the press, in its central and widely accepted image, is about the state not
being allowed to coerce the press in order for the public to receive the information they
need to make up their minds on their own and ultimately be the sovereign.67 But
Bollinger also outlines another press freedom image that tends to be downplayed in U.S.
domestic considerations, namely the fact that if unfettered, the press can also be a
gatekeeper with influence aver which voices get heard68 This has become more o f a
concern after the advent of radio and television news and has led to the implementation
of regulations aimed at guaranteeing a fair and balanced access to a plurality o f voices.
At the international level it is the second image of press freedom that dominates,
while Bollinger’s central image is mostly ignored. The human rights community is
primarily concerned with the dangers o f the gatekeeper role of the press. This is hardly
surprising considering that in the majority o f states the government has control over most,
if not all, broadcasting channels. But this state o f affairs has also had the unfortunate

67 Lee C. Bollinger, Images o f a Free Press (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1991). 1.
68 Ibid., 62ff.
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consequence of reducing the positive functions of the press as guardian of the people as
sovereign to the notion of the press as a mere tool of the government.
This reality is reinforced by the fact that the Internet, particularly social media, is
currently treated as the cure-all to the gatekeeper problem. Because the Internet
eliminates access barriers, everyone can be heard. Consequently, the freedom of
expression community is concerned with keeping the Internet free from restrictions.
While this is undoubtedly an important cause, one that should not be at odds with
promoting press freedom, it tends to neglect the role of journalists and the wider
implications of a free press.
Recently, Article 19, an NGO dedicated to the promotion of freedom of
expression, published a policy brief in which it makes the case for the international
community to recognize the right to blog. Again, this is a laudable cause, since bloggers
are targeted and prosecuted by many governments for their political views. However,
Article 19 also calls for a functional definition o f journalism, meaning it is “an activity
that can be exercised by anyone.”69 While in theory this might be workable, in practice it
is not. The functions of the press cannot simply be replaced by access to Blogger or
Twitter. For one, 61 percent of the world’s population is still without Internet access.70
Furthermore, what is published on blogs and social media is primarily
information, not necessarily context. Sure, there are bloggers that investigate, fact-check,
and explain. But there is no guarantee that they will be heard. It is easy to get published
online, but difficult to be heard and even more difficult to be heard by a critical mass.
Traditional or professional journalists are still needed to sift through the vast amounts of
69 Article 19, "The Right to Blog," (London: Article 19, 2013), 1.
70 ITU, The World in 2013: ICT Facts and Figures, (Geneva: ITU, 2013), http://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Documents/facts/lCTFactsFigures2013.pdf.

49

information we are bombarded with and give it meaning, particularly for those people
that do not spend their time searching for information online on their own initiative. Even
though journalism can be exercised by anyone, it does not mean that it will be exercised
by everyone; or that everyone will have the time or incentive to actively pursue the
efforts of citizen journalists. Those people, too, have a right to a political institution that
makes sure their government responds to their interests. And that institution is the press.
What the Internet is good at, among many other things, is making traditional
journalism more accountable, since it is much easier to spot errors in reporting with an
added layer of online fact-checkers that have the tools to spread the news about these
errors more quickly. It is one way of bringing the press closer to the people and making
them more responsive to the public’s interests, which is what the press is supposed to
look out for in the first place. It also shows how press freedom and Internet freedom are
two sides of the same coin and work best together. It does not show, however, that
focusing exclusively on Internet freedom will solve the problem o f securing an
unrestricted, independent press. If anything, political and civil rights would benefit if in
addition to the gatekeeper concern, the human rights community would invest more
resources into highlighting what Bollinger calls the central image of press freedom: that a
free press protects the status of the people as the masters of their government.
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Common Excuses for Not Making Press Freedom a Central Tenant of the Human Rights
Framework

O f course, the different roles of the press described above are mostly best-case
scenarios, ones that only rarely translate into reality in their idealized theoretical
understanding. The press and the system in which it operates have many flaws. In some
cases, as in the UK News of the World phone-hacking scandal, the press abdicates its
responsibilities entirely and thus opens itself up to criticisms from those that would like
to see the power of the press checked. However, politicians are not the only ones who
emphasize the problems of a free press at the expense of its merits. All too often,
observers and the public alike forget about the vital role the press plays for the protection
of democracy and human rights.
Granted, dealing with the press in legal and political terms is often complicated.
Below are a few excuses that are commonly brought up in discussions o f press freedom
and its special status in democracy. Some of them will be addressed in later chapters in
more detail, but they should nonetheless be featured here for the simple reason that they
are so often brought up. This is not an argument to ignore any of these concerns, but at
the same time we should not let them drown out the reasons for giving this ‘great bulwark
of liberty’ its rightful place in the context of human rights.
Problems for press freedom usually start with definitions. A lot of the First
Amendment literature, and many of the Supreme Court rulings, are concerned with the
difficulty of defining the term “the press.” This is further complicated by considerations
of what the Founding Fathers meant by the term and the fact that the media landscape has
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drastically changed since the creation of the Bill of Rights and even since the drafting of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Things become even trickier when
considering the fact that these days “the press” has practically disappeared in common
usage. Instead, it has been replaced by “media” to be all-inclusive and nondiscriminatory, when in fact some discrimination in this context might be rather helpful.
By trying to protect any and all media, the unique functions of the press outlined
above are diluted and downplayed. Most movies do not serve a political oversight
purpose. Nor do dance competition shows on television, or food blogs, for instance. The
key is to differentiate between the all-encompassing media and the press that is engaged
in newsgathering activities, provides government oversight and facilitates the democratic
dialogue. This is not to say that food bloggers and screen-writers have no right to
freedom of speech. Of course they do. But their rights are guaranteed by the right to
freedom of expression, whereas the special political functions of the press are rarely
recognized within the human rights debate and even more rarely legally protected.
Jay Rosen points out another problem with switching from “the press” to “the
media:”
Today we say media instead of “the press.” We need to keep the press from being
absorbed into The Media. This means keeping the word press, which is
antiquated. But included under its modem umbrella should be all who do the
serious work in journalism, regardless of what technology they use. [...] It has a
powerful social history and political legend attached.71
Others have argued that it is possible to determine who and what constitutes being
part of the press and thus deserves protection that goes beyond the general free speech

71Jay Rosen, "PressThink: An Introduction,"
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rights.72 Every day the government and other institutions decide who the press is and who
is not when they hand out press passes, assign seats at press conferences or even on press
planes. 73 Arguing that it is difficult to define the press, should not be an excuse for not
treating it as the important right that it is.
Furthermore, if press freedom is recognized as a distinct human right, the fact that
media systems differ dramatically from one country to the next, even within the West,
will not pose any more obstacles to addressing press freedom more uniformly at the
international level. In this case it will not matter if the press in Britain and France
developed differently, or if they one system is more market oriented in one country and
government subsidized in another. As long as the press is recognized for playing these
important structural roles and protected for it, other differences will become less o f an
obstacle of framing press freedom as a human right.
Another reason that is often brought up in negative reference to the media is their
status as an economic actor. At the international level global media corporations are often
seen within the debate of Western cultural and economic dominance and exploitation of
other countries. The next chapter will address this question in more detail. Suffice it to
say at this point that by focusing on the media’s economic status and the resulting
drawbacks their political and social functions are often overlooked.
Another concern is that many people think of the press as an elite club, rubbing
shoulders with political insiders instead of being in touch with the needs of the public.
Related to this is Anthony Lewis’ argument that it makes people apprehensive to talk
about the press as a political institution or watchdog, because referring to it as such

72 West (2011).
73 Ibid., 1062.

53

invokes the notion of outside checks.74 The question that arises then is who is supposed to
check the press?
This is certainly a valid concern, but it is also a somewhat hypocritical question. It
seems to put a lot more confidence in the other branches o f government to check each
other although they have vastly more capabilities to affect the lives of its citizens in
harmful ways than the press does. While presidents or members of parliament can abuse
their access to law enforcement and legislation, the press has no such power. It can fail in
its task of informing the citizenry adequately, as in the case of the 2003 Iraq War when
the U.S. press neglected to ask policymakers the right questions on behalf of the public.
Overall, however, the benefits of a free press far outweigh the disadvantages.
Without it, democracy would be unthinkable because it is the only way to ensure that the
government ultimately remains responsive to the people, the sovereign. The final arbiter
is the public and as such, if the public does not want a free press, there will not be one.75
The first step on the way to secure the birth right to a free press for everyone, therefore, is
to stop focusing on the alleged dangers of a free press, and instead concentrate on the
good it brings.

Conclusion

Political theorists and journalists alike have long praised press freedom for its
special democratic role. However, the distinction between press freedom and freedom of
expression has been underdeveloped particularly in the context of human rights. Such a

74 Lewis (1991).
75 Altschull (1990) 111-2.
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distinction is necessary, though, as it shows that the functions of the free press - as
political institution, provider of information and context, and as a social necessity - reach
much farther than the individual right to freedom of expression or the right to know.
The central difference to freedom of expression is the fact that the press possesses
power that it draws from its mass audience and its resulting status as the people’s
surrogate. Its role is to protect the masses from the age-old reality that power corrupts and
the conviction that those in charge of running the government consequently require an
outside checking mechanism that holds them accountable to the public whose interests
they are representing.
However, the human rights community tends to neglect this vital function o f the
press, while governments from Beijing to Washington know how to conveniently draw
the lines between the broader but not necessarily political concept of free speech and the
notion of a free press whose role it is to exercise political oversight. But as press freedom
is increasingly coming under threat worldwide, it is time for the human rights community
to rethink its current treatment of the press and re-instate it as a fundamental ingredient to
securing political and civil rights, and start promoting it as the guardian of the central
goal of the human rights movement of making the people the masters of their own
governments.

CHAPTER 3
UNESCO, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM DAY AND BEYOND: THE
MARGINAL PLACE OF PRESS FREEDOM AT THE UN

Introduction

As argued in detail in the previous chapter, promoting and protecting a free press
also protects and promotes a political institution that acts as the people’s surrogate and
provides a government oversight function. In this role press freedom differs from
freedom of expression as the latter lacks the power aspect of the press that it draws from
its political functions and its mass audience. As a consequence of its power and oversight
role, the press is the key to promoting and protecting human rights, the very notion of
which rests on the curtailment and accountability of government. Therefore, it is not just
worrisome that press freedom reports of press freedom violations have been worsening
across the world every year, but also that press freedom is largely absent from the human
rights discourse. The introductory chapter included evidence of the absence of press
freedom in the academic literature on human rights. This chapter will demonstrate that
the concept of press freedom is also neglected in the wider context of the human rights
debate.
In order to do so, this chapter studies in detail the treatment of press freedom at
the United Nations over the past ten years. The UN is the central setting for establishing
and upholding international norms on human rights. Because it is an inclusive
organization it can form internationally agreed norms that are politically legitimate. In
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addition to that, the UN monitors states’ commitments and adherence to these norms,
while also carrying the moral authority to admonish those that engage in norm violations.
Consequently, the UN is the logical place to investigate how states treat press freedom in
the context of human rights and international relations and to what extent, if any, press
freedom has reached the status of accepted international norm.
The UN is also the most logical place for a case study on the international
treatment of press freedom, since there is no other institution with comparable reach and
political power that works on behalf of freedom of the press. A few international NGOs
champion press freedom, and the European Union and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe have offices dedicated to the promotion and protection of media
and press freedom. Yet, these do not have the global, universal reach of the UN or
enough political influence or even resources to elevate press freedom to a human rights
priority internationally. While the UN in theory has the means to make press freedom a
top agenda item for the international human rights community, the evidence presented in
this chapter clearly shows that this is not the case.
Of course, proving a negative, in this case the absence or neglect o f press freedom
in the human rights debate, is never an easy endeavor, especially since the absence of
evidence does not necessarily constitute evidence of absence. It is further complicated by
the fact that there is no template to rank the level of UN attention paid to the different
human rights. But since press freedom has been linked philosophically to the core of
democracy and has been established as a vital civil and political right in the U.S. and
other countries’ bill of rights, one can reasonably expect there to be a discussion o f press
freedom within the context of human rights. Furthermore, this chapter does not argue that
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there is a total absence of press freedom at the UN - UNESCO’s World Press Freedom
Day is an annual occasion to highlight the importance of press freedom and remind
people of its continued abuse after all. This makes it even more difficult to make the case
that press freedom is neglected in the context of human rights, although it is an important
case to make.
While UNESCO’s work on press freedom is important, it is not enough. Other
rights have their own conventions, like the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) or the Convention Against Torture. They also
have committees, working groups and regular conferences exclusively dedicated to this
right, feature as regular agenda items at UN human rights bodies, and are thus much more
visible in the human rights debate than press freedom. The ‘right on which all other rights
depend,’ as it is historically and philosophically known, should occupy a much more
prominent role in the human rights hierarchy as well.
In order to make the case that press freedom is neglected, this chapter follows the
subsequent outline. First, an examination o f the legally binding human rights instruments
and declarations on the subject is presented. As a key to securing democracy and human
rights, press freedom should be well established and protected in this regard. As this
chapter shows, however, this is not the case. Second, the chapter contains an analysis of
the work of the various UN human rights bodies as it pertains to the protection and
promotion of press freedom. The results here are mixed. While the Human Rights
Committee and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression have made some progress in their efforts to support
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press freedom, the topic is largely marginalized in the work of the Human Rights
Council. If it is addressed, it is in the context of journalist safety.
Third, the chapter provides details on the work o f UNESCO, the UN organ where
most work on press freedom is done. This includes both more normative, standard-setting
efforts like the UN Plan of Action on the Safety o f Journalists and the Issue of Impunity
or promoting press freedom through the annual World Press Freedom Day activities, and
more practical, on-the-ground initiatives in media development programs facilitated by
the International Programme for the Development of Communication. Finally, the
chapter concludes with a section detailing the amount and content o f press freedom
references in speeches delivered by high-ranking UN officials in order to determine
whether press freedom is of high priority to them and, by extension, the wider human
rights debate.

The UN Human Rights Structure

Before moving on to the press freedom case, this section gives a brief overview of
the UN human rights framework. The UN human rights structure is based on the UN
Charter, the International Bill of Human Rights, other legally binding treaties and various
non-binding declarations and documents. Work on human rights is done by many UN
bodies and agencies, committees, working groups, rapporteurs and other experts, but at
the center of these is the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
The High Commissioner for Human Rights administers the human rights activities of the
UN and reports to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.
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The principal UN human rights organ is the Human Rights Council. It was
established in 2006 with the mandate to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms. The Council is made up o f representatives from 47 states, elected
based on equitable geographical distribution for a renewable three-year term. Its
predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, had been established in 1946 under the
UN Charter, but had become discredited over the years, due to the fact that many o f its
member countries were known human rights violators themselves. As a result, the
Commission was not so much a tool to address real human rights concerns, but was used
to block serious inquiry and became the setting for political criticism and attacks, most
often focused on Israel.
Whether the Human Rights Council will suffer a similar fate remains to be seen,
although the recent election of known human rights violators China, Saudi Arabia and
Russia to the Council does not inspire much confidence that it will not. Nonetheless, the
establishment of the Human Rights Council in 2006 serves well as a starting point for this
case study on the treatment of press freedom at the UN, due to its predecessor’s image as
something of a farce. Furthermore, the Council was also equipped with a new feature: the
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which reviews the human rights records of all 192 UN
member states once every four years, thus giving the Council more monitoring power
than its predecessor. The Council is also supported by the so-called Advisory Committee,
a form of think tank made up of 18 members providing expertise and advice on human
rights issues, and manages the improved Complaint Procedure, through which individuals
and organizations can bring human rights violations to the attention of the Council.1

1 OHCHR, "Background Information on the Human Rights Council,"
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx.
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The UN human rights system also features ten human rights treaty bodies that
monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties. Since there is no
explicit treaty on press freedom, the most relevant of those is the Human Rights
Committee, which monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
Special rapporteurs form another pillar o f the UN human rights structure. These
rapporteurs are independent experts and serve on the front lines of protecting and
promoting human rights. There are country-specific and thematic rapporteurs. They
prepare reports on their country or issue to the Human Rights Council and the General
Assembly. They collaborate with NGOs, governments and work in the field to gather the
necessary information to report on the status of their respective responsibility. The issue
of press freedom falls under the umbrella of freedom of opinion and expression, which is
currently headed by Special Rapporteur Frank LaRue and will be addressed in more
detail near the end of the chapter. First, however, the analysis will turn to the human
rights instruments and declarations on freedom o f the press.

Human Rights Instruments and Declarations

The human rights regime with regard to press freedom is weak. There are no
legally binding treaties or conventions that protect freedom o f the press. Article 19 o f the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is often cited as the legal instrument
protecting press freedom. However, the Covenant does not specifically address press
freedom:
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Article 19:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Unlike many national constitutions, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not mention the press. Instead, the focus is on the individual right of
freedom of expression. As demonstrated in chapter 2, however, press freedom and
freedom of expression cannot simply be equated. They are closely intertwined and both
fall within the broader category of communication rights, but they are nonetheless
differing concepts. While a free press meets a political role as government watchdog and
representative of the public will, freedom of expression simply guarantees that every
individual can freely express himself or herself, which does not necessarily constitute a
political act.
While press freedom has been ignored in any legally binding sense, it has
garnered some attention from UNESCO, the UN body with the mandate to ‘promote the
free flow of ideas by word and image.’ On 28 November 1978, UNESCO’s General
Conference adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the
Contribution

o f the

Mass

Media

to

Strengthening Peace

and International

Understanding, to the Promotion o f Human Rights and to Countering Racialism,
apartheid and incitement to war, or, in short, the Mass Media Declaration. As the title
indicates, this declaration treats the press, and the media more generally, as a tool for
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advancing certain goals rather than framing the importance of the press in a structural
sense. While the declaration highlights the important contribution the media can make in
strengthening peace and international understanding, it also points out the restrictions of
the current media landscape and the responsibilities that come with such opportunities for
playing a key role in fostering peace. This compromise was a direct result of Cold War
politics and the divisive New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)
debate, which, according to observers, rendered the declaration so ambivalent and
inconsistent that it became pointless. And since it is a mere declaration, it does not
demand any binding commitments from states.
The same applies to the series of declarations that resulted from various regional
UNESCO workshops on promoting independent and pluralistic media in the 1990s and
were later endorsed by the General Conference. The Declaration of Windhoek, focused
on promoting independent and pluralistic media in Africa, made the start in 1991,
followed by similar declarations on media development in Asia (Alma Ata, 1992), Latin
America and the Caribbean (Santiago, 1994), and the Arab states (Sana’a, 1996). These
declarations have been influential in establishing regional norms on press freedom and
have helped media development efforts.
They also acknowledge that “freedom of the press is a key and indivisible part of
freedom of expression,” which in turn is “the cornerstone of our democracies.”3
However, these declarations were initiated in the early 1990s, when communism had
collapsed and Western liberalism was at a peak. The Declaration of Sana’a even
recognized and welcomed “the world-wide trend towards democracy, freedom of
2 Thomas L. McPhail, Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, a n d Trends (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2010). 71.
3 UNESCO, "Declaration o f Santiago," (May 6, 1994).
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expression and press freedom” and urged “all Arab states to participate in this historic
process.” Since then, however, such optimism over the spread of democracy has subsided
and the topic of press freedom has failed to work its way up the ranks of the human rights
debate. Press freedom in the UN forum is still largely confined to discussions and
initiatives by UNESCO.
Press freedom, or freedom of expression for that matter, never warranted the
creation of specialized working groups in other UN bodies that other human rights issues
like freedom from torture and arbitrary detention,

enforced and involuntary

disappearances, the rights of the child, the rights of women, or the right to development
enjoy. In terms of UN conferences and summits, press freedom is also neglected. Since
the World Summit on the Information Society in 2003 and 2005 there has been no other
conference or summit in this field, and even the Summit was not about press freedom but
focused on the potential of new information and communication technology for human
development.
In light of the lack of legally binding instruments that promote and protect press
freedom, one needs to look at how often and in what context press freedom is addressed
in various UN forums in order to evaluate whether press freedom is indeed absent from
or neglected in the wider debate.
A search of the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET)
shows that the subject ‘freedom of the press’ only returns 927 results.4 Freedom of
expression, by comparison, is cited 2,147 times and women’s rights 5,596 times. A

4 UNBISNET, "UNBISNET Subject Search: Freedom o f the Press," Dag Hammarskjold Library,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=lP80HN0982440.48981&menu=search&aspect=alpha
&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=bib&ri=9&source=~%21horizon&index=SUBJECT&ternT=fTeedoni+
of+the+press&x=-478&y=-129&aspect=alpha.
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search for ‘freedom of the press’ in the full-text Official Document System of the UN
returns 2,450 results. However, nearly 800 of these are documents of NGOs reporting
press freedom abuses to various UN bodies. Furthermore, another 350 are related to
UNESCO’s annual World Press Freedom Day.
Freedom of expression fares even worse than press freedom in the Official
Document Search, with 1,160 results, while ‘freedom of information’ returns roughly the
same hits as press freedom with 2,400 results. Other civil and political rights return
roughly the same results. For example, ‘freedom of assembly’ shows up 2,430 times,
although ‘freedom of religion’ seems to have more visibility with 3,630 times. Other
rights also count more mentions, like the ‘right to food’ with 3,020 times and the ‘right to
education’ with 4,300 results.
Overall, this does not indicate that the UN is preoccupied with promoting press
freedom in a substantial manner. It merely shows that the UN is concerned with
publicizing its World Press Freedom Day once a year and that NGOs attempt to bring
some press freedom violations to the UN’s attention. It also suggests that civil and
political rights, particularly those in the area of communication and expression, receive
less attention than other, less controversial rights.

UN Human Rights Bodies

A closer look at the UN human rights bodies, under the umbrella of the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, also shows that the discourse on press
freedom is surprisingly limited.
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Human Rights Council

A search of all Human Rights Council resolutions from its regular sessions since
its inception in 2006 shows that press freedom is very rarely a topic of conversation. In
23 sessions, only two resolutions related to press freedom were adopted. These, however,
do not directly address the issue of press freedom, but concern the safety of journalists. In
terms of overall mentions of press freedom or freedom of the press in the annual reports
of the Human Rights Council, the results are equally dismaying. Press freedom comes up
a total of four times in these reports that contain resolutions, decisions and president’s
statements of the Council’s sessions since 2006.
Freedom of expression only fares somewhat better, with one dedicated resolution
from 2009, one resolution on the role of “freedom of opinion and expression in women’s
empowerment” adopted earlier in 2013, and two more resolutions that pertain to the
renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression. On the other hand, freedom of religion is on the agenda periodically with 13
resolutions in total, as is the right to freedom of assembly with 5 resolutions. The right to
food and the issue of women’s rights are very prominent as well, counting 10 and 13
resolutions respectively since 2006. These numbers show that press freedom is a
marginal issue in the Human Rights Council debates.
One topic that did attract some attention in recent years is the safety of journalists.
Although it should not be equated with addressing the issue of press freedom, the
discussions surrounding the safety of journalists pick up on the importance o f media
workers and the press. While the safety of journalists is an important part of protecting
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press freedom, saving journalists from being killed or thrown in jail does not constitute
the overall solution to guaranteeing everyone the right to a free press, whether in times of
crisis or peace. It is a step in the right direction to acknowledge the political significance
of press freedom, although it should be remembered that the Human Rights Council so
far has primarily addressed the issue of journalist safety from a humanitarian point of
view and in the context of protecting journalists in crisis and conflict situations.
Furthermore, the resolution agreed upon in the Council’s 13th session on the protection of
journalists in situations of armed conflict simply proposes the development of a panel
discussion on the topic.
The first time the issue of journalist safety in conflict situations came up at a high
priority meeting at the UN was in 2006. France and Greece joined forces to sponsor
Security Council resolution 1738, which was adopted unanimously and which “condemns
intentional attacks against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel, as
such, in situations of armed conflict, and calls upon all parties to put an end to such
practices.”5 The resolution also states that journalists and other media workers on
professional mission in areas of armed conflict should be considered civilian and are thus
protected under the same Geneva Convention statutes that apply to other civilians in
conflict situations. The issue seems to have resurfaced in various UN human rights
forums in 2010 due to an increased trend in violence and discrimination against
journalists.
Following the 2010 resolution, the UN has taken even more action on the issue:
UNESCO initiated the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of
Impunity and the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists
5 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1736," (2006), 2.
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in which it “[c]ondemns in the strongest terms all attacks and violence against journalists,
such as torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention, as
well as intimidation and harassment.”6 It should be stressed, however, that this document,
too, focuses on journalist safety in armed conflicts, as it:
Calls on all parties to armed conflict to respect their obligations under
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including their
obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where
applicable, the Additional Protocols thereto of 8 June 1977, the provisions of
which extend protection to journalists in situations of armed conflict, and to
allow, within the framework of applicable rules and procedures, media access and
coverage, as appropriate, in situations of international and non-intemational
armed conflict;
As mentioned previously, it seems that the increased focus on the safety of
journalists is a result of a rising trend in killings of and attacks on journalists in recent
years, particularly in the countries swept up in the Arab Spring revolts and their
aftermath.8 In this context, it should also be noted, however, that representatives of
several of the deadliest countries for journalists according to reports by the Committee to
Protect Journalists are serving currently on the Human Rights Council. For example, the
Philippines is the second most deadly country for journalists, Pakistan ranks fifth and
India ninth.9 This highlights the difficulties of reconciling state interests with the
promotion of human rights.
A look at the Universal Periodic Review documentation paints a similar picture.
Since press freedom is under attack worldwide, UN human rights bodies like the special
rapporteurs and NGOs do point out such violations in many countries as part o f the

6 United Nations Human Rights Council, "Safety o f Journalists (A/HRC/RES/21/12)," (2012), para. 5.
7 Ibid., para. 6.
8 Resolution A/HRC/RES/21/12 cites concerns over “increased attacks against and killings o f journalists
and media workers” as a reason to call for improved protection o f journalists.
9 Committee to Protect Journalists, "1040 Journalists Killed since 1992," http://cpj.org/killed/.
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review process. Western states also usually raise questions about how the country under
review plans to remedy these shortcomings in the areas of free speech and freedom of the
press and make recommendations for improving the situation. However, in many cases
the government in question insists that press freedom is guaranteed in its country or, in
the case of Russia, flat-out rejects such UN recommendations. It is clear that while the
UPR process is a useful monitoring exercise and helps raise awareness of human rights
violations in all countries, it is not an effective tool for effecting change in government
behavior. The government has the last word and all the UN human rights bodies, NGOs
and other stakeholders can do, is wait for the next review in four years and hope for an
improvement in the meantime.

Human Rights Committee

In addition to overseeing state party compliance with the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and managing the inter-state and individual complaints
procedures, the Human Rights Committee also interprets the content of human rights
provisions and publishes them as so-called general comments.
Until 2011, the Human Rights Committee had published only one general
comment on Article 19. This comment from 1983 was brief and did not speak to press
freedom. In 1996, the issue of press freedom came up in General comment No. 25 on
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights granting the right of
every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs. The document states:
In order to ensure the full enjoyment of rights protected by article 25, the free
communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between
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citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free
press and other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or
restraint and to inform public opinion.10
An important step towards explicitly acknowledging the importance o f press
freedom in the legal context was thus taken. But it took 15 more years until the
Committee focused on Article 19 specifically and delivered a much more detailed
interpretation of the article in General comment No. 34, which addresses the relationship
between press freedom and freedom of expression. It states that:
A free, uncensored and unhindered press or other media is essential in any society
to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of other Covenant
rights. It constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic society."28 The
Covenant embraces a right whereby the media may receive information on the
basis of which it can carry out its function."29 The free communication of
information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens,
candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and
other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and
to inform public opinion."30 The public also has a corresponding right to receive
media output.11
The general comments are viewed as general statements of law that communicate
the Committee’s conceptual understanding of a particular provision, in this case Article
19, aimed at adapting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to modem
circumstances.12 Consequently, the Committee’s interpretation of press freedom as an
essential factor for safeguarding freedom of expression, democracy and human rights, is a
significant development in elevating press freedom to a more central position not only in
the context of Article 19, but also in the wider human rights debate. It also suggests a step
forward in terms of normative standard setting in disentangling press freedom from

10 Human Rights Committee, "General Comment No. 25," (CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.7, August 27, 1996),
para. 25.
11 Human Rights Committee, "General Comment No. 34," (CCPR7C/GC/34, September 12, 2011), para. 13.
12 OHCHR, "Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1),"
(Geneva: OHCHR, 2005), 24.
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freedom of expression, even if the Human Rights Committee lacks effective enforcement
mechanisms that ensure that states adhere to the provisions of the Covenant and the
Committee’s interpretations thereof.

Human Rights Advisory Committee

Despite efforts by the Human Rights Committee in framing press freedom as a
central component of democracy and human rights, other bodies have not followed this
trend. It is indicative of press freedom’s neglect in the academic and activist community
that the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, whose task it is to provide the
Council with expertise in the form of studies and research-based advice and recommend
further research proposals, also does not seem to consider press freedom as a high
priority.13 The issues the Advisory Committee has covered since its inception in 2008 do
not feature press freedom, freedom of expression, or any other civil and political rights.
Instead, their work focuses on issues like the right to food, the right to peace,
international cooperation on human rights, and missing persons. All of these are
important causes, of course, but none of them fall under the category of political or civil
rights. This failure of the Advisory Committee to advance civil and political rights
highlights the reluctance of the Human Rights Council to promote rights that could
possibly threaten state power.

13 OHCHR, "Background Information on the Advisory Committee,"
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/AboutAC.aspx.
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Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression

The mandate for the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection o f the
right to freedom of opinion and expression was established in 1993. His primary job is to
monitor violations of the right to freedom o f opinion and expression and make
recommendations on ways and means to improve the promotion and protection o f the
right “in all its manifestations.” 14
Overall, the UN special rapporteurs and their work are well perceived within the
human rights community. Kofi Annan called them the “crown jewels” of the UN human
rights machinery.15 Similarly, Louise Arbour, the then UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, called the individual special rapporteurs “the frontline human rights
troops.”16 Others have argued that the special rapporteurs are not just crucial due to their
monitoring function, but also through standard setting, with which “they have
significantly influenced

the

elaboration,

interpretation,

and

implementation

of

international human rights law.”17
But when it comes to press freedom, the Special Rapporteur has not lived up to
this praise. For example, the Rapporteur’s website highlights plenty of “issues in focus”
like access to information and censorship, but there is not one specifically dedicated to

14 OHCHR, "Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection o f the Right to Freedom o f Opinion and
Expression," http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ISSUES/FREEDOMOPINION/Pages/OpinionIndex.aspx.
15 "Annan Calls on Human Rights Council to Strive for Unity, Avoid Familiar Fault Lines," UN News
Cen?re(November 29, 2006), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20770#.Unl73VCmgpg.
16 United Nations, "Statement by High Commissioner for Human Rights to Last M eeting o f Commission on
Human Rights," (March 27,2006).
17 Surya P. Subedi, "Protection o f Human Rights through the Mechanism o f UN Special Rapporteurs,"
Human Rights Quarterly 33, no. 1 (February 2011): 204.
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press freedom.18 A survey of the rapporteur’s annual reports since 2003 also shows that
press freedom does not seem to be of high priority.19 The latest one from 2013 does not
even mention press freedom. Most previous ones mention it in passing and often it comes
up due to the rapporteur reporting about his annual participation in World Press Freedom
Day events. Since the primary role of the Special Rapporteur is to monitor press freedom
violations, the annually submitted list of country cases often features press freedom
violations by various countries. Three annual reports also discuss the issue of safety of
journalists.20
In 2010, Special Rapporteur Frank LaRue issued a statement of the ten key
challenges to freedom of expression in the next decade. While press freedom is not
addressed specifically, the list indirectly speaks to several issues that are closely related
to press freedom, particularly government control over the media, which tops LaRue’s
list.21
These findings with regard to the Special Rapporteur’s work on press freedom
indicate two things: First, that clear distinctions between the concepts of press freedom
and freedom of expression are lacking even in communications by experts in the field.
18 "Freedom o f Opinion and Expression - Issues in focus," United Nations Office o f the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/Issues.aspx.
19 Reports are available from OHCHR, "Freedom o f Opinion and Expression - Annual Reports,"
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/Annual.aspx.
20 Human Rights Council, "Report o f the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection o f the Right
to Freedom o f Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue," (A/HRC/20/17: UN General Assembly June 4,
2012). Human Rights Council, "Report o f the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection o f the
Right to Freedom o f Opinion and Expression, Mr. Frank La Rue," (A/HRC/14/23: UN General Assembly,
April 20,2010). Human Rights Council, "Promotion and Protection o f All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development," (A/HRC/7/14: UN General
Assembly, February 28, 2008). Commission on Human Rights, "Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Question o f Freedom o f Expression," (E/CN.4/2005/64: UN Economic and Social Council, December 17,
2004). Although the latter two only mention it once.
21 Human Rights Council, "Report o f the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection o f the Right
to Freedom o f Opinion and Expression: Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to
Freedom o f Expression in the Next Decade," (A/HRC/14/23/Add.2: UN General Assembly, March 25,
2010 ).
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And second, that the importance of the press for securing human rights and freedom of
expression is implied, rather than outright stated, much like the Human Rights
Committee’s general comment 34 leads us to conclude.
So, while the rapporteur has been active in monitoring and promoting the right of
freedom of expression and developed numerous sub-categories, press freedom by itself is
very rarely a talking point in this forum. Furthermore, in recent years, there have even
been attempts to limit the mandate of the rapporteur. In 2008, for example, China and
Russia joined force with the Organization of the Islamic Conference to amend the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on freedom o f expression and opinion requiring him
not just to report on infringements of the right by governments, but also report instances
of “abuse” of the right to freedom o f expression as an act of racial or religious
discrimination. 22 This initiative was part of an ongoing campaign started in 1999 by the
•

•

*

Organization of the Islamic Conference to have ‘defamation of religion’ recognized
internationally as a crime.23 This trend has become more threatening to freedom of
expression since Russia and even atheist countries like China, Cuba and Vietnam joined
this call for more respect for religion. What is more, they are now linking concerns over
blasphemy with attempts to promote “traditional values” at the UN, thus signaling
opposition to Western values and civil and political liberties.24 In light of these worrying
developments, one has to wonder not just about the effectiveness of the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion, but also about the influence o f the
West on the UN human rights agenda in the future.
22 Article 19, "UN Human Rights Council Undermines Freedom o f Expression," (March 31, 2008),
http://www.articlel9.org/data/files/pdfs/press/hrc-resolution-passed.pdf.
23 Reporters Without Borders, Blasphemy: Information Sacrificed on Altar o f Religion, (December 2013),
http://rsf.org/religions/pdf/EN_RAPPORT_BLASPHEME BD.pdf. 21.
24 Ibid.
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UNESCO

As the UN organ mandated to protect freedom of expression, UNESCO is the
central UN forum for issues of free speech, freedom of information and freedom o f the
press, but even here press freedom seems to be nothing but a marginal issue. The press
freedom section of the UNESCO website is the most underdeveloped section o f the
organization’s online presence. While the Freedom of Information section features
resources, publications and lists o f initiatives, the press freedom section simply lists
World Press Freedom Day, “the establishment of an advisory group on press freedom
which includes media professionals from all parts o f the world,” and “the establishment
in 1997 of the UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize” as “major
UNESCO activities” in the field of promoting press freedom.25 Although World Press
Freedom Day, which falls on May 3 and was created in 1993 to mark the anniversary of
the Declaration of Windhoek, is the UN’s flagship initiative on the subject o f press
freedom, UNESCO’s website and other press freedom activities hardly indicate that press
freedom is a high priority for UNESCO.
A look at UNESCO’s budget and strategic plan confirms that press freedom is not
a central issue for the organization. The 2008-2013 strategic plan mentions press freedom
only three times, all under broader concerns for freedom o f expression. Press freedom
also falls under the fifth out of UNESCO’s five overarching objectives,26 and under

25 UNESCO, "Press Freedom," http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/freedomof-expression/press-ffeedom/.
26 Overarching Objective 5 is “Building inclusive knowledge societies through information and
communication.” UNESCO, "34 C/4 Medium-Term Strategy for 2008-2013," (2008), 29.
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Strategic Programme Objective 13 out of 14 in total.27 Table 1 shows that of UNESCO’s
five major programs only Social & Human Sciences receives less funds than
Communication & Information, under which the promotion o f press freedom falls.

2006-7
(33C/5)

610

108

56

31

51

33

2008-9
(34C/5)

631

108

57

29

51

32

2010-11
(35C/5)

653

119

59

30

54

33

2012-13
(36C/5)

653

115

59

29

52

32

Table 1. UNESCO budget by Major Programme.28

Thus, the Communication & Information sector qualifies as one of the smallest
UNESCO sections with sparse resources and staff. It counts some 80 staff in its
headquarters and field offices, while the Education sector by comparison employs
approximately 400 staff and the National Sciences sector about 150.
A 2010 UN evaluation report of UNESCO’s contribution to Strategic Programme
Objectives (SPO) 12 and 13: “Enhancing universal access to information and knowledge”
and “Fostering pluralistic free and independent media and infostructures” found that the
Communication & Information sector was indeed spread too thinly as the vast range o f its
activities by themes shows. This situation, the report concluded, was exacerbated by the

27 Ibid.
28 Data compiled from biannual UNESCO budgets, available from UNESCO, "Programme and Budget,"
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/bureau-of-strategic-planning/resources/programme-and-budget-c5/.
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circumstance that the sector was “also probably the most complex and diverse in its range
of responsibilities.”

")Q

Since publication of the report, the sector has consolidated its organizational
structure somewhat and is now broken down into the Division of Freedom of Expression
and Media Development and the Knowledge Society Division.30 Still, the tasks o f the
Communication & Information sector start with access for people with disabilities,
include all kinds of freedom of expression and media development activities as well as
Internet governance, linguistic diversity and documentary heritage initiatives, and end
with cross-cutting priorities like post-conflict and disaster responses, gender and media
issues.31
In some of these areas, most notably in media development, the Communication
& Information sector has been rather successful. One o f the main findings o f the
evaluation report states that the sector had made significant progress in achieving
enhancement of the capacities and competencies of media and information professionals.
It does so by developing guidelines and toolkits like editorial guidelines, which support
the work of media professionals; by training media professionals in areas such as
investigative journalism, information management and supporting training facilities; and
creating and supporting regional and national networks of media professionals.32
The objective of integrating “communication and information policies conforming
with the principles of press freedom, independent and pluralistic media and contributing
29 UN Office o f Internal Oversight Services, "Evaluation o f UNESCO’s Contribution to Strategic
Programme Objectives 12 and 13: “Enhancing Universal Access to Information and Knowledge” and
“Fostering Pluralistic, Free and Independent Media and Infostructures”," (Geneva: United Nations, 2010),
35.
30 UNESCO, "About Us," http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/about-us/.
31 UNESCO, "Communication and Information: Themes," http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communicationand-information/themes/.
32 UN Office o f Internal Oversight Services (2010) 20.
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to the development of infostructures adopted by Member States” also received good
marks due to the sector’s development and use of the Media Development Indicators and
its efforts in supporting legislation and policies in the field of media regulation and
literacy.33 The positive evaluations with regard to these two objectives are due to the fact
that the Communication & Information sector is also in charge of the International
Programme for the Development of Communication.
The Programme was established by UNESCO in 1980 as a consequence o f the
New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate, which will be
discussed in more detail in chapter 4. Its overall objective is to promote freedom of
expression and media pluralism by supporting media development projects in developing
countries. According to its website, it “is the only multilateral forum in the UN system
designed to mobilize the international community to discuss and promote media
development in developing countries.”34
Evaluations

of the

International

Programme

for the

Development

of

Communication have repeatedly indicated that the program is very effective in directing
support to grassroots media organizations and assisting with training and preparation
needs of media professionals, thus fostering media professionalization and advancing
community media.35 Even though the program secretariat falls within the organizational
structure of the Communication & Information sector, the budget for its projects comes
from an external funding pool to which 59 countries have contributed approximately a

33 Ibid., 20-1.
34 UNESCO, "About IPDC,” http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-andinformation/intergovemmental-programmes/ipdc/about-ipdc/.
35 UN Office o f Internal Oversight Services (2010) 25.
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little over 100 million US dollars over the last 30 years.36 This leads to some confusion
about the activities of UNESCO and the International Programme for the Development of
Communication, as themes and tasks overlap in many cases.
The evaluation report also identified a basic dilemma of the Communication &
Information sector, namely that on the one hand it “lacks funding for activities to
implement and embed policy and standards,” but on the other hand, it is at an advantage
when it comes to media development initiatives because of the funds and resources o f the
International Programme for the Development of Communication.37 In this context, there
is another factor that contributes to the difficulties of the Communication & Information
sector’s efforts in promoting and achieving its tasks, the promotion of press freedom
among them. As the report points out, “evidence from field missions suggests that
whereas education, health and climate change are clearly understood by other UN
agencies, they generally remain confused about UNESCO’s to the Communication &
Information priorities and approach.”38 This is hardly surprising, considering the broad
range of its tasks, which makes it difficult to present a coherent sector.
The example of press freedom underlines this circumstance. On the one hand, the
Communication & Information website claims to promote “freedom of the press as a
basic human right”, but then lacks any further links to resources or lists of activities other
than World Press Freedom Day and the World Press Freedom Prize.39 If there is already
“considerable confusion, over exactly what [Communication & Information] is all about,
among external stakeholders, staff in UNESCO and other UN agencies,” it can hardly
36 UNESCO, "IPDC - Funding," http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-andinformation/intergovemmental-programmes/ipdc/funding/.
37 UN Office o f Internal Oversight Services (2010) 22.
38 Ibid., 29.
39 UNESCO, "Press Freedom".
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come as a surprise that press freedom as one of the sector’s sub-themes also lacks
coherence in terms of where it belongs in the bigger debate over communication rights
such as freedom of expression and the broader human rights framework.40
What becomes apparent from UNESCO’s work in the field of freedom of
expression and press freedom is that it is better at downstream activities that implement
projects at the grassroots level, particularly in the area of media development. When it
comes to upstream activities and promoting press freedom in the context of international
norms, however, its efforts lack clarity. Some observers blame the UNESCO constitution
for this state of affairs. Since its constitution frames the media primarily as a tool with
which the organization should work to contribute to peace and security, it is difficult for
UNESCO to promote press freedom as distinct human right. What is more, the UNESCO
mandate is kept vague in that the organization shall “promote the free flow of ideas by
word and image.” Clearly, though, the free flow of ideas is not the same as freedom of
the press with its intrinsic political function. And as the next chapter outlines, the phrase
has been interpreted differently by different countries and thus led to substantial
controversies over UNESCO, its mandate and concepts like freedom of information.
Given its limited mandate, funds and resources, however, UNESCO works within
its limits to monitor press freedom violations and promote improved press freedom best
practices by helping on the ground to develop media in developing countries.
Nonetheless, as a basic human right, as the UNESCO website calls it, press freedom is
lacking in upstream activities that widely promote it as a key to democracy and human
rights.

40 UN Office o f Internal Oversight Services (2010) 26.
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World Press Freedom Day is an effective measure in this regard. Yet, even this
initiative is subject to different themes every year, themes that also tend to conflate the
different debates within the broader field of communication rights. In 2013, the events
were focused on the safety of journalists. In 2012, the broader concept of media freedom
was the theme of the day. In 2010, the spotlight was on freedom of information. This is
not exactly helpful in shedding light on the already very murky subject of communication
rights. It also does not help efforts in promoting press freedom as the ‘right on which all
other rights depend.’

UN Speeches

The lack of upstream activities within the UN framework is demonstrated by a
survey of speeches on the subject of press freedom given by high-ranking UN officials
and representatives of country missions to the UN. Interestingly, the UN Bibliographic
Information System only returns four indexed speeches on the subject of press freedom
or freedom of the press, and all four of them date back to 1993.41 In comparison, freedom
of expression counts 41 entries.42 When looking for speeches on press freedom by highranking UN officials, the results are equally limited. A search of UN Secretary-General
41 UNBISNET, "UNBISNET Topic Search: Press Freedom," Dag Hammarskjold Library,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=UJ8359264R837.30422&menu=search&aspect=power
&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=speech&ri=&index=.SM&term=&matchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND
&x=9&y=l l&aspect=power&index=.SP&term=&matchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.SC&term=
&matchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.SS&term=press+freedom&matchoptbox=0%7C0&ultype=&
uloper=%3 D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3 D&ullimit=&sort=.
42 UNBISNET, "UNBISNET Topic Search: Freedom o f Expression," Dag Hammarskjold Library,
http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=UJ8359264R837.30422&menu=search&aspect=power
&npp=5 0&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=speech&ri=&index=. SM&term=&matchoptbox=0%7 C0&oper=AND
&x=5&y=12&aspect=power&index=.SP&term=&matchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.SC&term=
&matchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.SS&term=ffeedom+of+expression&matchoptbox=0%7C0&
ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=.
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Ban Ki-moon’s speeches for the keyword ‘press freedom’ or ‘freedom of expression’ on
the UN News Centre website returns six speeches. Five of these are his remarks on the
annual occasion of World Press Freedom Day and the other one was given at the
inauguration of the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation.43
As can be expected from the UNESCO Director-General, the current office
holder, Irina Bokova, has given significantly more speeches on the subject since she took
office in 2009 than the Secretary General. A total of 37 of her speeches contain
references to ‘press freedom’ or freedom of the press.’ However, 19 of these speeches
simply mention World Press Freedom Day or UNESCO’s Guillermo Cano World Press
Freedom Prize.44 Another eleven of Bokova’s speeches mention World Press Freedom
Day, but also contain other references to press freedom. However, these are just cursory
references in most cases.
Seven speeches refer to press freedom without any mention of World Press
Freedom Day, but the majority of these bring up the subject in the context of brief
descriptions of UNESCO’s objectives of supporting freedom of expression and of the
press. And even the handful of speeches that do contain more than a fleeting reference to
press freedom do so because they quote famous people like Albert Camus and John F.
Kennedy on the importance of press freedom in order to make the case that press freedom
should be respected. Overall, however, the lack of substantial discourse on the subject of
press freedom is further highlighted by the fact that the UNESDOC database indexes

43 UN News Centre, "Ban Ki-moon's Speeches,"
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_results.asp.
44 Speeches are searchable on UNESCO, "Director-General: Speeches,"
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/who-we-are/director-general/speeches/.
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more than twice as many speeches (84) by Bokova on the subject of freedom of
expression.
These discoveries based on the amount and content of speeches and remarks by
UN officials on press freedom represent evidence that coverage of the topic is limited and
usually coincides with World Press Freedom Day event announcements. They also show
that press freedom is not addressed in any normative or policy-oriented sense, but is
linked to practical matters of protecting journalists, for example, rather than being
discussed in the context of its place in the human rights framework. These speeches
might also be interpreted as taking the importance of press freedom for granted. What
many of the documents and speeches featuring press freedom have in common is the
implied understanding that press freedom and freedom of expression go hand in hand and
that press freedom is a necessary component for securing both freedom of expression and
democracy. It is difficult to know for sure, however, whether UN officials take the
importance for granted, which further highlights the necessity of a debate on press
freedom and what is meant by it.
Freedom of expression is for all, whether they are journalists or a regular citizen.
But as put forward in the previous chapter, press freedom and freedom of expression are
two distinct concepts. A free press is a political institution that ensures that the
government draws its authority from the will of the people. This endows the press with
both a government oversight role and political power derived from its mass audience and
the fact that it acts as a surrogate of the public. Given this situation, and the fact, that
individual freedom of expression does not fulfill the same function, one would expect
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press freedom to be of more prominence and more clearly distinguished from the right to
free speech. As the evidence in this chapter shows, however, this is not the case.

Conclusion

Press freedom is neglected in the human rights debate at the UN. Article 19 o f the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not specifically address the
right to a free press and the handful of press freedom related declarations from the 1970s
and 1990s are not legally binding. The Human Rights Committee has made some
progress in clarifying the relationship between the concepts of press freedom and
freedom of expression, but discussions on press freedom in the Human Rights Council
are limited. The safety of journalists has garnered considerable attention from the UN in
recent years, but even though this is a topic closely related to press freedom, the UN
focus is on the humanitarian aspects of protecting journalists as civilians in armed
conflict. Several other UN bodies are tasked with the monitoring of press freedom
violations and the promotion of press freedom issues. Most monitoring work is done by
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression, while UNESCO deals with a broad range of tasks relating to freedom of
expression and press freedom. Its efforts are most successful in the area of media
development in developing countries and by drawing attention to press freedom issues
once a year on World Press Freedom Day.
Despite these grassroots efforts, however, press freedom does not reach high
priority status within the human rights debate at the UN. Compared to other rights, press

freedom gamers little attention, a fate it shares with other civil and political rights. Yet,
even those receive more coverage, particularly the right to freedom of religion. And of
course, the press freedom debate seems to be subsumed by discussions on the right to
freedom of expression. As the previous chapter argued, however, this situation needs to
be remedied in order to highlight the special role that a free press plays in promoting and
maintaining democracy and human rights. The press is a political institution that draws
power from its mass audience and functions as a government oversight mechanism. As
touched upon with regard to the Human Rights Council earlier in this chapter, promoting
such institutions or practices can often not be reconciled with government interests. The
following chapter will look closely at this circumstance and will advance and argument
about why press freedom is neglected in the context of the UN human rights discussions.
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CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICS OF PRESS FREEDOM

Introduction

Chapter 3 has shown that press freedom in recent years has not been o f much
concern to the UN human rights debate. Although it is not completely absent from the
agenda, it is confined to the margins of the discussion, usually subjugated to the debates
on freedom of expression and freedom of information. Press freedom, in short, is
neglected in the UN human rights context.
The resulting question, then, is why do states neglect press freedom? And why do
the Western nations in particular not do more to promote press freedom as a human right?
It is to be expected that China, Russia or other authoritarian states do not speak up for the
civil and political rights of their citizens, let alone try to promote them internationally.
Expectations for Western liberal democracies are different, however. The very notion of
the international human rights regime rests on liberal values like equality, personal
freedom and self-determination, after all. Western states are, in fact, the architects o f the
human rights order. And yet, press freedom, the guarantor of all other rights, is left on the
sidelines.
This chapter, however, contends that when it comes to press freedom at the UN,
idealism matters very little. Instead, what matters is state interests defined in the
traditional sense of power, security and wealth. Press freedom is neglected because it
undermines state power and this applies not just to authoritarian governments, but liberal
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democratic ones as well. In the rare cases when the West stood up for press freedom at
the UN it was not to champion an ideal of liberal self-determination, but because they
saw some benefit to their strategic interests.

Ideas

As outlined in chapter 2, press freedom is central to classical liberal philosophy. It
is the foe of tyranny, precisely because it is the key to ensuring individual rights. Its
presence or absence defines the status of state-society relations in any given country. If
the press is free, civil society is thriving, as is democracy. A free press ensures that
citizens are informed, that the government responds to the will of the people and that it
does not abuse its power and violates the rights of its citizens.
The UN human rights regime is a reflection of Western liberal ideals that are
safeguarded by the institution of a free press. The International Bill o f Rights is based on
the very idea of individual self-determination and the prevention of abuses of power that
had led to the atrocious human rights violations during World War II. Consequently, the
nature of the human rights discourse in general, and on press freedom in particular,
reflects liberal ideals. Even at the UN, where press freedom does not come up often, the
values of a free press in the context of protecting individual rights and supporting
democracy find their way into the discourse occasionally. For example, the Declaration
of Windhoek states that a free, independent and pluralistic press “is essential to the
development and maintenance of democracy in a nation, and

for economic
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development.”1 Similarly, the recent UNESCO report Pressing for Freedom: 20 Years o f
World Press Freedom Day points out that “[p]ress freedom is a cornerstone of human
rights and guarantees other basic liberties due to its unparalleled capacity to encourage
transparency and good governance.”2
It is difficult to isolate ideals from considerations of the national interest in liberal
democracies in any policy area, but even more so when it comes to human rights. There
is no denying the fact that these ideals inform the foreign policy behavior of Western
states. In the case of the U.S. this dates back even further than President Wilson’s goals
of making the world safe for democracy and building peace on “the tested foundations of
political liberty.”3 Liberal values have been enshrined in the concept of American
exceptionalism since the nation’s birth. Therefore, this is not an argument challenging the
notion that ideas influence Western policies, even when it comes to promoting press
freedom. As the historical section of the chapter demonstrates, it can hardly be denied
that Western delegates believed in the merits of the ‘free flow’ doctrine they advocated.
What ideational theories fail to explain, however, is why Western states do so
little for press freedom. According to liberal theory in International Relations, state
behavior is a result of state preferences that are determined by domestic circumstances.
Consequently, if the domestic preferences for individual rights, democracy and a thriving
civil society determine the behavior of Western states, they should promote press
freedom at the UN. As the evidence in chapter 3 shows, they do so to some extent. For
example, France champions the safety of journalists issue at the UN. Western countries
1 UNESCO, "Declaration ofW indhoek," (May 3, 1991).
2 UNESCO, Pressing for Freedom: 20 Years o f W orld Press Freedom Day (Paris: UNESCO, 2013),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002205/220525e.pdf. 15.
3 "President Wilson’s War Message to Congress ", (Records o f the United States Senate, Record Group 46,
National Archives, April 2, 1917).

88

also routinely raise the issue of press freedom violations in other countries during the
Universal Periodic Review process at the Human Rights Council. So, press freedom, after
all, is not completely absent from UN human rights discussions and initiatives. Given the
centrality of press freedom to democracy and human rights, however, these discussions
and initiatives are not nearly prominent enough.
In short, the mere existence of a human rights framework is a triumph o f ideas.
Idealism explains the existence of press freedom (and human rights) discussions at the
international level as well as the nature of the current discourse framing press freedom as
an important ingredient for the individual right to freedom of expression. It does not
explain, however, why there is so little of it.

Norms

The human rights phenomenon is not easily explained by rationalist theories. In
general, there is little strategic motivation for states to sign up to treaties that limit their
own power without much of an incentive like reciprocity. Realists, therefore, regard
human rights treaty compliance as a consequence of coercion or coincidence. But since
states do sign up to international human rights treaties even when they are not coerced,
this lack of explanatory power has given rise to ideational explanations, especially
constructivist ones, which now dominate the human rights literature. They focus on ideas
and norms, their formation, diffusion and influence.
Like liberals, constructivists are concerned with norms and ideas, but not whether
or how they regulate state behavior. Instead, constructivists focus on the interactions
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between agents and structures, which influence the formation of interests and identities
and consequently create the social environment in which states and other agents exist. In
short, norms and values matter because they have an effect on state preferences and
interests. Assuming, then, that these interests shape state behavior and given that states
tend to neglect press freedom, a constructivist would come to the conclusion that press
freedom is of little normative importance, that it has not reached the status o f an
established human rights norm.
Some might argue that this is a rather common occurrence when it comes to
human rights, that concerns for power and survival always outweigh the loftier goals of
providing every human being with the means to secure their dignity. However, there are
several examples of human rights norms that have gone beyond being a tool of regulating
state behavior and even had an impact on state identity. One of those is the issue of racial
equality. During the 1980s many states imposed sanctions on South Africa due to its
apartheid policies, even though strategically and economically, interests would have
dictated otherwise.4 Women’s rights is another example. In 1945, women were still
widely regarded as second class citizens. By 1975, the idea that women deserve the same
rights as men had become widely acknowledged and UN organized conferences, working
groups and various other activities promoting gender equality became ubiquitous. Today
nearly all countries (187) have ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination o f All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
Press freedom is not one of these norms, however. As argued in chapter 3, if press
freedom would have reached the level appropriate for the ‘right on which all other rights

4 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell
University Press, 1995). 3-4.

depend,’ there would be international conventions, other legal instruments and a host of
UN conferences and initiatives on the subject. Instead, press freedom does not even get
an explicit mention in the International Bill of Rights, let alone its own treaty or even
conference. This circumstance is even more astounding, considering that press freedom
pre-dates the establishment of the UN human rights regime by several hundred years. In
1644, Englishman John Milton delivered his well-known Areopagitica speech against
government censorship of the written word, which would later become the blueprint for
the right of freedom of the press. By the end of the 18th century, the French and American
revolutionaries recognized its importance and secured it constitutionally. Consequently,
the question of why press freedom has not become an international norm that neither
regulates state behavior nor has had much of an influence on the content or sources of
state interests, the social fabric of world politics, and the human rights discourse is even
more puzzling.
Martha Finnemore argues that normative shifts are not only due to structures, but
also a result of agents who promote new norms.5 In the case of press freedom, one would
assume these agents to be the Western liberal states, led by the Americans, who, after all,
cherish their First Amendment rights. National identity based on values, therefore, cannot
explain why the U.S. does not lead the efforts to protect and promote press freedom as a
human right.
Furthermore, if there is no established norm on press freedom or active agents
who champion it, international organizations, such as the UN and UNESCO, can hardly
be expected to teach or socialize other countries to adhere to these standards or even to

5 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1996). 24.

make them a more central part of the human rights debate. It is thus not surprising that we
do not see the UN Secretary-General or UNESCO’s Director-General be more outspoken
about the central role of press freedom and urging heads of state or country delegates to
call for a specific press clause in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Human Rights Committee might have spelled out their interpretation that a free press
is implied in the right to freedom of expression in their General Comment 34 in 2011.6
But the UN executive staff has not picked up this interpretation. The only actors that
seem to be working on popularizing freedom of the press as a human right are NGOs, and
even those tend to be caught up in definitional problems, as the following chapter will
show.
Looking at the UN rhetoric on press freedom further highlights the fact that there
is no established norm on freedom of the press. First of all, rhetoric is limited when it
comes to press freedom, even from the most liberal of liberal democracies, as is outlined
below. Secondly, the existing rhetoric, usually concentrated on World Press Freedom
Day, is murky at best. Press freedom gets mixed in with discussions of freedom of
expression and information and even those concepts are not very well defined in the
human rights context. The UN has been grappling with these definitional questions since
the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To this day, however, the area
of communication rights lacks clarity, a circumstance that is further complicated by new
considerations over Internet freedom and everything that it entails. What is clear,
however, is that the political aspect of the press and its power as a democratic institution,
which makes it so valuable to the promotion of human rights, is very rarely addressed.

6 Human Rights Committee (September 12, 2011).
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To sum up, constructivism is a useful guide for explaining instances of normative
change in state behavior. The case of press freedom, however, is not such an instance. In
the end, constructivists believe that press freedom, like anarchy, is what you make o f it.
States - even the liberal ones - make very little of it, which suggests that ideational
concerns are not much of a driving force in this case. Instead, the neglect of press
freedom in the human rights discourse comes down to old-fashioned power politics.

Power

While norms, in theory, have dominated the way we think about human rights, the
reality* particularly in the field of civil and political rights, is still firmly guided by state
power. Realists, who attribute state behavior to the national interest as defined in terms of
power, security and wealth, thus still offer the better explanation for the current status of
civil and political rights. Sometimes interests in the realist sense overlap with idealist
goals and values, but when it comes to promoting press freedom through the UN, these
interests almost always trump ideas. The evidence from the case presented in this section
will support this hypothesis.
According to realism, state interests are a result of strictly rational, cost-benefit
considerations based on power politics, national security, and/or the economic well-being
of the nation. Given that press freedom is currently not high on the Western agenda, one
can assume that promoting press freedom is not in states’ interests as defined by realism.
If anything, a free press undermines the power of those in charge of running the
government and their self-interests.

Realists argue that no matter what type of regime, its policies are determined by
calculations that enhance its power. This is on display with press freedom in the UN
context. Even the most liberal democratic states have a very limited agenda when it
comes to promoting press freedom at the UN. Take for example the U.S., France, Sweden
and Norway. The U.S. and France are the liberal pioneers in that their respective Bill of
Rights and Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and their constitutions
translated the Enlightenment principles of political equality and individual freedom into
blueprints for democratic government. Sweden and Norway are also champions of
equality and liberal values, and they regularly top the various press freedom rankings for
their exemplary free and independent media. They constitute the most likely cases to
support liberal values like press freedom. If not even they, the most liberal, most likely
states to pay attention to press freedom in their human rights policies do so, it is unlikely
that other states would.
Speeches and statements by representatives of their missions to the UN, however,
indicate that press freedom is not a high priority issue for them. The U.S. Mission to the
UN publishes a list of its statements between 2009 and 2013.7 Out of all of these
statements, press freedom comes up once a year on the occasion of World Press Freedom
Day. In 2013, a U.S. representative also delivered remarks at a Security Council Open
Debate on the protection of journalists in armed conflict. It is notable, however, that even
these remarks do not contain any reference to press freedom and simply stress the

7 United States Mission to the United Nations, "Statements 2013,"
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/c55549.htm.
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universal right to freedom of expression.8 Women’s issues, on the other hand, were
covered in between 8 and 13 statements per year during that time.
The Swedish mission website does not cite any speeches or remarks on the topic,
although the Swedish mission is a champion of freedom of expression on the Internet and
the right to privacy in the digital age.9 The French UN representatives have somewhat
more resources dedicated to press freedom, although they are also framed by World Press
Freedom Day and eclipsed by the issue of journalist safety, a topic that is close to
France’s heart as it pushed for the adoption of Security Council resolution 1738 on the
protection of journalists in armed conflicts.10 A search on the mission’s French website
returns 32 results for press freedom (liberte de la presse). To compare, women’s rights
(les droits de femme) shows up 43 times and food security or the right to food (securite
alimentaire) 47 times.
The track record on press freedom is even worse for the Norwegian mission to the
UN. None of the statements they publish on their website from 2011, 2012 and 2013
references press freedom or even related terms.11 A search o f their website for ‘freedom
of the press’ returns one hit: an announcement of Norway lifting its ban on Myanmar in
2012, acknowledging that the country had made some progress in the area of freedom of

8 Rosemary A. DiCarlo, "Remarks by Ambassador Rosemary A. DiCarlo, Acting Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, At a Security Council Open Debate on Protection o f Civilians in
Armed Conflict: Protection of Journalists," (July 17, 2013),
http://usun.state.gOv/briefing/statements/212072.htm.
9 Permanent Mission o f Sweden to the United Nations, "Sweden Abroad: UN,"
http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/Embassies/UN-New-York/.
10 A search for press freedom on the French Mission to the UN returns 12 documents: Permanent Mission
o f France to the United Nations in New York, "Press Freedom Website Search,"
http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?recherche=%22press+freedom%22&Submit=Ok&id_secteur=2&page
=recherche.
11 Permanent Mission o f Norway to the United Nations, "Statements," http://www.norwayun.org/Statements/.
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expression and freedom of the press.12 On the other hand, there are at least six statements
on women’s rights each year and the overall website search shows 34 results for the
‘status of women,’ 58 results for ‘women’s rights,’ 24 for ‘freedom of expression’ and 38
for food security.
These findings indicate that coverage of the topic is limited and usually appears in
conjunction with event announcements surrounding World Press Freedom Day. They
also demonstrate that press freedom is not addressed in any normative sense, but is linked
to practical matters of protecting journalists, for example, rather than being discussed in
the context of its place in the human rights framework.
There also seems to be a tendency to take the importance of press freedom for
granted. Many of the cited documents share the implied understanding that press freedom
and freedom of expression go hand in hand, and that press freedom is a necessary
component for securing not just freedom of expression, but also democracy. At the same
time, however, by focusing on issues such as journalist safety in conflict zones, the
debate is put into the humanitarian context. In other instances, free expression or freedom
of information take precedent over press freedom. It seems, however, that by
circumventing discussions of the political aspects of having and championing a free
press, governments protect their own power.
Observers might point out that this is not always the case; that the West does take
a strong stand in favor of press freedom at the UN from time to time. However, even in
instances when Western states did go out of their way to support it, they did so not out of
purely idealistic reasons, but because the national interest in the sense of power, security
12 Permanent Mission o f Norway to the United Nations, "Norway to Lift Sanctions Against Myanmar,"
http://www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Selected_Topics/Humanitarian-Effortsl/Norway-to-liftsanctions-against-Myanmar/#.Upp YY5TF1gw.
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or wealth dictated it. This is demonstrated clearly by taking a look at the history of press
freedom at the UN.

The Drafting o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and the Early Days o f the
UN Human Rights Agenda

Press freedom entered the international debate early on. What is more,
deliberations always followed the same pattern. The League of Nations portrayed the
press as a tool to usher in peace and a pre-condition for material disarmament.13 A few
years later, in 1932, the League focused on the press again, but this time it was during a
conference to discuss the problem of inaccurate news, followed by another meeting in
1933 on the right to correct false information.14 The emerging pattern was that the free
flow of information ideal was introduced by the West, and then followed up by
opposition from the Soviets, highlighting the many alleged dangers of a free press and
requesting regulation.
During the initial stages of establishing the UN human rights framework, the
press garnered a fair amount of attention, too. Following the experiences and
consequences of the Second World War and its widespread propaganda campaigns the
issue of freedom of information was close to the hearts of those tasked with drafting an
international human rights regime. Members of the Commission on Human Rights
“pointed out that it had often happened that newspapers and news agencies had poisoned

13 Cees J. Hamelink, The Politics o f World Communication: A Human Rights Perspective (London: Sage
Publications, 1994). 18.
14 Ibid., 19.
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the mind of the public by twisting the facts.” 15 They felt that “in the future, measures be
considered against deliberate and systematic, distortion of the truth.” 16 To do so, the SubCommission for Freedom of Information and o f the Press was created. The Western
delegates encouraged it “to get to work immediately because it was formulating one of
the basic human freedoms.”17 But the official mandate of the Sub-Commission was “to
examine what rights, obligations, and practices should be included in the concept of
freedom of information.”18 Enthusiasm for advocating an unfettered press clearly was
limited not just on the side of the Soviets, then.
Press freedom was a major talking point during the early stages of the drafting of
the International Bill of Rights. But the debate occurred within the framework of
discussing the concept of freedom of information and the accepted notion that the press
needed restrictions, since its role came with certain responsibilities. Like the discussions
of press freedom at the UN today, the drafting process o f the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights also suggests that no clear distinctions were drawn between press freedom
and freedom of information. The former was simply regarded as being part of the larger
idea of the free flow of information.
The first draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written by the
Canadian John Humphrey, who served as Director of the UN Division of Human Rights.
The Humphrey draft was based on numerous other drafts written by interest groups,
NGOs, organizations of lawyers, and the like. At least one of these drafts, that o f the

15 UN Economic
o f the Economic
16 Ibid.
17 UN Economic
18 UN Economic

and Social Council, "Report o f the Commission on Human Rights to the Second Session
and Social Council," (May 21, 1946), 10.
and Social Council, "Sixty-Eighth Meeting" (Lake Success,New York, M arch 14, 1947).
and Social Council (May 21, 1946) 11.
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Inter-American Juridical Committee, includes the right to a free press specifically.19
Furthermore, a UN report summarizes:
The major part of the various drafts deals with the status of liberty. The rights
listed are: life, personal liberty and its corollaries (prohibition of slavery and
compulsory labour, sanctity o f the home and secrecy of correspondence), freedom
from wrongful interference, freedom of association and of assembly, freedom of
speech and of opinion, freedom of information and of the press (sometimes
qualified in the interests of responsibility), religious worship and nationality.20
The Humphrey draft, however, did not mention press freedom specifically, but
clearly prohibited censorship and also highlighted the responsibilities o f a free press.

")

1

The following draft by Rene Cassin again included the press.22 However, it did not grant
freedom of the press like the American First Amendment did, because the emphasis was
still on freedom of expression. It also emphasized the restrictions on freedom of
expression, and the free press in particular, by saying “that the author, and the publishers,
printers and others concerned shall be answerable for any abuse of this right by
defamation of character or failure to present information and news in a true and impartial
manner.”23
Although the article on freedom of expression was subject to heated deliberations
in the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press, there does not seem
to be any evidence that the specific inclusion of references to the press was considered

19 Article 3: “The right to freedom o f speech and o f expression includes the special and highly privileged
right to freedom o f the press.” Inter-American Juridical Committee, "Draft Declaration o f the International
Rights and Duties o f Man," (UN Economic and Social Council, January 8, 1947), 3.
20 Division o f Human Rights, "Analysis o f Various Draft International Bills of Rights," ed. Commission on
Human Rights (UN Economic and Social Council, January 23, 1947), 4.
21 Humphrey Draft in Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal
Declaration o f Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001). 272.
22 Article 23 o f the Cassin Draft: “There shall be freedom o f expression by word o f mouth, in writing, in the
Press, in books or by visual, audible or other means; provided, however, that the author, and the publishers,
printers and others concerned shall be answerable for any abuse o f this right by defamation o f character or
failure to present information and news in a true and impartial manner.” Printed in ibid., 277.
23 Cassin Draft, ibid.
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controversial. This suggests that the delegates considered press freedom as part and
parcel of the freedom of information concept. Indeed, the U.S.-backed Philippine draft
resolution from December 1946 that called for the convention of an international
conference on freedom of information notes that “[f]reedom of information implies the
right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere without fetters.”24
Some U.S. delegates even advocated passionately for the inclusion of a free press
clause in the International Bill of Rights:
It raises the banner of freedom of the press, where all citizens can see and respect
it. Constitutional recognition prevents freedom of speech from remaining an ideal
of radicals or of isolated thinkers like Milton and Mill, or of any other special
group such as professors and newspaper owners. These men would probably
cherish the ideal, without the first amendment, but that ideal would then lack a
large portion o f emotional force which it now possesses. Its embodiment in a very
prominent place in the Constitution, proclaims it to every school-child.... What
might otherwise be the forlorn hope of eloquent highbrows and frustrated
lowbrows, has a strong hold upon everybody in the United States.25
Yet, the West failed to secure a place for the free press in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Whether this was intentional or happened in good faith because they considered
press freedom as an intrinsic part o f freedom of information is difficult to say. However,
it does seem like the Western delegates had a good understanding of the role of the press
within the broader free flow of information and democratic governance:
The Soviet delegations never understand that the free press in America has great
advantages, even though we sometimes have to agree that it has disadvantages;
but in the case where it fights the battles o f the underprivileged, or of those people

24 UN General Assembly, "Calling o f an International Conference on Freedom o f Information," (December
14, 1946).
25 U.S. Delegate Chafee, Sub-Commission on Freedom o f Information and o f the Press, June 9, 1947 (UN
Document E/CN.4/Sub.l/32, p. 2), quoted in Achal Mehra, Free Flow o f Information: A New Paradigm
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). 18-19.
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who temporarily are being exploited by individuals, its freedom is valuable to us
all.26
Furthermore, the matter of a free press came up in various discussions. A U.S.
delegate to the General Assembly pointed out that “[pjrogress was based upon the
continual criticism of institutions. The existence of a free and diversified Press was one
of the most important factors in that process.”27 A Cuban representative supported this
view with a similar statement in another meeting: “A free and independent Press in
democratic and liberal States contributed to the development of civil responsibility and
critical judgment.”
Clearly then, the Western countries discussed the idea of press freedom in the
context of individual rights and framed it as a vital ingredient for a healthy civil society,
democratic governance and a public government oversight mechanism. But it became
obvious very quickly that these values were not shared by the Soviets and that American
idealism could not be reconciled with the Soviet position. Ideological clashes thus
marked the discussions from the outset. The U.S. opposed any kind o f restrictions onthe
press, while the Soviets claimed to be worried about the abuse of the press by fascists and
wanted to impose limitations on the free press. The American position, defended by Mrs.
Roosevelt, was “that a good press will compensate for a bad one; remove all restrictions
and the public will be served.”29 But the Soviets stood their ground:
The use of freedom of speech and of the Press for the purposes of propagating
fascism and aggression or of inciting to war between nations shall not be
tolerated.... In order to ensure the right o f the free expression of opinion for large

26 Eleanor Roosevelt Papers 1949-1952, Vol. 2, Eleanor Roosevelt, ed. The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers: The
Human Rights Years, 1949-1952 (Charlottesville, VA: University o f Virginia Press, 2012), 755.
27 Quoted in Mehra (1986) 21.
28 Quoted in ibid.
29 John P. Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations: A Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry, N Y :
Transnational Publishers, 1984). 51.
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sections of the peoples and for their organizations, State assistance and co
operation shall be given in providing the material resources (premises, printing
presses, paper, and the like) necessary for the publication o f democratic organs of
the Press.3
They also accused Western countries of pursuing a free flow o f information
policy in order to ensure “the most favorable conditions, in certain countries, for the
activities of the Press monopolies.”31 They complained that the Sub-Commission on
Freedom of Information and of the Press had become a “loudspeaker spreading the
expansionist ideas of Anglo-American monopolists.”32 The Soviets even alleged that
press corporations were used as cover-ups for Western propaganda and espionage
activities.

This Soviet mistrust of the commercial ownership of media organizations in

the U.S. would later resurface in the New World Information and Communication Order
debate, but in those early stages of debating the right to freedom of information,
ideological positions were already hardened.
As the East-West conflict intensified further, the Sub-Commission of Freedom of
Information and of the Press was discontinued in 1952. This was a result o f divisive
debates between the West pushing for the free flow doctrine and the Soviets opposing it
based on their argument that unrestricted press organizations are a tool of Western
expansionism at the 1948 UN Conference on Freedom of Information. At this conference,
three draft conventions were proposed: the Convention on the Gathering and
International Transmission of News (“the American convention”), the Convention on the
International Right of Correction (“the French convention”), and the Convention on

30 Commission on Human Rights, "Draft International Covenant on Human Rights: Recapitulation o f
Amendments to Articles 16, 17 and 18," (E/CN.4/272: UN Economic and Social Council, M ay 26, 1949).
31 cited in Mehra (1986) 25.
32 cited in ibid., 26.
33 Ibid., 27.
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Freedom of Information (“the British convention”). Only one of them, on the right of
correction, was adopted by the General Assembly (in 1952). Although it became a
binding international agreement, even this convention did not have much of an impact,
due to the small number of states who ratified it and as a result of clumsy enforcement
procedures.34
In light of these differences, Humphrey describes the encounter at the 1948
Conference on Freedom of Information as follows:
The atmosphere at the conference was highly political, the committee rooms
becoming arenas for fighting the Cold War which (after the Prague coup d’etat)
had become more intense. Positions hardened and there was very little room left
for compromise. As so often happens at the United Nations, it was a dialogue
between the deaf.35
It became clear that no consensus could be reached and consequently the freedom
of information debate disappeared almost entirely until the late 1960s. Although the issue
of freedom of information and, within it, discussions of a free press, started out as a high
priority at the UN, it fell victim to Cold War power politics between the West and the
Soviet bloc, highlighting once more that the impact of ideals was limited.

The Great Global Media Debate o f the 1970s and 1980s

While the early stages of the freedom of information deliberations at the UN were
marked by concerns over the role of the press as a tool for propaganda and war
mongering, the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) discourse

34 Inger Osterdahl, Freedom o f Information in Question: Freedom o f Information in International Law and
the Calls fo r a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) (Uppsala: Iustus Forlag,
1992). 29. As o f writing, 17 countries had ratified the convention.
35 Humphrey (1984) 53.
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primarily focused on the economics of the debate. As a result, ideological differences
between the developing world, the communist East and the capitalist West became very
prominent within the communication rights debate, which often framed the ‘free flow’
idea as a tool of Western cultural imperialism.
NWICO grew out of calls from the newly decolonized states for a New
International Economic Order, which was first formalized at a summit of the NonAlignment Movement in Algiers in 1973. The goal of the new economic order was to
restructure the global economy in a more balanced way that would benefit developing
nations, who felt disadvantaged in the current system dominated by Western
industrialized nations and their transnational corporations. The Non-Alignment
Movement called for - among other things - more favorable terms of trade, control over
multinationals working within their borders, foreign aid, technology and knowledge
transfers from industrialized nations, and full permanent sovereignty over their own
territory including the right to nationalize foreign property.36
The concept of cultural imperialism was also a talking point at the 1973 NonAlignment Movement summit in Algiers.37 Consequently, the New International
Economic Order and the emerging NWICO were closely linked from the outset. In 1976,
a Non-Alignment Movement media seminar first declared the call for the New
International Information Order:38

36 UN General Assembly, "Declaration on th e E stablishm ent of a New International Econom ic Order,"
(May 1,1974).
37 "Economic Declaration", (paper presented at the Fourth Summit Conference o f the Non-Aligned
Countries, Algiers, September 1973).
38 Colleen Roach, "The Western World and the NWICO: United They Stand?," in Beyond Cultural
Imperialism: Globalization, Communication & the New International Order, ed. Peter Golding and Phil
Harris (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 95.
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Since information in the world shows a disequilibrium favoring some and
ignoring others, it is the duty of the non-aligned countries ... to change this
situation and obtain the decolonization of information and initiate a new
international order in information.39
The representatives of the developing countries did not make a secret of feeling
culturally dominated by Western forces:
[T]he peoples of developing countries are the victims of domination in
information and this domination is a blow to their most authentic cultural values,
and in the final analysis subjugates their interests to those of imperialism.40
The colonialist, imperialist and racist powers have created effective means of
information and communication which are conditioning the masses to the interests
of these powers.41
The same Cold War rivalries that had derailed the discussion of freedom of
information in the 1950s were at display in the New World Information and
Communication Order debate. Now, however, the issue also pitted developing countries
against the Western ‘free flow of information’ doctrine. Thomas McPhail summarizes the
Third World criticism of the mass media in three categories: First, peripheral nations took
a straightforward anti-capitalist approach, criticizing the commercial orientation of the
media. Second, they criticized the one-way flow of information through the media from
Western nations, primarily the U.S., to other nations without little reciprocity. Third, they
feared “electronic colonialism.”42
Consequently, the Third World, joined by the Soviets, saw the press primarily as a
Western economic force that required regulation. The West, of course, opposed this
characterization, pointing out that this was simply an excuse for authoritarian regimes to

39 Report o f the 1976 Non-Aligned media seminar in Tunis, “Information in the Non-Aligned Countries,” p.
30, quoted in ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 McPhail (2010)69.
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curb free speech and free press at home to consolidate their power. Canada’s Secretary of
State, John Roberts, aptly summarized this position in 1978:
On every continent there are some people who think that governments should
regulate journalists, should tell them, in the public interest, what to write, or
should pass judgment on their accuracy. Canadians do not believe that either
politicians or public servants should have anything to say in the management,
direction or correction of the media. Quite the contrary. In their view, only a free
press can guarantee that the decisions of the state power are in harmony with the
wishes of the people. Governments have no means o f knowing what the needs of
society are for its own well-being, unless they are told by an informed public.43
By the mid-1970s, the positions of both sides had hardened and the conflict
between the West, the Non-Alignment Movement and the socialist East unfolded in the
UNESCO forum, no more pronounced than during the deliberations over the
organization’s Mass Media Declaration. The draft declaration had been introduced to
UNESCO’s agenda in 1972, before neither the New International Economic Order nor
NWICO were even formulated, and it took until November 22, 1978 for it to pass. When
it did under its full name, Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the
Contribution

o f the Mass

Media

to

Strengthening Peace

and International

Understanding, to the Promotion o f Human Rights and to Countering Racialism,
Apartheid and Incitement to War, it was unanimous, but in no way uncontroversial.44
Kaarle Nordenstreng identifies three stages in the tumultuous life of the declaration.45
The first coincided with the offensive o f the newly decolonized countries on the
international stage, calling for a new global economic and information order, briefly

43 Quoted in ibid., 69-70.
44 Kaarle Nordenstreng and Lauri Hannikainen, The Mass M edia Declaration o f UNESCO (Norwood, N.J.:
Ablex Pub. Corp., 1984). 1.
45 Ibid., 8.
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outlined at the beginning of this section. The second phase was characterized by a
Western counterattack starting in the mid-1970s.46
Western interests had been threatened from the beginning of the great media
debate for several reasons. One the one hand, the U.S. national security strategy of
containment aimed at stopping the spread of communism was undermined by nonaligned nations siding with the Soviets on the issue o f the international flow of
information. Given the prevalent anti-Western narrative of framing the free flow doctrine
as a Western tool of exploitation and imperialism, the U.S. saw its power at the UN and
in terms of global spheres of influence vis-a-vis the Soviets threatened.
At the UN, UNESCO had already started to move away from its intended
technical mandate towards a more normative approach to the issue of communication
rights. UNESCO’s Director-General at the time, Amadou Mahtar M ’Bow, contributed to
forging close links between the New International Economic Order and the New World
Information and Communication Order.47 In an address to the 1978 General Assembly on
the future agenda of UNESCO, he stated: “the establishment of a new international
economic order constitutes ... one of the major contexts, and no doubt the largest, within
which the activities of the Organization will take place.”48 His promotion of the New
International Economic Order and NWICO did not go over well with the West, and
UNESCO would indeed become the primary battleground for the ideological clashes over
New World Information and Communication Order.
The British Managing Director of Reuters, Gerald Long, summed up the Western
problem with UNESCO’s newfound advocacy zeal:
46 Ibid., 15.
47 McPhail (2010) 68.
48 Quoted in ibid.
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Unesco’s aims are clear: it seeks money from those countries that have developed
the technology of media communications, and which are for the most part
committed to the view that information is an essential component of freedom, and
makes plans to use that money to transfer media technology to the countries that
do not have it, while encouraging them to use the technology to control
information for the purposes of government. We are being asked to put up the
money and provide the technical, human and operational resources to spread
throughout the world that very view of information that is most repugnant to us.
The fact that such a programme has not already been rejected out of hand shows
that we would be wrong to underestimate the political skill of Unesco.49
The change in UNESCO’s orientation and its poor reception by the West is linked
to another set of interests that the West regarded as being threatened by the New World
Information and Communication Order, as the following quote highlights:
UNESCO’s public image was more negatively affected by its shift from a passive,
pro-Western agency to an activist, pro-development, peripheral oriented agency.
Its ideological commitment to fundamental change, through [the New
International Economic Order], for example, was little understood and was
perceived as a threat to the free markets and economic security that core nations
had taken for granted since UNESCO’s inception in the 1940s.50
Economic considerations played an important role in Western opposition to
NWICO. Many Western media professionals and transnational media companies saw
their interests threatened by the international calls for the new economic and information
orders. An American delegate to UNESCO and later Director of the U.S. International
Communication Agency pointed out some of the specifics in the calls for the New World
Information and Communication Order that would hurt Western businesses:
There have been some preliminary definitions issuing from the Non-Aligned
Movement that, frankly, we find unacceptable. They would entail such things as a
wholesale withdrawal of radio frequencies from current users, and a possible
abolition of international copyright for published works entering the Third
World.51
49 G. Long, Speech at a Reuters dinner for media representatives at the Plaza Hotel on 13 May 1980.
Quoted in Nordenstreng and Hannikainen (1984) 44.
50 McPhail (2010) 68.
51 Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations o f the Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House o f Representatives, UNESCO and Freedom o f Information, July 19, 1979,4-5.
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But Western strategic and economic interests in opposing the New World
Information and Communication Order coincided with a genuine Western aversion
towards restricting free speech and the free press. A U.S. member of the MacBride
Commission, Elie Abel, neatly summarizes this confluence of moral reasoning against
censorship, the fear of economic losses and the notion that NWICO is nothing short o f a
threat to U.S. national security:
If adopted, this version of the new world information order would have serious
consequences for the United States. As Senator George McGovern once observed,
“One way to attack a nation such as the United States which depends heavily on
information and communications is to restrain the flow of information.” Adopting
[the Non-Alignment Movement’s] proposal would mean accepting the idea of
state control (i.e., censorship) over all news or information crossing a nation’s
borders. It would reduce greatly the amount of news about the world available to
Americans and their Government. It might provide justification for countries to
exclude form their markets American movies, television programs and
advertising. It might even produce the extraordinary result of nationalizing
information throughout the world, thereby enabling governments to tax or even
prohibit computer conversations via satellites.52
As a result of these concerns, Western states staged their counterattack. They
were supported by media organizations, which also saw their interests^ threatened and
formed interest groups to lobby Western governments and international organizations on
their behalf. Chief among these groups were the World Press Freedom Committee, the
International Press Institute and the Inter-American Press Association. With the help of
international news agencies and other commercial media outlets, these organizations
launched a publicity campaign aimed at the Non-Alignment Movement and UNESCO.53

52 P.H. Power and E. Abel, "Third World vs. The Media," The New York Times Magazine September 22,
1980.
53 Nordenstreng and Hannikainen (1984) 15-16.
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This offensive was not an isolated incident; it was a matter of international
politics overall.54 The Western line became harder on other issues that concerned its
interests. Detente of the early 1970s was replaced with “trilateralism” at the end o f the
decade, mobilizing the Western world to be more coherent and stronger when defending
its interests.55 This new strategy paid off, as they were able to stage enough opposition to
the Mass Media Declaration that it was successfully stalled for a while.
Adopting more of a carrot than a stick approach, the U.S. also tried to get the
more moderate developing countries onto its side by offering assistance and training for
journalists, investments in communication infrastructure and other measures that would
foster a knowledge transfer between advanced and developing countries. This ‘divide and
conquer’ strategy led to the proposition of a “Marshall Plan of Telecommunications,” but
many representatives from the developing world were not entirely convinced that the
U.S. was sincere.56
Only three weeks after the Marshall Plan proposition, however, the Mass Media
Declaration was passed, which some observers have characterized as a defeat for the
West. U.S. efforts to de-politicize the debate by focusing on practical measures to reduce
inequality in the field of communications rather than stressing normative considerations
about the free flow of information certainly failed. They also did not do a lot to avoid the
restrictive nature of the declaration.57
One of those normative debates emerged around the concept of the right to
communicate. Originally attributed to Jean D ’Arcy in 1969, it still lacks a clear

54 Ibid., 16.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 18-19.
57 Ibid., 19.
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definition. Due to the lack of consensus on these issues, the 1980 MacBride Report
mentions the right to communicate only briefly and when it does, puts it in very vague
terms:
Communication needs in a democratic society should be met by the extension of
specific rights such as the right to be informed, the right to inform, the right to
privacy, the right to participate in public communication - all elements of a new
concept, the right to communicate. In developing what might be called a new era
of social rights, we suggest all the implications of the right to communicate be
further explored.58
Although hailed as a fundamental right that would encompass all the previously
discussed communication rights (freedom o f opinion, of expression, of the press), the
right to communicate aimed to re-frame the issue of communication away from the mass
media as a one-way information channel. Instead, D ’Arcy wrote, “what matters is the
establishment or re-establishment of true communication among human beings.”59 The
existing formulations of communication rights and freedoms were no longer sufficient, he
and other experts charged with investigating the right to communicate argued: “They
concentrate on the content of communication. Their thrust is to ensure that the
information contained in the message is available to all. The emphasis is on a one-way
flow of information from the few to the many.”60
Discussions like these, however, were loaded with the potential for ideological
clashes, since they primarily stressed normative issues such as the place of
communication rights in preserving cultural heritage and identity. The right to
communicate debate, for example, was welcomed by the Third World, who regarded it as
58 International Commission for the Study o f Communication Problems, "Many Voices, One World:
Towards a New, More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order," (London,
New York, Paris: Kogan Page, Unipub, UNESCO, 1980), 265.
59 Jean D'Arcy, "Preface," in The Right to Communicate: A New Human Right, ed. Desmond Fisher and
L.S. Harms (Dublin: Boole Press, 1982), xxv.
60 Desmond Fisher and L.S. Harms, eds., The Right to Communicate: A New Human Right (Dublin: Boole
Press, 1982), 3.
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a new collective right defending cultural sovereignty. But it was also supported by some
in the West, most notably Sweden, who sponsored it at the UN. The MacBride
Commission also concluded that the right was a central individual and social right:
Freedom of speech, of the press, of information and of assembly are vital for the
realization of human rights. Extension o f these communication freedoms to a
broader individual and collective right to communicate is an evolving principle in
the democratization process.61
Unsurprisingly, however, the right to communicate was less enthusiastically
received by the U.S. and its allies, who saw it as relating to the New World Information
and Communication Order proposals.62 Moreover, the U.S. also tried to frame R2C as a
communist ploy, despite the fact that the Soviets had their own reservations about the
right. The American opposition was triggered, according to Cees Hamelink, by the link
between the right to communicate and people’s rights, a notion which they regarded as a
threat to individual rights.63
Debates about the right to communicate continued at UNESCO throughout the
1980s, but never came to any satisfactory definition or implementation. In the 1990s, the
debate disappeared almost completely, without any mentions in the Declaration of
Windhoek or its successors.64 But not even the Mass Media Declaration from 1978 had
much of an impact.
Despite its unanimous passing, the Mass Media Declaration has little legal
significance. Generally, declarations are important because they can be forerunners of
binding treaties or can become international customary law. The power of a declaration
depends on the way it is worded, that is, whether it is written in a way that is strong and
61 International Commission for the Study o f Communication Problems (1980) 265.
62 Hamelink (1994) 299.
63 Ibid., 300.
64 Ibid., 298.
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obligatory. The importance of declarations also depends on whether it was adopted
unanimously, whether it is referred to in later debates, or whether it intends to interpret or
clarify existing legal principles or rules. The Mass Media Declaration has a poor record
on most of these criteria.65 And even the condition that it was a unanimous vote is
weakened by the fact that the declaration was undermined by strong reservations from
Switzerland, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands as well as Third World countries,
which wanted a more normative document.66
Even though the Mass Media Declaration passed, the West did not turn to drastic
measures in response. They did not return to their uncompromising position that they had
held during previous disputes at UNESCO meetings before and up to the Nairobi
conference in 1976.67 Their threat to withdraw from UNESCO entirely and the eventual
follow-through by the U.S. and the UK were still six years away. Still, parallel to the
deliberations on the declaration, at the same UNESCO session, the U.S. and moderate
members of the Non-Alignment Movement cooperated. They intended to find a middle
ground between the Marshall Plan project and the idea of developing countries to set up a
fund at UNESCO for helping the improvement o f communication in developing countries
through a transfer of technological know-how.68 This collaboration led to the creation of
the International Programme for the Development of Communication two years later,
apparently the lowest common denominator in terms of communication rights that all
sides could agree upon.

65 Cees J. Hamelink, "MacBride with Hindsight," in B eyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization,
Communication and the New International Order, ed. Peter Golding and Phil Harris (London: Sage
Publications, 1997), 73.
66 Ibid.
67 Nordenstreng and Hannikainen (1984) 90-113.
68 Ibid., 20,44.

The “Great Global Media Debate” died during the 1980s, after the West waged
another offensive with the help of the media and their lobbying groups that culminated
with the 1981 Declaration of Talloires, which rallied Western governments and media
and journalism organizations against the plan to place restrictions on press freedom. But
as previous Western strategies on communication rights, this offensive also coincided
with an overall shift in policy not just towards the UN, but the Soviets as well. The New
World Information and Communication Order received its final blow when the West
refused to compromise after calls for draft resolutions on communications issues became
increasingly militant. 69 In the end, the U.S. and the UK even withdrew from UNESCO
in 1984, UNESCO’s Director General M ’Bow, who had been instrumental in the
organization’s advocacy on behalf of the new information order, was unseated, and the
NWICO concept met its demise.
To summarize briefly, while it seems that the Western representatives certainly
believed in the merits of an unfettered press, their policies were not strictly guided by
normative considerations either. On the one hand, they did regard the notion of placing
restrictions on the right to freedom of information and expression as a way for Soviet
leaders and Third World dictators to silence their domestic oppositions and continue their
oppressive rule. On the other hand, however, the West was also driven by strategic and
economic interests in opposing the proposed new information order.

69 Mehra (1986) 40.
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The 1990s and 2001

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic incentive to champion
the free flow of information evaporated. After all, the free market model had triumphed
over the Soviets’ command economy. Multinational media companies could now pursue
their business interests in a globalized world characterized by an ever-increasing flow of
information across borders. Or, as one expert put it, the 70 “came about - in reverse.”71
A new information order had already been established by CNN and other transnational
corporations, so by the early 1990s, the new information order was a reality.72 And with it
the Western worries about regulations being imposed on their media MNCs dissipated.
Not for long, however, since the importance of strategic and economic interests is
also highlighted by the Internet freedom debate that is currently the focus in the
communication rights area. Even though the Cold War is over and the West is not trying
to contain the Soviets anymore, there are certain parallels between the New World
Information and Communication Order and Internet freedom debates at the UN. Looking
at the question of why states support or oppose Internet freedom, it is obvious that the
central concern is power. China, Russia and other authoritarian Internet freedom
offenders are pushing for regulation of the medium. It is in their interest to maintain or
extend censorship to online channels in order to consolidate their own power vis-a-vis
their citizens. The Western countries, on the other hand, are interested in keeping
information flowing freely. Part of it is due to their commitment to liberal values, but it is

70 Ibid.
71 George Gerbner, Hamid Mowlana, and Kaarle Nordenstreng, eds., The Global Media Debate: Its Rise,
Fall, and Renewal (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Company, 1993), xi.
72 Ibid.
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also in their interest to stand up to China and Russia and their growing global influence.
And as during the New World Information and Communication Order debate, there is
also a Western economic incentive to oppose Internet regulation due to the fact that many
Internet MNCs are Western and their livelihood depends on a free flow of information.
But not just economic incentives disappeared. Politically it also did not pay to
defend press freedom at the UN anymore. The West won the Cold War and there were no
Soviets left to oppose or contain. Western liberal ideas seemed to have triumphed. The
end of history had arrived. UNESCO had gotten rid of its trouble-maker Director-General
M’Bow and took a more pro-Western, pro-free flow of information direction. Post-Soviet
and non-aligned countries turned towards democracy and capitalism. To support them in
this endeavor, UNESCO continued its media development programs through the
International Programme for the Development of Communication, mostly funded by
Western countries. UNESCO organized seminars on promoting an independent and
pluralistic press in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Arab States
that led to the respective declarations on the issue of supporting a free press.
A sense of optimism abounded. A lot of trust was put into new information and
communication technology and its democratizing power. After all, the Soviet Union had
been brought down, as one story went, by the fax machine. “Too many people,” Thomas
Dine observes, “in both the post-Soviet states and in the West” believed that there was
nothing that could keep the media from transforming unfree societies.73 They believed
“that democracy was secure, and that the future was one of unalloyed brightness.”74 But
this optimism and confidence was premature and the West failed to use the 1990s and the

73 Dine (2001)48.
74 Ibid.
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international goodwill towards its liberal values and advocate for a human rights
discourse that goes to the political heart of the matter. Instead, the 1990s were a lost
decade for the promotion of press freedom. Except for the International Programme for
the Development of Communication, World Press Freedom Day and Windhoek and its
successor declarations, press freedom and communication rights were of no interest to the
West.
After the 9/11 terror attacks the cause of press freedom was even less likely to
gain Western supporters on the international stage. For the U.S., the ‘War on Terror’ took
precedence over concerns for promoting human rights. Even at home, civil liberties came
under threat following the passing of the Patriot Act. Historically, this is not an isolated
incident. In times of war, national security concerns tend to hold more sway than the
protection of civil rights, particularly those that concern the press or freedom of
expression. Governments have a stronger case to restrict these rights when there is a
credible threat to the nation and its soldiers.
Enacting legislation to stifle freedom of information and of the press during war
time was always controversial in the U.S. The Sedition Act of 1798, which restricted
speech that was critical of the government, only lasted for a couple of years. It took more
than a hundred years and World War I before a similar act, the Sedition Act of 1918, was
passed. It, too, did not last long and came with a high political cost for the Democrats
who proposed it.75 But governments found other ways to control the press and the flow of
information, always in the name of protecting its soldiers and the nation. Over the years,

75 Jeffery A. Smith, War and Press Freedom: The Problem o f Prerogative Power (Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999). 221.
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censorship techniques included news management, emphasizing secrecy, and denying
access to journalists.76
The 2003 Iraq War is seen by many observers as the epitome of government
media management. The Bush administration bullied reporters, isolated and limited
critical reporting and was generally apt at manipulating the media, because they knew
how the media operate and how to stay on message.77 A report by the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press lays out in detail how the ‘War on Terror’ affects
access to information and the public’s right to know. It cites incidents of the U.S. military
keeping journalists from access to soldiers, for example. It also concludes that the Bush
administration went to unprecedented lengths in their efforts to manage the flow of
information.78
Other Western countries were subject to similar trends. Deadly attacks on the
transportation systems in Madrid and London also fuelled anxiety over terrorism and
gave governments more tolerance and scope for implementing surveillance measures in
the name of the safety of the nation and its citizens.
Even more than ten years after 9/11, its effects are still very pronounced when it
comes to the national security vs. communication rights debate. Current Western
administrations are also trying to control information. The Obama administration has
been criticized for being the most aggressive in its ‘war on leaks’ since the Nixon years,

76 Ibid.
77 David Dadge, The War in Iraq and Why the M edia Failed Us (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006). ix.
78 Homefront Confidential: How the W ar on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public's
Right to Know (2005) 41.
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which has the effect of intimidating government sources who could have important
information relevant to public affairs and keeping them from sharing it with the press.79
In short, 9/11 was a watershed.

It changed Western priorities both in regard to

their civil rights at home and in their policy agenda abroad. Fighting terrorism and
keeping citizens safe started to become the go-to excuse for limiting civil rights, among
them press freedom. It is no surprise, then, that press freedom did not gain much support
in the context of the UN human rights discourse from the West following 9/11.
So although the U.S. rejoined UNESCO in 2003, the visibility o f the press
freedom issue did not increase. The World Summit on the Information Society in the
early 2000s drew some attention to the issue of communication rights, but it was
primarily focused on the Internet and not much came of it anyway. Press freedom
rankings and the number of journalists killed in various countries are often brought up by
Western states at the Universal Periodic Review process at the Human Rights Council,
but actions to elevate the protection of press freedom to a central concern of the human
rights discourse are lacking. It seems like press freedom, or rather the lack of it, is good
enough for the West to be used as a measure to criticize other countries. But it is not good
enough to them to act proactively and seriously address the political importance o f press
freedom as the basis for the implementation of all other human rights.

79 Leonard Jr. Downie and Sara Rafsky, "The Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and
Surveillance in post-9/11 America," Committee to Protect Journalists,
http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php.
80 Ibid.
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Conclusion

The conclusion is thus clear: power and politics trump ideas or norms when it
comes to press freedom at the UN. Kaarle Nordenstreng reached the same conclusion
about the New World Information and Communication Order debate:
NWICO was not really about media or communication but basically about ‘high
politics.’ The first lesson to be learned about the NWICO story is indeed that the
determining factors are socio-economic and geopolitical forces rather than
intellectual and moral arguments. In other words, power rather than reason sets
the rules of debate.81
The New World Information and Communication Order debate dominated
UNESCO in the 1970s and 1980s, but more than twenty years after its end, the same
dynamics seem to be at play when it comes to the area of communication rights at the
UN. Some might argue that this is a natural byproduct of any liberal project in a realist
world, that “the international law of human rights all too often reflects a realist world.”82
But it is difficult to find an area of human rights that historically has been as contested as
the one of communication rights. Other human rights, like women’s rights for example,
have made an enormous amount of progress since 1945, while press freedom and its
cousins have been stuck in the same controversial debates and is still sidelined at the UN.
Compared to other human rights, press freedom had much more time to become
an established international norm given its historical significance in fighting government
oppression. Our thinking on issues such as slavery or racial and gender inequality have
been overhauled. Even the concept of development, which is closely linked to other
human rights such as food security, have undergone a process of rethinking. When it
81 Kaarle Nordenstreng, "The History o f NW ICO and Its Lessons," in From NWICO to WSIS: 30 Years o f
Communication Geopolitics, ed. Divina Frau-Meigs (Bristol, UK and Chicago: intellect, 2012), 36.
82 Forsythe (2012) 317.
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comes to press freedom or even freedom of information that is not the case. Internet
freedom is the latest complication in the discourse, but the debate follows the same
pattern as the discussion over freedom of information at the early stages of the UN and
the New World Information and Communication Order debate during the 1970s.
Strategic and economic interests defeat the notion that the free press is a key liberal
institution that is essential for democracy and human rights.
A similar argument could be made for other civil and political rights, like the right
to peaceful assembly or association. The UN human rights discourse steers clear of these
subjects much like they prefer to stay away from any honest discussion o f press freedom
and its central political role. What this shows, though, is the broader realization that the
human rights regime still inhabits an overwhelmingly realist world, one in which despite
a vast net of transnational actors state power and interests still largely outweigh any
normative progress. In many cases the existence o f transnational actors and the effects of
interdependence and globalization have had a mitigating effect on such normative
progress in the sense that most states do not want to be seen as human rights violators and
sign on to international treaties and obligations. In practice, it often looks differently,
even in the case of such widely championed issue as women’s rights. But in the case of
press freedom states do not even pretend that it is something that needs to be protected or
promoted in their rhetoric. And if they do, it is of marginal concern.
This is further reinforced by the fact that the West was trying to avoid normative
discussions about the role of information and the press during the early stages of the
International Bill of Rights and the New World Information and Communication Order
debate. Granted, they probably knew that during the Cold War this would have been a

futile endeavor due to the opposing ideological points of view. However, Western policy
on communication rights has not changed at all since the end of the Cold War. The early
1990s were marked by Windhoek and the related declarations in order to push for
regional implementation of press freedom standards. Yet, these initiatives coincided with
the enthusiasm for liberal values after the demise of communism. And once the initial
euphoria wore off, not a lot happened in terms of expanding on issues of freedom of
information or of the press. To this day, the International Programme for the
Development of Communication is the main channel for grassroots media development at
the UN. It was underfunded when it was founded and it is underfunded now. Compared
to the rest of the UNESCO Communications and Information operations, under which
press freedom falls, it is the most effective, however.
None of the evidence presented in this and the previous chapter supports the view
that press freedom or even freedom of information or expression is a high priority for the
UN or its Western liberal member states. What is more, the fact that the existing
discourse is void of any real discussion of the role of the press, or media, as a key
political institution can only lead to one conclusion: namely that states do not want to talk
about it. Since a free press is a thom in the side of every government, whether democratic
or not, this may not be surprising. What is surprising, however, is that this matter has
attracted such limited attention so far. A lot of the current human rights literature and
observers agree on the fact that the needed human rights instruments are in place, and that
the real battle now is to implement them. If this is truly the case, then what should be
addressed are the underlying political issues of press freedom, freedom of information,
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freedom of assembly and association and related rights, because they are the key to free,
healthy and prosperous societies.
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CHAPTER 5
NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE PROMOTION OF PRESS
FREEDOM

Introduction

Academics have dedicated many pages of scholarship to the role of the media in
international affairs, because of their many influences on the world. The rise of the mass
media, for instance, has contributed to the democratization of world politics: Foreign
policy used to be in the hands of diplomats, now it is in the hands of everyone. The world
has become a global village because mass media and information and communication
technologies enable information to cross borders fast and easily. Thanks to the Internet
this trend has been further amplified. These days it is not just information that spreads
easily across borders, social movements do, too, and they are facilitated by the media, old
and new.
Media coverage is also said to influence foreign policy, particularly in
democracies, as a result of the CNN effect, for instance.1 War reporting can have serious
consequences for foreign policy as well, as the 2003 Iraq War has shown.2 In some cases,
the media are even powerful enough to incite war, as was the case in Rwanda in the early
1990s, when print and radio media broadcast hate speech against the Tutsis.3

1 See for example Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth o f News, Foreign Policy and Intervention
(London, New York: Routledge, 2002).
2 Lance W. Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston, When the Press Fails: Political Power
and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 2007).
3 Allan Thompson, ed. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (London, A nn Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007).
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But plenty of studies have also found that the media can facilitate peace and
promote human rights, as previous chapters of this dissertation have shown. With such a
wide array of effects, the impact of the media on international politics is therefore
significant. As advocates of press freedom, on which their livelihood and safety depends,
however, the influence of the media is limited. This chapter examines the role o f the
media in the context of promoting freedom of the press and finds that it lacks advocates
and resources, not just in the media themselves, but also in the NGO community and the
public.

The Public Attitude Towards the Press

The days when journalism was seen as an honorable field and journalists were
viewed as the noble defenders of democracy are over. In 2011, 42 percent o f people
participating in a poll conducted by the Pew Center on the People and the Press in the
U.S. said that the media hurt democracy (Figure 3). Overall, public trust in the media in
the U.S. has declined steadily since the 1970s (Figure 4). The most recent polls find that
the news media are among the least trusted institutions.
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The American Public's View of th e M edia's Impact on
Democracy, 1985-2011 (in percent)
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Figure 3. The American Public’s View of the Media’s Impact on Democracy, 1985-2011.4
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Figure 4. The American Public’s Trust in the Mass Media.5

4 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Press W idely Criticized, But Trusted More Than Other
Information Sources #11," http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/22/press-widely-criticized-but-trustedmore-than-other-institutions/9-22-11-11/.
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In a 2013 Gallup poll, only 23 percent of the respondents said that they trusted
television news and newspapers ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot.’ This leaves the news media
just ahead of big business and behind banks in terms of institutional trustworthiness (see
Figure 5).

Gallup Poll: Confidene in Institutions
I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me
how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one - a great deal, quite a lot,
som e or very little?
Congress
Health m aintenance organizations
Organized labor
Big business
Newspapers
Television news
Banks
The criminal justice system
The public schools
The U.S. Supreme Court
The medical system
The presidency
The church or organized religion
The police
Small business
The military
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Figure 5. The American Public’s Confidence in Institutions, 2013.6

Young Americans are equally as skeptical about the media. A 2013 poll
conducted by Harvard’s Institute of Politics found that only 11 percent o f the
approximately 3,000 surveyed young adults between the ages of 18 and 29 have

5 Elizabeth Mendes, "In U.S., Trust in M edia Recovers Slightly From All-Time Low," Gallup,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/164459/trust-media-recovers-slightly-time-low.aspx.
6 Gallup, "Confidence in Institutions," http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx/.
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confidence in the media.7 According to the poll, young Americans trust Wall Street more
than they trust the media to do the right thing all of the time or most of the time.
This loss of trust development is not confined to the American media, however.
Europe is following a similar trend. As Figure 6 shows, the number of people in the EU
who ‘tend not to trust’ the media has gone up since 2003, with the press considerably
ahead of other media outlets in terms of public confidence.
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Figure 6. Public Trust in the Media in the EU.8

Where does this mistrust come from? Research carried out by the Pew Center for
the People and the Press shows that negative views of the news media have increased
considerably over the last 30 years. The number o f survey respondents who think that the
7 Harvard University Institute o f Politics, Survey o f Young Americans' Attitude Toward Politics and Public
Service, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Institute o f Politics, 2013),
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/spring_poll_13_Exec_Summary.pdf 15.
8 Data retrieved from "Eurobarometer Interactive Search System," European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf7index.cfm?lang=en.
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media often publish inaccurate stories, favor one side in their coverage, and are often
influenced by powerful people or organizations is now in the 66, 77 and 80 percent range
respectively (Figure 7). The vast majority of participants also said that news
organizations tried to cover up mistakes (72 percent) as opposed to being willing to admit
mistakes (18 percent). In 1985, 55 percent of respondents said the media were trying to
cover up their mistakes, and 34 said they were willing to admit mistakes.9
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Figure 7. Public Evaluations of Press Performance in America, 1985-2011.10

Another study supports these findings, arguing that the loss of trust in the media is
due to two main factors: elite opinion leadership (that is, partisan media criticism) and
tabloid-style news coverage.11 The consequences o f this increasing public distrust o f the
media are far-reaching. But before addressing them, a closer look at the reasons why the

9 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Press Widely Criticized, But Trusted M ore Than Other
Information Sources #10," http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/22/press-widely-criticized-but-trustedmore-than-other-institutions/9-22-11-10/.
10 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Press Widely Criticized, But Trusted M ore Than Other
Information Sources #9," http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/22/press-widely-criticized-but-trustedmore-than-other-institutions/9-22-11-9/.
11 Jonathan M. Ladd, Why Americans Hate the Media and How It Matters (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2012).
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public has lost confidence in the press, or news media, and the broader driving forces
behind them is warranted.

Business v. Audience Interests

Journalism is vital for a functioning democracy, but it is also a business. As a
consequence, it is driven by market forces. At the same time, news is not a commodity
like any other, which creates problems like inadequate coverage of public affairs, the
‘race to the bottom’ or increased coverage that is biased and caters to people’s already
formed opinions.
There are several characteristics that define the special nature of media products.
First, like public goods, the news and other media products can be watched or read by
anyone without limiting anyone else’s ability to watch or read the same news. Media
products incur high first-copy costs, meaning owners and editors have to invest a lot of
resources to create a news broadcast or article, but once it is published, it does not cost
anything (or very little) to circulate it to any more readers or viewers.12 These factors
make it difficult for media organizations to adequately charge for their news services, so
that they then, in turn, can invest these revenues into better public affairs coverage. What
is more, not being able to exclude people who do not pay for their consumption o f news
might discourage news organizations to create certain types of news.13 This is further
reinforced by the fact that competitors can also use news stories once they are circulated,

12 Edwin C. Baker, Media, Markets and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 810 .

13 James T. Hamilton, All the News That's Fit to Sell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 9.
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which also lowers incentives for original and investigative reporting, as these types of
news take more time and resources.14
Second, news products create positive externalities. Those readers or viewers who
are interested in learning about public affairs will learn about policies, candidate
positions and other issues that will help them make better choices when they go to vote.
This benefits society on the whole, since the votes of better-informed citizens might
positively impact the lives of those who did not take the time to inform themselves on
public affairs issues. However, since readers and viewers do not fully take into account
the impact their reading or watching the news has on society, they will not be likely to
express a great desire to consume the news, hence limiting the demand for it.15
Third, media products are peculiar in that although they cater to advertisers and
audiences, they often only charge the advertisers. Since the value of a product is made up
of the combined value of the product for the advertiser and the audience, this creates
inadequate incentives for the broadcasters to spend resources on quality news
programming. The fact that the media are heavily reliant on advertising creates further
problems. They are often brought up in the context of the claim leveled against the media
that powerful people or organizations have an impact on the nature of news coverage.
Because the media rely on advertisers, they are more likely to modify their coverage in
ways that do not alienate advertisers, thus potentially creating a conflict between the
interests of the audience and those of the advertisers.16 The influence o f advertisers might
also extend to considerations over which target audience the news should cater to. Young

14 Ibid., 3.
15 Ibid., 10-13.
16 Baker (2002) 11-12.
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people are the most sought after advertising target group, but they are also often less
interested in public affairs.17
Related to this third point is another concern many media critics bring up often:
the fact that media ownership has become highly concentrated over the last three decades,
to the point where only a handful of media multinationals own the majority o f media
outlets.18 As a result of this consolidation, journalists are more likely to exercise selfcensorship to avoid a clash with the owner’s interests, critics say.
Fourth, media products are peculiar in that it is difficult for media organizations to
give audiences what they want. The reason for this lies in the difficulty of assessing why
or how audiences value news products.19 Some readers or viewers are interested in local
news, others follow politics in the capital, and another group would like to know the
latest Hollywood gossip.20 Differing interests combined with high costs and the fact that
media products have to be consumed to be fully understood all contribute to the overall
challenge of meeting the needs of the audience while also turning a profit.
Media outlets attempt to tackle this problem by reporting in predictable ways.
Another way is to create brands, which are often focused on the personality o f news
anchors.

This trend has led to media criticism, however, decrying the cult of celebrity

and the watering down of news coverage. In this context, the news media also gain the
reputation for not being an independent watchdog, but rather a lapdog, as journalists rub
shoulders with the rich and the powerful. As journalists become wealthy and/or famous,

17 Hamilton (2004) 4.
18 Dwayne Winseck and Dal Yong Jin, eds., The Political Economies o f Media: The Transformation o f the
Global Media Industries (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 8, 15.
19 Baker (2002) 12.
20 Hamilton (2004) 13.
21 Ibid., 2.
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one expert points out, they “join the country club, and start spending time with people of
power.” 22 They start out on the side of the people, but as they become friends with the
powerful, they stop challenging power, the argument goes.
Another consequence of the business side of journalism and its need to be
profitable is the chase for additional consumers, which results in a ‘raise to the bottom’
because the content will often reflect the preferences of those viewers or readers who are
least interested in public affairs reporting.23 The result is more sensational, tabloid-style
news coverage that Ladd identifies as one of the main reasons for public distrust in the
media.
Interestingly, the very economic and technological forces that drove the broadcast
media towards more partisan coverage in the 1990s were also behind the decline o f the
partisan press in the 19th century. Back then, the availability of high-speed printing
presses made it possible to reach many more customers and in order to reach them and
gain more attention from advertisers, the newspapers refrained from covering events in a
partisan manner.24 The standard of journalistic objectivity was bom.
In the 1990s, however, this trend started to reverse, particularly in the area of
broadcast news. Because the television networks saw increased competition from cable
channels, programmers started to focus on the marginal viewers and other attractive
advertising target groups, who were more interested in soft news programming and issues
that fall on the liberal side of the political spectrum.25 The same rationale was behind the
emergence of the Fox News Channel. Due to the fact that more and more channels

22 William Serrin, The Business o f Journalism, ed. William Serrin (New York: The New Press, 2000). x.
23 Hamilton (2004) 2.
24 Ibid., 3.
25 Ibid.
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competed for viewers, it was not necessary to appeal to a big audience anymore, and the
channel’s coverage started catering to its conservative viewer base.26
With the influx of partisan news, and radio channels and network news aiming at
marginal audiences, it is no surprise that many Americans regard the current news
coverage as extremely biased. While media bias is real, the assumption that the media are
pushing an ideological agenda is not. They are simply driven by market forces.
This is the reason why many observers point out that press freedom in the West is
primarily threatened by economic factors, rather than political ones. Because media
organizations have to turn a profit and are threatened by financial cuts, they have fewer
resources to invest in public affairs coverage and investigative reporting due to the
reasons listed above in more detail. In short, press freedom is threatened not because the
government is trying to control the flow of information, but because the need for profit,
and consolidated ownership by rich and powerful individuals undermines the
independence of the press.
While economic trends are certainly influential, political control still poses the
primary threat to press freedom. This claim is supported by Freedom House statistics.
Freedom House rankings are based on three categories: the legal environment, the
political environment and the economic environment of the country in question.
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In the

2013 edition of the organization’s Freedom of the Press report, Western states score
better in the economic category than in the political one. This shows that despite
worrying economic trends in the Western media landscape, political forces are more
threatening to press freedom - even in the West.
26 Ibid.
27 Freedom House, "Freedom o f the Press 2013 - Methodology,"
http://www.freedomhouse.org/reportyfreedom-press-2013/methodology.
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Ladd’s finding that partisan media criticism is one of the major contributors to the
increasing public distrust of the news media in the U.S. further highlights the political
threat, which press freedom faces. What it comes down to is the fact that those in power
are undermining the press. Politicians have various ways of doing so, from giving out socalled gag orders and passing legislation on confidentiality of journalistic sources to
managing access to official press conferences and other government events and
information. Another, rather successful, way has been to criticize the media in ideological
terms, that is, liberals and conservatives alike condemning the news media for being too
biased. Or, to put it in Craig Crawford’s words: “[politicians won the war against the
media with a simple rule: first, attack the messenger.”28

Consequences o f Public Distrust in the Press

The consequences of this sad state of affairs in media popularity are significant. A
recent American study found that those who distrust the media are less likely to accept
new information from the news media and more likely to turn to partisan outlets for new
information. This means their beliefs also tend to be more partisan and less accurate,
which in turn has an impact on the political system and society as a whole, as citizens
become less informed.29 Furthermore, due to this negative effect on political learning,
electoral outcomes are also impacted. When voting, people who distrust new information
rely more on party identification and less on actual circumstances, like the current

28 Craig Crawford, Attack the Messenger: How Politicians Turn You Against the Media (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 15.
29 Ladd (2012) 138.
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economic situation. Therefore, media distrust has effects on the way the public holds the
government accountable in elections.30
Media distrust affects press freedom as well. If the public does not trust the
media, they are less likely to stand up for the freedom of the press or that of the media.
And if the public does not stand behind them, then who does? Politicians are very
unlikely candidates, because they would like nothing more than to control the flow of
information. As will be discussed later in this chapter, it is also difficult for the media to
take a stand because they are supposed to be objective. If they do lobby governments for
legislation they are blamed for being in cahoots with the rich and powerful, or for being
guided by their rich owners.
This is not to say that the media do not deserve their share in taking the blame for
the increase in public mistrust. The false Benghazi report by CBS’ 60 Minutes and
misleading reports by various media outlets in the wake of the Boston marathon
bombings did not help the reputation of the American television news in 2013.31 Neither
did the actions by the News o f the World reporters in the UK and Rupert Murdoch’s
attempts at keeping politicians from investigating the scandal in recent years.
But despite such regrettable episodes and growing concerns over economic
driving forces behind the news media, it is worth noting that there never was a golden age
of journalism free from economic influences. What is more, the vast majority of
journalists is still very much interested in serving the public. Journalism schools still
teach codes of conduct and professional ethics. And, by and large, news media

30 Ibid., 176.
31 Bill Carter, "The F.B.I. Criticizes the News Media After Several Mistaken Reports o f an Arrest," The
New York Times April 17, 2013. http://www.nytimes.eom/2013/04/18/business/media/fbi-criticizes-falsereports-of-a-bombing-arrest.html
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organizations adhere to them. Luckily, polls also show that the public still recognizes
these circumstances. Journalists have fallen drastically in the public esteem, with only 28
percent of the public saying that journalists contribute a lot to society.32 But the public
also regards the news media as highly professional and believes that journalists care
-7-5

about how good a job they do.

Overall, the American public thinks that the watchdog

role of the press has its merits and keeps political leaders “from doing things that should
not be done.”34
The consolidation of media ownership is a reality and certainly has its drawbacks,
but not all of its consequences might be negative. For example, consolidation of
ownership might mean that news desks can tap into greater resources and invest time and
effort into investigative reporting. This new state of media structure also comes with a
trend towards absentee stockholders, which means a lot of the day-to-day decision
making is left to professional managers and editors who care about more than making
profits.35
In the end, it is important to remember that news media trends, like the rise of
news anchor celebrities, biased coverage and ownership consolidation, are first and
foremost about people and their preferences and not about the media themselves. James
Hamilton argues:
I believe the more fundamental truth is that our problems lie not in our media
stars but in ourselves. Those making efforts to improve media markets need to
32 Pew Research Center on Religion & Public Life, "Public Esteem for Military Still High,"
http://www.pewforum.0rg/Other-Demographics/Public-Esteem-for-Military-Still-High.aspx#joumalists.
33 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Press Widely Criticized, But Trusted M ore Than Other
Information Sources #8," http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/22/press-widely-criticized-but-trustedmore-than-other-institutions/9-22-11-8/.
34 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Press Widely Criticized, But Trusted M ore Than Other
Information Sources #6," http://www.people-press.org/2011/09/22/press-widely-criticized-but-trustedmore-than-other-institutions/9-22-11 -6/.
35 David Demers, Global Media: Menace or Messiah? , Rev. ed. (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2002). 7.
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recognize that news emerges not from individuals seeking to improve the
functioning of democracy but from readers seeking diversion, reporters forging
careers, and owners searching for profits.36
If the public doesn’t want a free press then there won’t be one.37 And if the public
does not stand behind the press, its surrogate, then there is no reason why Western
governments should promote press freedom internationally in the context of promoting
human rights and democracy. While other human rights issues, like equality of women
and minorities, have broad domestic constituencies and thus more visibility, press
freedom advocates find themselves marginalized and with limited resources. More often
than not the first thing they hear when championing the press, is that the media are no
good, biased and run by big business. But by focusing exclusively on the negative aspects
of the press in the West, we undermine its status as a political institution that is the very
basis for the democratic systems in Western liberal states. As one observer puts it:
Corporate and global media are almost always portrayed as organizations that
work to the disadvantage of all except a small group of political and economic
elites. Even when a series of investigative news reporting uncovers wrongdoing
and the political system makes statutory changes that benefit the disadvantaged,
critics typically see this as an anomaly that has virtually no impact on changing
the power structure, even in the long run.38
In reality, it is the opposite. Free and unfettered news media, whether global,
corporate, or local, work to the advantage of all except a small group o f political elites.
Even if they slip up or chase after ever more profit promising formats, the good they
bring far outweighs the bad. Government officials and their access to legitimate violence
is a far greater threat to political and civil rights than media conglomeration or a rogue
reporter here or there.

36 Hamilton (2004) 6.
37 Altschull (1990) 111-12.
38 Demers (2002) 94.
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The good news is that the awareness that the news media are fulfilling an
important political role by keeping politicians in check still remains. In many developing
and emerging countries journalists are, of course, leading human rights defenders, who
try to inform their fellow citizens about the things they need to know and speak truth to
power, in states where this can cost them an extended time in prison or even their life.
Western publics will have to adjust their attitude towards the press and its freedom, if
they want to truly help these human rights defenders and make any advances in
implementing, protecting and promoting civil and political rights internationally - and at
home.

Non-Governmental Organizations

There are, of course, non-governmental organizations that are on the case of
promoting and protecting press freedom. But even here the work that is done is limited.
As of September 2013 there were 36 non-govemmental organizations working on media
and communications related issues registered in consultative status with the UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and other UN agencies.39 To compare, there
are 349 organizations registered that work on women’s rights issues. There are also
several big human rights organizations that promote freedom of expression, freedom of
information and, to a lesser degree, press freedom.40 However, they do not dedicate
significant resources to the advancement of press freedom and related issues.

39 A list o f these organizations is attached as an appendix.
40 These organizations are Freedom House, Amnesty International, Human Rights First, Human Rights
Internet, Human Rights Watch and Internet Society.
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The communications NGOs can be broadly divided into two subcategories. On
the one hand there are the NGOs that mainly represent business interests of various media
organizations. The most notable of these are the Inter-American Press Association, the
International Press Institute, the World Press Freedom Committee, the Association for the
Promotion of the International Circulation of the Press, the International Federation of
Journalists, the International Federation of the Periodical Press, and the International
Publishers Association.
Most of these are not very active at the UN, however. A search of the UN’s
Official Document Search shows that with the exception of the World Press Freedom
Committee all of these organizations are almost exclusively mentioned in UN documents
relating to the annual listing of NGOs in consultative status or the quadrennial report that
is required to maintain their status. The World Press Freedom Committee is also
mentioned in a Universal Periodical Review on Tunisia from 2008, to which it
contributed.41 Mostly, however, the World Press Freedom Committee entries date back to
the 1990s. If they are more recent, they usually refer back to the Committee’s activities in
the 1980s, when it was very active in opposing the proposed New World Information and
Communication Order.
The second category is made up of NGOs that are concerned with human rights
violations, particularly in the field of freedom of expression and press freedom. The most
prominent are the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders/Reporters
Sans Frontieres and Article 19: International Centre against Censorship. The latter two
are considerably more active at the UN than the industry NGOs. Article 19, which gained

41 Human Rights Council, "Summary Prepared by the Office o f the High Commissioner for Human
Rights," (A/HRC/WG.6/1/TUN/3: UN General Assembly, March 11, 2008).
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consultative status in 1991, comes up 208 times in the Official Document Search. Some
documents are related to NGO status, but most results are from ECOSOC documents
(154) and the rest come from the Human Rights Council (54). Reporters Without Borders
is even more active, evidenced by nearly 700 Official Document Search results. Most of
them, roughly 500, are Human Rights Council documents and 78 of those are written
statements submitted by Reporters Without Borders on topics such as the status of press
freedom worldwide,42 the safety of journalists,43 or the situation of press freedom in
specific countries.44
Despite the best efforts o f organizations like Reporters Without Borders, however,
groups working on press freedom and related issues make up only a very small part o f the
overall community of human rights organizations. Even Freedom House, which does
high profile work on the status of global press freedom with its annual Freedom o f the
Press reports, also has an agenda of other issues that it champions at the UN. Overall, the
Official Document Search returns 804 documents on Freedom House, but only 119
feature a mention of press freedom or freedom of the press. Yet, 334 mention the
Internet, Internet freedom or Internet censorship. This is hardly surprising, given the fact
that Freedom House has also been monitoring the state of freedom on the Internet since
2009. However, it also shows the relative priority given to press freedom on the agenda
of many human rights NGOs when they lobby various UN bodies.

42 Human Rights Council,
(A/HRC/23/NGO/37: UN
43 Human Rights Council,
(A/HRC/24/NGO/32: UN
44 Human Rights Council,
(A/HRC/13/NGO/88: UN

"Written Statement Submitted by Reporters Without Borders International,"
General Assembly, M ay 17, 2013).
"Written Statement Submitted by Reporters Without Borders International,"
General Assembly, September 4, 2013).
"Written Statement Submitted by Reporters Without Borders International,"
General Assembly, February 24, 2010).
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The low priority given to press freedom is further demonstrated by the fact that Human
Rights Watch features a press freedom section on its website, but does not employ an
expert on the topic. In fact, the only expert on free speech issues is someone with
expertise in Internet freedom. Similarly, the website of Human Rights First has a whole
section entitled Internet Freedom and Privacy, but press freedom is absent. Searching
their website brings up only 58 results on press freedom altogether.45
Many of the human rights NGOs mentioned above, while active in raising
awareness of press freedom violations, are not directly supported by the media. Many of
their members are journalists and a lot of their leadership and employees are, or were, as
well. However, as listed in Table 2, the most active organizations at the UN in this
regard, tend not to be funded by the media, or if they are, contributions from media
organizations only make up a small part of their budget. Reporters Without Borders, for
example, relies mainly on its own publications (45.4 percent) for its budget. Donations
from corporate entities (which could or could not be media companies) make up 17.8
percent of their most recent budget.46 Article 19, however, does not seem to count any
media organizations among its donors, according to their annual reports. Instead, it is
funded primarily by government and foundation grants.47

45 "Human Rights First - Google Custom Search,"
http://www.google.com/cse?cx=001648087321990522602%3 Abth 1nzx 1is4&ie=UTF 8&q=%22freedom+of+the+press%22&siteurl=www.humanrights first.org%2Four-work%2Fbusiness-andhuman-rights%2Fintemet-freedom-andprivacy%2F&ref=www.humanrightsfirst.org%2F&ss=3620jl529928j24&oq=%22freedom+of+the+press%
22&gs_l=partner.3...98688.102245.0.102433.22.22.0.0.0.0.125.1434.18j4.22.0.gsnos%2Cn%3D13...0.362
Oj 1529928j24..1ac.l .25.partner.. 19.3.110.jfH9yNKW HoI#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=%22press%20freedom%22.
46 Reporters Without Borders, Reporters Without Borders: For Freedom o f Information, (Paris: Reporters
Without Borders, 2011), http://issuu.com/rsf_webmaster/docs/plaquette_issuu_gb/19?e=0. p. 19.
47 Article 19, "Funders," http://www.articlel9.org/pages/en/funders.html.
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Inter-American
Press Association
(LAPA)
International
Press Institute
(IPD
World Press
Freedom
Committee
(WPFC)
Committee to
Protect
Journalists (CPJ)
Reporters
Without Borders
(RWB)
Article 19
Journalists for
Human Rights
Ghr)
IFEX
Reporters
Committee for
the Freedom of
the Press (RCFP)
Association for
the Promotion of
the International
Circulation of the
Press
(DISTRIPRESS)
International
Federation of
Journalists (IFJ)
International
Federation of the
Periodical Press
(FIPP)
International
Publishers
Association (IPA)

Publications or
newspaper chains

yes

unknown

ECOSOC,
since 1953

editors, media
executives, leading
journalists
national and
international news
media organizations

yes

yes

ECOSOC,
since 1993

yes

unknown

UNESCO

media executives,
journalists

yes

no

journalists

corporate, foundations

yes

ECOSOC,
since 1993

human rights/NGO
experts
human rights/NGO
experts, journalists

no

yes

ECOSOC,
since 1991

no

yes

representatives o f IFEX
network organizations

no

yes

journalists, lawyers

corporate, foundation
and individual

no

press distribution
companies^

Yes, in the form o f
membership dues

no

UNESCO

Journalist associations
and trade unions

Yes, in the form o f
membership dues

no

ECOSOC,
since 1953

Media owners,
associations, service
providers and
individuals
Publishing companies
and organizations

Yes, in the form o f
membership dues

no

UNESCO,
WIPO48

Yes, in the form o f
membership dues

no

UNESCO,
WIPO

Table 2. International Press Freedom NGOs.

48 WIPO stands for World Intellectual Property Organisation
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The Committee to Protect Journalists, on the other hand, wants to remain independent
from government influence and does not accept government funds of any kind.49 Instead,
it is funded to a large degree by media organizations and corporations.50
There are also three other notable organizations that work on behalf of journalists
and press freedom, although they do not have consultative status at the UN. These are the
Canadian Journalists for Human Rights, the American Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press and the global network for defending and promoting freedom of expression,
IFEX. The American Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press provides free legal
support to journalists. Journalists for Human Rights is a media development organization
aiming “to make everyone in the world fully aware of their rights.”51 The IFEX network
campaigns “for the free expression rights of all, including media workers, citizen
journalists, activists, artists, scholars.”52
While these organizations can record some victories in their field, overall the
impact of freedom of expression and press freedom NGOs at the UN is limited. This can
be seen by the lack of high profile items on the UN human rights agenda relating to
freedom of expression and press freedom. In some cases, their work is even openly
undermined, as in the case of Reporters Without Borders.
In 2003, ECOSOC suspended Reporters Without Borders’ consultative status with
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the predecessor of the Human Rights
Council, for one year, after some of the NGO’s activists had protested the decision to let
known human rights violator Libya chair the commission. ECOSOC did not even invite

49 Committee to Protect Journalists, "Membership," http://www.cpj.org/zinfo/membership2.html.
50 Committee to Protect Journalists, "Current Supporters," http://www.cpj.org/zinfo/contrib02.html.
51 "About jhr," Journalists for Human Rights, http://www.jhr.ca/en/aboutjhr_leamabout.php.
52 "What We Do," IFEX, http://www.ifex.org/what_we_do/.
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Reporters Without Borders to explain their actions and among those that voted in favor of
suspension were countries like South Africa and Brazil, while Argentina, Ecuador, Japan
and Senegal abstained.53 This shows that it is not only the authoritarian regimes that
make life more difficult for those who aim to promote human rights.
It is difficult to measure NGO impact on the issue o f press freedom in the first
place, since most of them have not focused on this issue specifically. The tagline for
Reporters Without Borders is “for freedom of information.” Article 19 states on its
website that “[f]reedom of expression and freedom of information are fundamental
human rights that are central to freedom and democracy.”54 Even for these organizations
there is no mention of press freedom, which gets mixed in with the theme “Censorship,
Violence & Press Freedom,” and is not even specifically addressed on the theme’s
webpage.55 Similarly, IFEX lists several free expression issues on its website (access to
information, attacks, censorship, digital rights, freedom of assembly, free expression and
the law, and impunity). But press freedom is absent.
The work of these NGOs is further complicated by limited financial and human
resources, which leads them to focus primarily on such issues as media development and
protecting journalists from getting killed, imprisoned and harassed, rather than pushing
for more normative debates about the central role of press freedom in the human rights
discourse.
NGOs like Reporters Without Borders do a great deal of work advocating for
their issues by lobbying international bodies. But they also collaborate with Western
53 "Reporters Without Borders Suspended for One Year from UN Commission on Human Rights,"
Reporters Without Borders, http://ar.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=7619.
54 Article 19, "What We Do," http://www.articlel9.org/pages/en/what-we-do.html.
55 Article 19, "Censorship, Violence & Press Freedom," http://www.articlel9.org/pages/en/censorshipviolence-press-freedom-more.html.
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governments, providing them with information on the status of press freedom in various
countries so that government officials can adequately address the situation at
international meetings if they choose to do. Media corporations or associations also lobby
Western governments, but their efforts are primarily focused on domestic issues and
legislation.

The Media and the Promotion of Press Freedom

The most surprising gap of all is that the media themselves are not that focused on
promoting press freedom either. The news media follow professional codes of conduct
for the most part, but do not often talk about the importance of press freedom. Lobbying
activities by the printing industry in the U.S. is also limited, particularly when compared
to other sectors of the communications industry.
In the U.S., the Communications and Electronics sector has ranked in fourth or
fifth place in terms of expenditures on government lobbying over the past 16 years with
an annual spending between 350 and 400 million dollars in recent years.56 However,
when looking at the breakdown of the sector, it becomes apparent that the printing and
publishing industry has consistently been the lowest spender (see Figure 8) in the sector.
The Computers and Internet industry far outspends newspapers, magazine publishers and
other printing and publishing interests. In 2013, for example, the Newspaper Association
of America spent 690,000 dollars on lobbying efforts according to the Center for

56 Center for Responsive Politics, "Ranked Sectors," OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&indexType=c.
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Responsive Politics. 57 Google, on the other hand, spent nearly 11.5 million dollars. 58 This
does not indicate that the press has a lot of influence on U.S. government policies through
lobbying efforts, particularly if one assumes that more money means more influence.
Such lobbying activities also do not necessarily mean that media organizations
advocate for matters of press freedom. Most of the subjects they lobby for relate to
copyright, science and education issues. Nonetheless, there have been a few freedom of
the press and free flow of information bills for which newspapers and other media
organizations lobbied in 2013, like the Freedom of Information Act, which would
establish a federal shield law for journalists.

Annual Lobbying Expenditures of th e Communications/Electronics
Sector, by Industry, 1998-2013
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Figure 8. Annual Lobbying Expenditures of the Communications/Electronics Sector, by Industry,
1998-2013.59

57 Center for Responsive Politics, "Newspaper Assn o f America," OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000054676&year=2013.
58 Center for Responsive Politics, "Google Inc," OpenSecrets.org,
http ://www.opensecrets .org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000022008&year=2013.
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The Freedom of Information Act of 2013 has not passed, however, and this was
not the first year the act was introduced in Congress. This indicates that the printing and
publishing industry does not have much influence on government policies on freedom of
the press. Influence of lobbying efforts are difficult to measure, of course, but events in
2013 have further underlined that the U.S. government has the upper hand when it comes
to press freedom issues. The Department of Justice seized AP phone records, and Bradley
Manning was, among other things, charged with ‘aiding the enemy’ for leaking classified
documents to WikiLeaks. Although he was cleared of it, the fact that he was even
charged with this serious offense sent a chill down many a journalist’s spine, worrying
about the future of investigative reporting in the U.S. At the end of the day, it seems,
there is only so much NGOs and media corporations can do in terms of exercising
influence over legislators, especially if the public is ambivalent about the role and
benefits of the news media, and the media themselves are not a very active promoter of
press freedom.
The news media are not openly campaigning for press freedom, given the nature
of news making. Journalists are supposed to be objective, not push an ideological agenda.
Journalism ethics and codes of conduct help ensure that journalists meet the obligations
of accurate, independent and accountable reporting that come with their jobs. Most codes
of conduct focus on the practical aspects of the day to day work of a journalist. But some
also compel journalists to uphold and defend the principle o f press freedom. The media
have access to the public at their disposal, of course, but at the same time they are
committed to objectivity, which has been discussed at length in both the academic and
59 Data compiled from Center for Responsive Politics, "Communications/Electronics," OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2014&ind=B. 2013 numbers include data up to
the end o f October.
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journalist community as a concept, but boils down to its contemporary form of making
sure all sides of an issue are equally presented, without any judgment or emotion. And
covering press freedom is no exception, even though it goes straight to the very core of
the news media’s professional codes of conduct.
The New York Times archive contains 9,770 articles indexed for the subject of
freedom of the press since 1851. This is not a bad result compared to other topics such as
religious freedom (2,790 articles), freedom of assembly (3,530 articles), equal rights
(3,760 articles), and freedom of information (5,750 articles). Free speech, however,
trumps press freedom quite considerably with 55,100 articles.60
Between 1990 and 2007, an average of 49 stories per year appeared on freedom of
the press (see Figure 9), a meager number. The results are slightly better, when including
the New York Times blogs in recent years, but even those do not increase the number as
much as one might expect, with the archive registering 580 blog entries on press freedom
overall.61 In 2008, the number of articles doubled and remained at an annual average of
103 articles since then. This rise might be explained by the increasing threats on press
freedom globally and in Russia and China particularly, as these two countries feature
most prominently in the New York Times coverage on press freedom in 2008. The highest
number of articles appeared during 2011 as a result of the Arab Spring and more
importantly, the breaking of the News o f the World hacking and bribery scandal in the
UK.

60 Results gathered from the New York Times online search tool at "New York Times Online Search Tool Freedom o f the Press Articles,"
http://query .nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/#/%22freedom+of+the+press%22/since 1851 /articles/.
61 "New York Times Online Search Tool - Freedom o f the Press Blogs,"
http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/#/%22freedom+of+the+press%22/sincel 8 5 1/blogs/.
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Number of Articles on "Freedom of th e Press" in the New York
Times, 1990-2013
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Figure 9. N um ber of Articles on “F reedom o f the P ress” in the New York Times, 1990-2013.62

Most of these articles are, as one might expect, objective reports on domestic
press freedom issues. Only a small percentage of articles, however, appear in the opinion
section of the paper, where journalists are allowed to take sides and defend the value and
system of press freedom. It has been said, though, that the editorial pages do not have as
large an audience as the news sections.63
Searches of other newspapers paint a similar picture. According to the Factiva
database, the Washington Post published 1,599 articles on freedom of the press and/or
press freedom since 1990. For the British Guardian it were 3,330 articles and the
database counted 2,216 in The Times. The French Le Figaro published 612 articles on
“liberte de la presse” during this time. The volume of articles published by news agencies
like Reuters and AP is in general higher, which explains the bigger number of press
62 "New York Times Online Search Tool - Freedom o f the Press Articles".
63 J. Herbert Altschull, Agents o f Power: The M edia and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman
Publishers USA, 1995). 63.
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freedom related articles for these two outlets (11,261 for AP and 7,834 for Reuters).
Reuters for example, delivers more than two million unique stories per year.64 Nearly
eight thousand articles on press freedom over the span of thirteen years, thus does not
constitute a significant share of Reuters’ overall output. Overall, therefore, these numbers
show that the topic of press freedom gamers only moderate coverage in major print news
outlets. It is also interesting to note that when searching within the press freedom results
for UN related coverage, the results are even more limited, as Table 3 shows.
Human rights gain the highest amount of coverage in the context of press
freedom, but the UN in general, and UNESCO in particular, are only subject of a small
number of articles. In fact, a search for press freedom and the Human Rights Council
returns no results whatsoever. There also does not seem to be a lot of connections drawn
between press freedom and individual rights when it comes to news coverage o f the
topic. And lastly, even the UN’s flagship press freedom awareness raising campaign,
World Press Freedom Day, receives a measly amount of coverage in most of the
surveyed publications, given it has been around since 1993.
In terms of professional conduct of journalists and news outlets, these findings are
good news. They show that the press is not abusing its resources to advance their own
political and ideological agenda by publishing article after article on press freedom or
starting publicity campaigns against anyone who threatens press freedom. They are still
offering their audience fair and balanced accounts. Not even the opinion and editorial
pages are filled with this one topic, no matter how close to the hearts of journalists and
editors it might be.

64 Thomson Reuters, 2013 Fact Book, (New York: Thomson Reuters, 2013),
http://ar.thomsonreuters.com/_files/pdf/IR_FactBook.pdf. 67.

■

151

1,885

318

10

144

588

42

1,599

137

19

31

486

19

3,330

57

42

31

574

20

2,216

61

14

24

550

21

612

38

2

23

211

2

AP

11,261

589

274

190

2,361

49

Reuters

7,834

619

174

111

2,162

14

New York
Times65
Washington
Post
The
Guardian
The Times
(London)
Le Figaro66

Table 3. Number of articles on press freedom and UN related coverage in seven major international
publications since 1990.67

In the UK, despite their access to audiences, the newspapers were unsuccessful in
creating enough public opposition to reject the imposition of a royal charter creating a
press regulator in 2013. This new regulator will have greater powers than its predecessor,
will draw up a code of standards and will be able to fine the press in violation of these
standards up to one million British pounds.68 This shows that the findings on the limited
coverage of press freedom above are also bad news, since promoting press freedom is
also in the public interest. After all, press freedom is the key to self-government and
individual rights, without which democracy cannot be sustained. But if the press does not
promote press freedom more visibly - and they do not do so for good reason - then who
will?

65 Discrepancies between the results from the Factiva database and the New York Times online archive
might be due to overlap between the search terms ‘press freedom’ and freedom o f the press’ in the latter.
66 French search terms were used.
67 "Factiva," Dow Jones, http://global.factiva.com/sb/default.aspx?lnep=hp.
68 "Press Regulation: Privy Council Grants Royal Charter," BBC NewsfOctober 30, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24746137.
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In some cases, the press even undermines its own interests and status as a political
institution. For instance, while the majority of British newspapers strongly opposed the
implementation of legislation that would regulate the press following the release o f the
Leveson report in November 2012, the Guardian expressed a favorable view toward the
proposed legislation.69 What is even worse, however, are the actions by the News o f the
World reporters, editorial and executive board that led to the Leveson inquiry in the first
place. They hacked (or allowed their employees to hack) into phones of victims o f the
2005 London terror attacks, relatives of deceased soldiers and others, bribed police
officers to gain stories, topped off by owner Rupert Murdoch pressuring high-level
politicians to not investigate the scandal.
Such misbehavior can have dramatic consequences not just for the press in the
UK, but in less democratic places around the world. As then-editor in chief of the New
York Times, Bill Keller, puts it: “Despots love to see a free press behaving badly.”70 It
gives them an excuse to make the case against an unfettered press. And their argument is
further fueled by a Western response to such scandals that advocates press regulation, as
demonstrated by the following quote by a spokesman for Robert Mugabe’s oppressive
Zimbabwean regime:
[T]he hacking scandal should serve as a lesson to the Third World that the
concept of free media is a myth, saying people should judge from the way the
British government has reacted to the scandal that even the West can not practice
what they preach.71

69 "Press Regulation: Lord Justice Leveson Throws the Ball Back," The Guardian(November 29, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/29/press-regulation-lord-justice-leveson-editorial.
70 Bill Keller, "Why Tyrants Love the Murdoch Scandal," N ew York 77»tes(July 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/magazine/why-tyrants-love-the-murdoch-scandal.html.
71 "Media Practitioners Warned," Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Wews(July 18, 2011),
http://www.zbc.co.zw/news-categories/local-news/10497-media-practioners-wamed.html.
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The press and its freedom, in short, are easily criticized and criticism often comes
from more than just the government, and sometimes from the media themselves. This is
not to say that the media do not stand up for press freedom. Many newspapers in the UK
strongly and publicly opposed the establishment of the new press council, albeit
unsuccessfully. At the international level, news organizations occasionally even join
forces in criticizing the press freedom practices of governments. In 2010, for example,
several major news agencies (the AP, Reuters, Bloomberg and Agence France-Press)
wrote a letter to South African president Jacob Zuma to protest the planned ‘protection of
information’ bill and further legislation that would establish a media tribunal in order to
punish inaccurate reporting.72 Such instances of united action are rare, however.
What is more, news agencies have been the target of international criticism
themselves for most of the last century. Since World War II they have been at the center
of the communications debate at the UN as well. Because the major news agencies
originated in Europe and the U.S., the Soviets and Third World countries leveled
allegations of colonialism and bias against them for two main reasons. First, they argued
that the agencies focused only on news that was relevant to colonial powers. Second, they
worried that agency coverage of the Third World was almost exclusively negative,
reporting mainly about civil wars, famines and natural disasters. Since people’s
perceptions are defined by what they read and see in the media, Third World countries
were concerned about negative coverage by the Western news agencies.73

72 "Global News Agencies Uneasy Over South Africa's Press Freedom," Christian Science
Monitor^September 7, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.eom/W orld/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2010/0907/Globalnews-agencies-uneasy-over-South-Africa-s-press-ffeedom/(page)/3.
73 McPhail (2010) 274.
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These two arguments were central to the New World Information and
Communication Order debate in the 1970s and 1980s. The days of the New World
Information and Communication Order also provide an instance in which the Western
media did indeed get organized and rallied in favor of protecting press freedom,
particularly when they saw their business interests threatened. As Table 2 shows, as in
other industries, there are non-governmental organizations that advocate for the interests
of their members working in or owning media enterprises. In this context, a closer look at
the World Press Freedom Committee and its actions during the New World Information
and Communication Order debate is in order to highlight that the media can be effective
in opposing international attempts at curbing press freedom.
The World Press Freedom Committee began operations in May 1976 as a non
governmental organization aimed at coordinating the policies and actions o f the
International Press Institute and the Inter-American Press Association.74 One o f the
NGO’s first major tasks was to stage protests in response to the Inter-American Press
Association’s ban from a 1976 UNESCO conference in Costa Rica. They did so by
setting up office across from the conference hotel, monitoring developments, issuing
statements, briefing reporters, and generally getting the word out about a conference that
otherwise might not have garnered any public attention.75
Other successes followed. The threat of a publicity campaign led by the World
Press Freedom Committee was able to persuade the UNESCO leadership to meet with
media organizations and discuss their concerns over allegations of media imperialism and

74 Dana Bullen and World Press Freedom Committee, Voices o f Freedom: The Story o f the World Press
Freedom Committee (Reston, VA: World Press Freedom Committee, 2002). 2-4.
75 Ibid., 7.
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threats to establish greater media regulation.76 In 1981, the World Press Freedom
Committee was able to raise enough awareness to gain media attention and news
coverage of a UNESCO meeting discussing the licensing of journalists that was supposed
to be held in secret.

77

They also worked with the U.S. government and media

organizations like newspapers and news agencies to coordinate the U.S. response to the
1976 UNESCO conference in Nairobi.78 The World Press Freedom Committee also
started to implement media assistance projects in Third World countries to improve news
media around the world and to help eliminate many misconceptions that existed about the
international news agencies and the Western press.79
The organization’s objections to UNESCO’s Mass Media Declaration fell on deaf
ears initially, but after increased rallying and lobbying efforts, the revisions proposed by
the World Press Freedom Committee were passed. Although the result was not perfect in
the eyes of the Western media lobby, the Committee’s efforts brought some success.80
The biggest achievement for the World Press Freedom Committee, however, was the
Declaration of Talloires, signed by 63 delegates from 21 countries from around the world
in May 1981.
At Talloires, delegates from independent news organizations gathered to declare
that international efforts to regulate the media be abandoned and set out to propose and
implement practical steps to help the media in the Third World. They declared: “Press
freedom is a basic human right. We pledge ourselves to concerted action to uphold this

76 Ibid., 13.
77 Ibid., 41-43.
78 Ibid., 11.
79 Ibid., 17.
80 Ibid., 22-25.
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right,” and laid out global press freedom principles.81 These principles were further
consolidated in the 1987 ten-point Charter for a Free Press.
Since then, however, efforts by the World Press Freedom Committee have
become fewer. This is to a large degree due to the end of the Cold War and the end o f the
New World Information and Communication Order debate. The West won and with it
capitalism and Western media multinationals. While the World Press Freedom
Committee and other organizations were still active on issues such as opposing insult
laws during the 1990s, the threat of media regulation had largely disappeared and with it
the visibility of the World Press Freedom Committee and its friends. This shows that
although media organizations rally when their interests are at stake, these interests are
most important when they coincide with business interests and, in the case of New World
Information and Communication Order, with the political position of the Western
governments. The World Press Freedom Committee and company might have been able
to raise awareness of UN efforts to constrain press freedom; their overall successes were
limited, however. Not the threat of media NGOs incentivized UNESCO to rethink its
press freedom policy, but the withdrawal of the U.S. and UK from the organization, and
ultimately the end of the Cold War, did.
So while the media provide a useful service to the promotion of Western values in
general, they are, politically speaking, not much of an influential force internationally,
even when their most basic principle, press freedom, comes under attack. Western media
products export Western values, and are thus influential in a cultural sense. As a unified
political actor on the international stage, however, their impact is minimal. In a brief

81 "Declaration of Talloires," World Press Freedom Committee,
http://www.wpfc.org/DeclarationofTalloires.html.
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overview of a global understanding of the media, Jean Seaton writes that they should help
monitor and hold accountable NGOs because they “act in our name, with our money, and
what they do influences everyone’s future.”82 For the same reasons, they should also
monitor and hold accountable the UN, which might also explain the reluctance of UN
bureaucrats to elevate press freedom to more than a tool to promote and monitor freedom
of expression. All office holders, after all, are interested in sustaining their power, and
press freedom often runs counter to this interest. It would not be surprising, if the UN
leadership is no exception. In any case, the absence of a strong lobby for press freedom at
the UN suggests that the media should take on more than simply its cultural and
economic role and become more of a political actor in the international arena.

Conclusion

Press freedom is being attacked across the globe, it is neglected as a human right
at the UN and it has only a small number of highly visible organizations that work on its
behalf. Governments try to undermine press freedom to control the flow of information
and consolidate their power. The media and journalists themselves (mostly) uphold the
principle of press freedom through their work, by adhering to journalistic standards of
fairness, accuracy, transparency and objectivity. But because they are sworn to these
principles, there is a limited degree to which they can use their news outlets for publicity
campaigns for the issue of press freedom, even if they wanted to. The NGO community is
active in areas such as the safety of journalists, media development and more general

82 Jean Seaton, "Global Understanding," in Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the
Internet in Britain, ed. James Curran and Jean Seaton (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 323.
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freedom of expression issues. But their resources are limited, especially those focusing on
press freedom, and particularly when compared to the resources that go into the
promotion of other human rights.
The public, which should support a free press, is turning increasingly against it in
Western democracies. The public view is increasingly that the news is biased and
inaccurate and journalists are controlled by the rich and powerful and news reporting is
only an afterthought to making profits. Arguments like these are ubiquitous in the press
freedom debate in the West. Economic forces are causing the news media to undermine
press freedom themselves, the argument goes. But the much more worrying trend is that
Western politicians are increasingly successful in undermining the news media. Their
preferred techniques used to be things like managing access to officials and information.
These days they engage in partisan media criticism to turn the public against the media,
or they exploit the misbehavior of some journalists to constrain all of them.
The politicians are winning the upper hand against the one of the institutions that
is meant to represent the voice of the people. This has serious consequences not only for
the media, but for democracy itself. Public distrust of the news media leads to a neglect
of press freedom on all fronts, a trend that needs to be corrected as soon as possible, if the
state-society balance is to remain a democratic one in the West, and if the principle o f a
free press is to be exported to other parts of the world. Mistrust of the press leads to
people, organizations and governments not caring about the press and this development is
reinforced by the emphasis on the Internet and the widespread view that the Internet is
the cure-all to the problems with the press. But as chapter six will show, the press is not
obsolete in the age of the Internet. On the contrary, it is needed more now than ever.
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CHAPTER 6
PRESS FREEDOM IN THE INTERNET AGE

Introduction

Press freedom is neglected by states and the human rights community.
Government interests in sustaining their own power runs counter to promoting a
watchdog press. The UN debate on press freedom, when it happens, is mired in power
politics and finger-pointing. The few NGOs working on behalf of press freedom grapple
with limited resources. And the media, particularly those dealing in news, face a whole
onslaught of complications: Increasing tabloidization, the steady replacement of hard
news by soft news, shrinking newsrooms, rising public mistrust of the media, falling
viewer- and readerships. In addition, the advent o f new information and communication
a^iews media landscape that is as
citizen journalists, political bloggers and social media as by traditional reporters and
news outlets.
The area of communication rights has always been murky. There has been talk
about free speech, freedom of expression, freedom of information, the right to
communicate, and press freedom. Clear definitions of these are rare, however, and even
more rare are distinctions drawn between these concepts. With the advent o f the Internet,
the field of communication rights has become even more complex.
Reporters Without Borders changed its official tagline from “Reporters Without
Borders for Press Freedom” to “Reporters Without Borders for Freedom o f Information”
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in 2005 to be more inclusive of bloggers and other Internet activists who also face threats
in many countries due to publication of their political opinions. However, the debate is a
complicated one and one that is constantly evolving.1 Other NGOs have also been putting
more weight on issues of Internet freedom in recent years.2
At the UN, the World Summit on the Information Society, which was held in
2003 in Geneva and 2005 in Tunis and has generated numerous follow-up meetings,
focused specifically on the digital divide and its implications for the world. Press freedom
did not play any significant role in the WSIS deliberations. The most recent outcome
reports from 2012 and 2013, while heavy on the issue of Internet freedom, feature no
mention of press freedom or even journalists, despite discussing the action line ‘access to
information and knowledge.’3
Western governments have also put more international rhetoric and resources into
Internet freedom than they have into press freedom. In 2010, then-Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton spoke about the importance of Internet freedom and what the U.S. was
doing and would do to support it globally:
We are making this issue a priority in at the United Nations as well, and included
internet freedom as a component in the first resolution we introduced after
returning to the UN Human Rights Council. [...] I'm announcing that over the
next year, we will work with partners in industry, academia, and non
governmental organizations to establish a standing effort that will harness the
power of connection technologies and apply them to our diplomatic goals.4
A 2013 White House factsheet on the Obama administration’s international
leadership on human rights states that: “With over 120 million in Internet freedom grants
1 Delphine Halgand, "Personal Interview," (November 19, 2013).
2 HRW ’s only expert in the field o f free speech, for instance, is Cynthia Wong on Internet freedom. Since
2009, Freedom House is also producing a Freedom on the Net report.
3 ITU, "WSIS Forum 2012 Outcome Document: Identifying Emerging Trends and a Vision Beyond 2015,"
(Geneva: ITU, 2012). And ITU, "WSIS Forum 2013: Outcome Document," (Geneva: ITU, 2013).
4 Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom, (Newseum, Washington, D.C.January 21, 2010),
http://www.cfr.org/intemet-policy/clintons-speech-intemet-freedom-january-2010/p21253.
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since 2008, the United States has made Internet freedom a central program and foreign
policy priority.”5 A comparison of the issue pages on Internet freedom and freedom of
the press by the Department of State shows where the administration’s focus lies. The
Internet freedom page outlines in detail what actions and initiatives the Department of
State has taken to support online freedom internationally.6 The page on press freedom,
on the other hand, is only two paragraphs long and simply lauds journalists for their
important and often dangerous work.7
Media development assistance from global donors amounted to nearly half a
billion dollars in 2010.8 With 222 million dollars the U.S. spent considerably more on
media assistance in 2010 than in previous years. However, most of the funds went into
establishing and supporting independent media in Afghanistan and Iraq, and media
assistance made up only 0.4 percent of the total U.S. foreign aid spending.9 What is more,
the Center for International Media Assistance found that, especially since the Arab
Spring, more investment had flown towards digital technology and the Internet, often at
the expense of traditional journalism training.10
Does this mean, then, that press freedom has become obsolete in the digital age?
Is the reason why states and the human rights community neglect press freedom that

5 White House, "Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Leadership on International Human Rights,"
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/fact-sheet-obama-administration-leadershipintemational-human-rights.
6 United States Department of State, "Internet Freedom,"
http://www.state.gOv/e/eb/cip/netfreedom/index.htm.
7 United States Department of State, "Press Freedom," http://www.state.gOv/j/drl/press/index.htm.
8 Center for International Media Assistance, "Empowering Independent Media: US Efforts to Foster a Free
Press & an Open Internet Around the World," (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy,
2012), 14.
9 Ibid., 12.
10 Ibid., 14, 17.
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Internet freedom is a panacea to abuses of all communication rights? The answer to both
questions is a clear no. This chapter will outline why.

Internet Freedom vs. Press Freedom

Internet freedom and freedom of the press clearly belong to the communication
rights category. But despite the fact that they are related, and often equated in their
importance for protecting freedom of expression, they are still two different concepts. To
put it in the words of a former UNESCO Assistant Director-General, “while what we
often call “new media” technologies always imply the fundamental right to freedom of
expression for the individual, they do not necessarily imply freedom of the press.”11
The Internet and other new media technologies make it easier for people to spread
or publish their own opinions, be it through text message, social media status update or a
blog. As argued in more detail in chapter 2, however, giving everyone the means and
right to freely express themselves, does not automatically grant press freedom. The
reason is simple: “One can safely say that contestation around press freedom in general is
fundamentally around public power - and in particular about journalism, the form of
communication that deals with power.”

19

One of the central aspects of promoting press freedom is that a free press has a
mass audience. When information and opinions are published by the press they are more

11 Abdul Waheed Khan, "The Same Principles Apply to the New and Old Media," in New M edia - The
Press Freedom Dimension: Challenges and Opportunities o f New Media fo r Press Freedom (Paris:
UNESCO and World Press Freedom Committee, 2007), 76.
12 Guy Berger, "New Media and Old: A Need to Share Common Press Freedom Interests," in New Media The Press Freedom Dimension: Challenges and Opportunities o f New Media fo r Press Freedom (Paris:
UNESCO and World Press Freedom Committee, 2007), 14.
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likely to reach a critical mass, which is necessary to affect political change, and thus has
an impact on the power relationship between the state and society. It is hardly surprising
that governments prefer to support Internet freedom rather than press freedom, given that
freedom of expression is not necessarily a threat to state power, while press freedom
almost always is. Again, Russia under Putin deserves to be mentioned here, since he
claims to be fully supportive of freedom of expression, but only to the point where it does
not affect his power. As a consequence, the few independent journalists remaining active
in Russia are stifled by the government, most recently by the introduction of a series of
repressive measures expanding regulatory tools.13
O f course, these days there are political bloggers and other activists who primarily
reach their audience through the Internet, and some have audiences big enough to
threaten state power. This explains why more and more netizens are targeted by
authoritarian regimes and thrown in jail or even killed. According to numbers from
Reporters Without Borders 38 netizens and citizen journalists were killed in 2013.14 The
year before it was 49, a drastic increase from 10 reported netizen killings in 2011.
One reason why the international community tends to pin its hopes on the Internet
and new media is the fact that in many authoritarian countries the traditional media are
firmly in the hands of the state. Supporting new media and ICTs in those countries thus
promises to give more power to people. For instance, when the Mubarak regime shut off
the Internet in Egypt for a day in 2011 during the Arab Spring, Google went live with a
speak-to-tweet service that Egyptians could use to stay connected via Twitter by simply

13 Freedom House, "Freedom o f the Press 2013: Russia," http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/2013/russia#.UubJrfQo5As.
4 Reporters Without Borders, "2013: Netizens and Citizen Journalists Killed," http://en.rsf.org/pressffeedom-barometer-netizens-and-citizen-joumalists.html?annee=2013.
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calling one of the provided phone numbers, without the need for an Internet or cell phone
connection.15
Nonetheless, the traditional media should not be forgotten, since they are still the
best way to reach a mass audience. During the Arab Spring, for instance, satellite TV,
particularly A1 Jazeera, played a crucial role in scaling the protest movement up from a
few hundred to several hundreds of thousands.16 Supporting press freedom is thus still as
relevant as ever, despite the advances new media have made in giving people the means
to free expression.
This becomes even more obvious when considering that the latest Freedom House
report on the Internet found that “[d]igital media in several of the 60 countries covered
was relatively unobstructed when compared to the more repressive or dangerous
environment for traditional media.”17 At a 2007 UNESCO conference co-sponsored by
the World Press Freedom Committee on new media and press freedom, experts pointed
out that there is silo thinking among the realms of the old and new media.18 And although
Internet freedom and press freedom are two sides of the same coin and should be
advocated together, the trend in recent years is going towards more emphasis on Internet
freedom.

15 Official Google Blog, "Some Weekend Work That Will (Hopefully) Enable More Egyptians to Be
Heard," http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/some-weekend-work-that-will-hopefully.html.
16 Alterman (Fall 2011) 104-10.
17 Sanja Kelly et al., Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment o f Internet and Digital Media,
(Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, October 3, 2013),
http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf. 26.
18 Berger (2007) 17.
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Freedom of Information vs. Press Freedom

The Internet and other information and communication technologies have also
had an impact on how people think about freedom of information. Due to these
technologies the flow of information has not only accelerated, but also expanded. There
is so much information available at all times now that the Internet age is also becoming
the age of information overload. And so the sense-making and educational role o f the
press is needed now more than ever.
Although some might regard the press as obsolete in an age where governments
can communicate directly with citizens through websites and social media, it still has a
vital task to fulfill in informing and educating the public. In Western democracies, in
theory, citizens simply need a computer or smart phone and Internet access in order to
read up on government policies, legislation, other public affairs topics or about what is
happening abroad. Governments and other organizations publish policy papers, speeches,
statistics and other data constantly through their websites. As do plenty of political
bloggers and activists. But, as the Ian Katz character puts it in the movie The Fifth Estate
in reference to WikiLeaks, “[a]nyone can take a bundle of information, toss it up on a
website and call it news. But people buy our papers for something a little more
discerning.”19
Indeed, as we grapple with information overload, we need journalists to sift
through information, tell us what is important, and package it in a way that is accessible
and understandable. Having freedom of information and an Internet accessible to all does

19 The character o f former Guardian deputy editor Ian Katz, as quoted in The Fifth Estate, (Dir. Bill
Condon: Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, 2013).
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not guarantee an informed public. Many people do not have the time or interest to
immerse themselves in public affairs research in order to make informed decisions. In
fact, studies have shown that the Internet, too, is making the information-rich richer, and
the information-poor poorer. Even though it is easier to access information, the new
information resources that are a result of the Internet are more likely to be used by those
who are politically knowledgeable and from a higher socioeconomic status.
But the average citizen also needs the necessary information about the pressing
issues of public life in order to participate in political decision-making. In the words of
two journalism experts: “Journalism goes where its audience cannot or will not.”21 And
that applies as much to far away countries as to the depths of information and data we are
confronted with in the digital age.
Of course, the digital revolution has brought many improvements. Now that
practically anyone with a phone and Internet access can take and upload pictures or
videos to Twitter or YouTube, and citizen journalists can contribute to traditional news
websites or get political on their own blogs, more voices can get heard. New media can
provide information and points of views that enrich the public sphere, voices that might
not be able to be heard through traditional communication channels.
Furthermore, in some cases citizen journalists and bloggers can act as additional
fact checkers or watchdogs, thus making the press more accountable as well. Those that
are worried about the press getting too powerful or irresponsible should welcome citizen
journalism as a tool to ensure that the press is doing its job of informing and educating
20 Jennifer Brundidge and Ronald E. Rice, "Political Engagement Online: Do the Information-Rich Get
Richer and the Like-Minded More Similar?," in Routledge Handbook o f Internet Politics, ed. Andrew
Chadwick and Philip N. Howard (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 149.
21 George Kennedy and Daryl Moen, eds., What Good Is Journalism? H ow Reporters and Editors Are
Saving America's Way o f Life (Columbia, MO: University o f Missouri Press, 2007), I.
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citizens on public affairs. Ideally, the Internet can bring journalism closer to the people,
making sure that the press stays in touch with its constituency, the public.
Accounts of the demise of the press, on the other hand, seem premature. For all
the positive developments the Internet and ICTs have brought, there are also considerable
drawbacks. In authoritarian regimes, the Internet can become as much a tool of
government oppression as of democratization, as Evgeny Morozov convincingly argues
in The Net Delusion?2
In the developed world, too, the Internet has not just affected democracy
positively. Some have argued that instead of enhancing the diversity of the public sphere,
the Internet creates “echo chambers,” in which people’s existing attitudes and opinions
are reinforced rather than challenged or changed.23 Conclusive empirical evidence to
support these arguments is still lacking, but the notion that the Internet is a “breeding
ground for extreme opinions” has been around almost as long as the Internet.24 In
addition, some find excessive personalization and the increasingly widespread option to
filter news according to personal preferences and interests concerning. They argue that it
keeps people from stumbling upon information or points of view that they would
otherwise not come across. The public debate thus becomes poorer instead of richer.25
Other studies have also found that online politics has been less open and diverse
than expected: Although countless political bloggers are active and a lot of citizencreated content is available online, there has not been a shift from big outlets to smaller

22 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The D ark Side o f Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs,
2011 ).
23 Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007). xi.
24 Geert Lovink, Networks Without a Cause: A Critique o f Social Media (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
2011). 17.
25 Sunstein (2007) 4-6.
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ones.26 In fact, the majority of the top 25 news sites in the U.S. in 2011 were made up of
newspaper websites (eleven), broadcast network television or cable news sites (six) and
the Reuters website. 27 Even Google News, which only a few years ago at its launch was
seen as the biggest threat to traditional news outlets, directs most of its traffic to legacy
news sites.28
In this context it should also be noted, that only a small percentage of bloggers
focuses on politics to begin with, “most are focused on describing their personal
experiences to a relatively small audience of readers.”

This means that there are a lot of

new voices out there, but politics or even public affairs are not a high priority for their
online musings. It also means that ordinary citizens may be able to write things online,
but it is highly unlikely that others will see it.

Or, in the words o f another observer,

“[w]hen everyone broadcasts, no one is listening.”31 Indeed, the fact that the informationrich are getting richer, and political debate and participation is firmly in the hand o f the
well-off and well-educated, is backed up by more recent surveys.32
New media has also had negative effects on traditional journalism, which is also a
reason why the two are commonly being pitted against each other. With the advent o f the
Internet, newspapers experienced a dramatic loss of advertising revenues and thus had to
cut costs, which allows for fewer resources and investment into investigative reporting.

26 Matthew Hindman, The Myth o f Digital Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 133.
27 Kenneth Olmstead, Amy Mitchell, and Tom Rosenstiel, "Navigating News Online: The Top 25," Pew
Research Journalism Project, http://www.joumalism.org/201 l/05/09/top-25/.
28 Kenneth Olmstead, Amy Mitchell, and Tom Rosenstiel, "Navigating News Online: Google Drives M ost
Users," http://www.joumalism.org/2011/05/09/google-drives-most-users/.
29 Amanda Lenhart and Susannah Fox, Bloggers: A Portrait o f the Internet's New Storytellers,
(Washington, D.C.: Pew Internet & American Life Project, July 19, 2006),
http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2006/Bloggers.aspx.
30 Hindman (2009) 142.
31 Lovink (2011)7.
32 Aaron Smith, Civic Engagement in the Digital Age, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, April 25,
2013), http://pewintemet.Org/~/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_CivicEngagementintheDigitalAge.pdf.
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Furthermore, websites like YouTube and Twitter have, much like the arrival of cable
news before them, made it much more difficult for journalists to keep up with the
constant stream of news and work to deadlines. As a result, substance has been suffering
as a consequence of placing more and more emphasis on speed and scoops to keep up.33
To be fair, the news media had done a pretty good job of undermining themselves,
even before the Internet came along. Practices such as horserace campaign coverage or
the general ‘he said she said’ reporting style justified under the cherished but misguided
journalistic principle of objectivity had already helped to erode the quality of hard news
reporting. Increased competition and financial imperatives, as discussed in the previous
chapter, led to tabloidization and further damaged the news media output and
consequently its reputation.
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that many see the press as having passed
its zenith, or worse, that it is, or in the near future is going to be, obsolete. Defenses o f the
press and their vital work have been rare in recent years. If they do occur they usually
come from experienced journalists themselves, often offering prescriptions for how the
press can improve its work and adapt to the new media environment. For example,
Charlie Becket, a former British journalist for the BBC and Channel 4 News, defends
journalism as follows:
Journalism matters. We live in a much more interconnected world where
information is ever-more critical to our lives. And it is journalism that conveys
that data and allow us to debate its significance.34

33 Peter Hamby, "Did Twitter Kill the Boys on the Bus? Searching for a Better Way to Cover a Campaign,"
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, http://shorensteincenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/d80_hamby.pdf.
34 Charlie Beckett, SuperMedia: Saving Journalism So It Can Save the World (Chichester: Blackwell
Publishing, 2008). 4.
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He suggests the implementation of “networked journalism,” a compromise
between old and new versions of journalism that is taking advantage of new technologies
in order to let professionals and amateurs, like citizen journalists, cooperate towards a
more efficient, inclusive and accountable type of journalism.35 Andrew Chadwick
advocates a similar approach, as he argues for more emphasis on hybridity when
addressing media systems in the U.S. and UK. Instead of talking about old or new media,
he contends, it is more useful to focus on how these media forms overlap, how and where
distinctions between them are dissolving and how this affects political communication.36
Thomas Patterson, a scholar on the subject on media and politics and participant
in anew initiative to strengthen journalism

education and practice, also has not yet given

up on the traditional news media, despite acknowledging the many ways in which the
press has been failing the American public over the last two decades:
As I see it, citizens need journalists
more than ever, precisely because there is so
much information available, of such varying quality and relevance. The
contribution of the reporter cannot be compared with that of the scholar or policy
analyst, much less that o f the talk show host or blogger. Each has a place in our
public life, but none of the others are equipped to do what journalists do.
Journalists are in the daily business of making the unseen visible, of connecting us
to the world beyond our direct experience. Public life is increasingly complex,
and we need an ongoing source o f timely and relevant information on the issues
of day. That’s why we need journalists.37
This goes back to a debate that Walter Lippmann and John Dewey were engaged
in nearly a century ago. Lippmann argued that the world had become so complex that it
was difficult for the average citizen to grasp it. Lippmann’s solution was to have elites
ran foreign affairs, whereas Dewey thought that democracy was too vital a process to be
35 Ibid., 14.
36 Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power (Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013). 4.
37 Thomas E. Patterson, Informing the News: The N eed fo r Knowledge-Based Journalism (New York:
Vintage Books, 2013). 6.
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limited just because technology was advancing rapidly. Although they differed on their
prescriptions, they agreed that in order to educate the American public, journalists should
be well trained in the complexities of modem societies.38 Since their debate in the 1920s,
the world has become even more complex, but the point they make about the press and its
educational responsibility is still relevant. Patterson takes it up and calls again for
knowledge-based journalism, this time as a solution to the crisis in journalism itself.
So despite the current wave of criticism aimed at the traditional news media, there
are still those that have not given up on promoting the press. But they also seem to
wonder why not more people do so: “As a journalist you are constantly being told that the
news media have enourmous power to shape society and events, to change lives and
history. So why are we so careless as a society about the future of journalism itself?”39
After all, not only journalists have a dog in this fight, the public has, too. But it seems as
if we have given up on journalism because new technologies handed everyone the
capability to post their every thought or picture online. What often fails to be stressed,
however, is the difference between amateurs and professionals.
Snapping a picture and putting it on YouTube or watching a presidential speech
and tweeting one’s reactions to it live, is not the same as journalists leaving their desks,
building rapport with sources, verifying facts and then presenting, in Carl Bernstein’s
words, “the best obtainable version o f the truth.” What most citizen journalists and
bloggers provide is more information, not necessarily a way to make sense of it. Most of
them, particularly in the Western democracies, are not going to go out into the real world,

38 Leonard R. Sussman, "20 Years in the Fight on Censorship," in New Media - the Press Freedom
Dimension: Challenges and Opportunities o f New Media fo r Press Freedom (Paris: UNESCO and W orld
Press Freedom Committee,, 2007), 74.
39 Beckett (2008) 2.
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or take risks to tell the story. Without the press as an institution, who is going to cover the
city hall beats or the police departments? Journalism is not just about high-level politics
or uncovering scandals; it is also about keeping an eye on the day-to-day workings o f the
public authorities, so that those they are supposed to be serving know what they are up to.
Although the functions of the press are still very much needed, they do not gamer
much attention or even respect any more. It seems that the press has become a relic o f the
un-networked past, while the future will be monitored and served by the Fifth Estate.

Fifth Estate vs. Fourth Estate

The Fifth Estate are new digital technologies like the Internet and citizen
journalists, bloggers, hackers, etc. that constitute an addition to the four existing estates.
They create a space “for networking individuals in ways that enable a new source of
accountability in government, politics and other sectors.”40 One criticism that is often
leveled against the press these days is that journalists are getting too cozy with those in
power, or become part of the elite establishment as well. The Fifth Estate is seen as an
antidote to this trend. In the digital age, the sources do not need the press anymore; they
can go straight to the people and can bypass another one of the traditional gatekeepers,
the press. But an equally problematic question is who holds the Fifth Estate accountable?
Journalists and traditional news media work according to codes of conduct and
ethics that have developed over centuries. Many journalists still believe that they are
providing a public good with their work, even if poll numbers suggest a negative trend in

40 William H. Dutton, "The Fifth Estate Emerging Through the Network o f Networks," Prometheus 27, no.
1 (2009), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=T 167502.
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this regard.41 The Fifth Estate, at least for now, is a loose network of citizens armed with
smart phones, political bloggers (that might or might not have their own agenda),
whistleblowers with access to online submission platforms, and computer geeks who
know how to use these platforms to leak information. All of these people might have
noble goals, but they are not bound by professional codes of conducts, or anyone to
account to. If we do not like what they do, we cannot simply change the channel or
cancel our subscription. Sure, we can stop reading their blogs, but there is not much the
average citizen can do to stop a hacker. All we can do is trust that they will do the right
thing, whatever that might be.
The WikiLeaks phenomenon highlights precisely this dilemma. At the height of
its influence in 2010, the organization was firmly led by Julian Assange and his morals.
At WikiLeaks, paradoxically a secretive organization that advocates transparency, the
lines between activism and journalism became blurred, a circumstance that is not bound
to disappear quickly in an era where information can come from a lot of different, often
unverified, sources. But despite these unresolved questions, WikiLeaks also demonstrates
that the Fourth and Fifth Estate are not adversaries, despite the fact that current punditry
likes to belabor the adversarial relationship between the two. In reality they often
complement each other. For example, the Fourth Estate is useful in keeping the Fifth
Estate in check and vice versa. Or a Fourth Estate strapped by financial pressures and
shrinking newsrooms can benefit from collaborating on investigative reporting with

41 "Bottom-Line Pressures Now Hurting Coverage, Say Journalists," Pew Research Center's Project for
Excellence in Journalism, http://www.people-press.org/2004/05/23/bottom-line-pressures-now-hurtingcoverage-say-joumalists/. Also "The Web: Alarming, Appealing and a Challenge to Journalistic Values ",
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press,
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/files/2011/0 l/Joumalist-report-2008.pdf.
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representatives of the Fifth Estate. Furthermore, the events surrounding WikiLeaks have
shown that the Fifth Estate still relies on the Fourth Estate for legitimacy and audience.
In 2010, U.S. analyst Bradley Manning, in the possession o f hundreds of
thousands of classified documents, called the Afghanistan and Iraq war logs, and
diplomatic cables of the U.S. Department of State, submitted them to the anonymous
WikiLeaks platform, which was aimed at protecting whistleblowers. WikiLeaks was
determined to publish them, but decided to work with several traditional news
organizations in different countries, most notably the Guardian, The New York Times and
Der Spiegel.
This cooperation once more underlined the benefits of having the press as an
institution with a mass audience, legitimacy, professional standards and expert
knowledge. WikiLeaks, with its handful of staff and volunteers would have not been able
to sift through the documents the way the news media were able to. The journalists
worked with the U.S. authorities to decipher the abbreviation-laden documents, edited
and interpreted what they meant for U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy, published them
to the local audiences in their languages, and, most importantly perhaps, went to great
lengths to redact names and other information that could have identified any sources and
jeopardized them.
In short, journalism, and the investigative kind in particular, requires more than
just information or facts. As one observer puts it:
Traditional investigative journalism once consisted of three phases: unearthing
facts, cross-checking them, and backgrounding them into an understandable
discourse. WikiLeaks does the first, claims to do the second, but omits the third
entirely. This is symptomatic of a particular brand of the open-access ideology in
which content production itself is externalized to unknown entities “out there.”42
42 Lovink (2011) 179.
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Citizen journalism and crowd-sourcing are valuable new tools, but they do not
replace, at least for now, the standards and expert knowledge of the traditional news
media. Some have argued that the ‘cult of the amateur’ is leading to an overreliance on
citizen journalism and crowd-sourced outlets like Wikipedia, an example of the blind
leading the blind, “perpetuating the cycle of misinformation and ignorance.”43 Already,
people often cannot distinguish between what they read on a random blog and objective
political reporting by professional journalists.44 Such criticism might come mainly from
grumpy old technophobes, but they have nonetheless a point: hyping new media and
sounding the death knell for traditional journalism is not going to serve the public
interest.
What is needed is cooperation, not least because the traditional media are still the
main pathway to public attention 45 But not just the sense-making and educational role of
the press is still needed; its watchdog fimction is still vital as well. And, rather than
pitting the Fourth and the Fifth Estate against each other, they can be most useful to the
public if they combine their resources. Because in the digital age we do not only have to
worry about human and civil rights violations from public authorities or governments; we
also have to worry about the increasing influence of tech companies that are gaining more
and more insights into our lives and have a growing impact on privacy and free speech
issues.

43 Andrew Keen, The Cult o f the Amateur: How Blogs, MySpace, YouTube, and the Rest o f Today's UserGenerated Media Are Destroying Our Economy, Our Culture, and Our Values (New York: Double Day,
2007). 4.
44 Ibid., 3.
45 Yochai Benkler, "WikiLeaks and the Networked Fourth Estate," in Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications fo r
the Future o f Communications, Journalism and Society, ed. Benedetta Brevini, Arne Hintz, and Patrick
McCurdy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 28.
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Jeffrey Rosen, for instance, draws attention to the so-called Deciders of Silicon
Valley, those people at Google, Facebook, Twitter and other technology companies who
determine the various companies’ content policies. In short, he argues, “[t]heir positions
give these young people more power over who gets heard around the globe than any
politician or bureaucrat—more power, in fact, than any president or judge.”46 They are
deciding on free speech issues on a daily basis, thus defining what constitutes hate
speech, pornography or unacceptable violence and consequently shaping social norms.
Their approach might be the better option than installing regulatory bodies, but the issue
nonetheless brings up questions of accountability and corporate social responsibility.
In an ideal world, one in which tech companies subscribe to corporate social
responsibility policies, the Googles and Facebooks have a responsibility to protect user
privacy, but in many cases that might go against their business interests. Facebook sells
user data to advertisers so that those can target users better. Google wants to expand the
user base of its social network website, so it integrates it with other Google services,
whether the user wants it or not. It is unlikely that we can count on them to tell us about
their motives or the implications of their policies. Not even the top executives of the tech
companies are sure that corporate social responsibility will win the day. According to a
2012 survey of more than one thousand Internet stakeholders, views are mixed on
whether social responsibility can trump political and economic incentives to cooperate
with governments on monitoring or tracking people.47

46 Jeffrey Rosen, "The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the New Global Battle over the Future
o f Free Speech," The New Republic^ April 29, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.eom/article/l 13045/freespeech-intemet-silicon-valley-making-rules. and Jeffrey Rosen, "The Deciders: The Future o f Privacy and
Free Speech in the Age o f Facebook and Google," Fordham Law Review 80, no. 4 (2012).
47 Janna Q. Anderson and Lee Rainie, Corporate Responsibility: How Far Will Tech Firms Go in Helping
Repressive Regimes?, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Internet & American Life Project, July 5, 2012),
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Only recently a U.S. court ruled in favor of Verizon against the FCC, which until
now had enforced the principle of net neutrality, meaning that broadband providers had to
give equal access and bandwidth to all lawful content.48 The mere fact that Verizon has
been going to great lengths to make its case highlights that business interests are more
important to ICT companies than even the most cherished principles; in this case even the
principle on which the whole project of an open Internet was founded. These cases
underscore why we need a watchdog press now more than ever to tell us the whole story,
not just about what the government is doing, but also about what the new tech giants,
who dominate already so much of our lives, are up to. This is particularly true since there
are obvious possibilities for governments to exploit the services of the tech companies for
their own ends. American and British surveillance programs are only one example of this.

Conclusion

To stress the point once more: this chapter is not an argument against the Internet,
other new technologies and media, or the Fifth Estate, as there can never be too many
estates checking up on each other. Rather it is a call to not forget the traditional media
and the important job journalists do for society. The Internet has brought positive
changes, but it is not an adequate replacement for traditional news media. Far from being
obsolete in the digital age, the press still provides important functions for society. There
might be a glut o f information available these days, but the press is still needed to provide

http://www.pewintemet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Future_of_Corporate_Responsibility_07()51
2.pdf.
48 Dan Roberts, "Appeals Court Rules Against FCC's Right to Protect 'Net Neutrality'," Gwart//a«(January
14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/14/net-neutrality-intemet-fcc-verizon-court.
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citizens with context and interpret the information that they are confronted with. In a
world as complex as ours such a role is indispensable, even if citizen journalism and
crowd-sourcing have become a staple of the new era o f news production, the bulk o f the
job of creating news content and distributing it to the masses still falls to the legacy news
outlets.
Whether this will remain so, is too early to tell. Although many observers surely
have an obituary written for journalism already, stashed away in a folder on their
computer, ready to whip out the next time another newspaper closes down or a journalist
at one of the remaining ones makes a mistake. Granted, the press is often not helping its
own case, particularly in recent years, but the public narrative on the news media seems
overwhelmingly negative. Instead of trying to support the institution that is meant to
represent the voice of the people, many have jumped on the Internet bandwagon, hoping
that it will solve all the problems that are associated with the traditional media.
Gatekeepers can now be circumvented and everyone has the opportunity to express their
political views.
The problem is that freedom of expression on the Internet is not the same as press
freedom. The press has a mass audience, online it is difficult to get heard, let alone have
enough of an impact to challenge government policies. The multitude of voices online
can also not be equated with that of journalists with expert knowledge, their ability to put
things in perspective, educate the wider public and present the “best obtainable version of
the truth.” In the vast world of online blogging and citizen journalism, each voice
becomes just one more version of the truth. Journalists need to makes sense of it.

179

To give up on the idea of press freedom because the Internet has come along and
given us all a voice online, therefore, would be a grave mistake. Political authorities, and
increasingly economic actors, need to be checked, and the most effective way to do so, is
still with the help of a free press. In the digital age, the press is needed more than ever,
and promoting and protecting press freedom should be of the highest priority to activists
who want to keep the political power in the hands of the people.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Press freedom is under attack worldwide and it has been for some time now.
Almost daily new stories about journalists being killed or harassed emerge. But the free
press is not only threatened in countries in crisis. Democracies, too, are responsible for
the global decline of press freedom. This month, Reporters Without Borders released its
2014 World Press Freedom Index and the findings are not pretty. The U.S. dropped
thirteen ranks to 44th place due to increased government attempts at using journalists to
identify sources or whistleblowers.1 The fact that the Department of Justice seized phone
records of journalists at the Associated Press in 2013 also did not help the U.S. scores.
In Europe, things do not look much better. While the Northern European countries
remain at the top of the rankings, South Europe has almost collectively dropped in the
rankings^ Greece and Hungary have been worrying cases for several years, but this year
France and the U.K. also fell in the ranks. In France, publishing the assets o f certain
elected officials is now punishable by imprisonment.2 The low point of the UK’s 2013
press freedom violations came when government officials supervised the destruction of
the Guardian's computer hard drives with information from Edward Snowden.3 This
scenario sounds more like something that could occur under an authoritarian regime, not
like something that we expect a Western democratic government to do. And of course the
press freedom situation in the non-democracies is even worse.
1 Reporters Without Borders, "World Press Freedom Index 2014," http://rsf.org/index2014/enindex2014.php#.
2 Reporters Without Borders, "World Press Freedom Index 2014: EU and Balkans,"
http://rsf.org/index2014/en-eu.php.
3 Ibid.

Clearly, then, the ‘right on which all other rights depend’ is experiencing
considerable setbacks. Surprisingly, however, it has garnered very little attention in the
context of the international human rights debate. Press freedom lacks legal
institutionalization in international human rights law. The creators of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights did not include an explicit provision for the freedom o f the
press. For the UN, press freedom falls under Article 19, which is focused on the
individual right to freedom of expression. The UN framework does not treat press
freedom as an end in itself. Rather, the media are treated as a means to an end. For
example, they can help protect the right to information, guarantee freedom of expression,
foster understanding and friendly cooperation among people and states, publicize and
mitigate humanitarian disasters’ or promote human and economic development. In other
words, the media and press freedom are treated as a channel to secure other human rights.
The press is not treated as a political institution that requires its own protection.
This UN discourse is reflected in the academic literature on human rights. In fact,
press freedom is virtually absent in the academic discussion on human rights. And where
it is discussed, it is of marginal concern, just as at the UN. The most prominent human
rights volumes lack any reference to freedom o f the press. Press freedom fares only
slightly better in human rights reference works and is mentioned only in passing in many
more notable human rights books. Coverage of press freedom in academic human rights
journals is even more limited.
Generally speaking, older texts on human rights do not feature significant
discussion on press freedom, free press or the media. When they do it is mostly
connected to the right to free speech and mostly superficial. Newer texts tend to
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acknowledge the importance of the media and particularly the Internet, but do not address
press freedom in depth either. In general, the power of the press is either taken for
granted in the context of other human rights, or the drawbacks and dangers o f the media
are highlighted.
This marginal existence of press freedom in the human rights debate is
remarkable given the fact that history and philosophy have recognized press freedom as
central to democracy and human rights for well over four hundred years. Throughout this
period, thinkers and practitioners have made the case for the necessity o f press freedom
as the basis for human rights and self-government, values to which the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is clearly committed. Securing a free press also emerged as
a constitutional concern in the U.S. and France at the end of the 18th century, when
revolutionaries fought to overcome tyranny and establish equality, values that are also
fundamental to UN objectives.
Democratic politics are based on the principle that the people are the ultimate
sovereign; that the government responds to the will of the public. Without an unfettered
press it is difficult for the voice of the people to be heard and for the government to be
held accountable. Indeed, the institution of a free press, or the Fourth Estate, is the
greatest safeguard the public has against official misconduct, and for ensuring that they
receive the information they need in order to make government accountable to them.
The press is a political institution that acts as a facilitator for public opinion,
which in turn acts as a check on official power. By shining a light on those in power, the
free press is also an antidote to corruption. Furthermore, the press also fulfills a social
function by fostering a sense of community, engaged citizens and tolerance. This
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highlights that the role of the press goes beyond a political watchdog function towards
promoting an open, tolerant society that goes hand in hand with democratic politics.
In addition to its status as the Fourth Estate and social role, the press is also an
important provider of not just information, but context as well. For the democratic
process to function, the public needs to be informed not only about its government’s
conducts and policies, but also about important issues and debates. The press aides the
democratic dialogue in this context, but it does more than simply providing information.
It is also needed to make sense of the vast amount of information that the government and
other institutions release every day. This demonstrates why it is important to distinguish
between the right to freedom of information and the right to a free press. Even in the
unlikely case of absolute government transparency and free flow of information, a lot of
information might still end up in the vast depths o f the Internet, if it were not for the press
to gather, interpret and publish the most relevant information.
Press freedom is also often treated as a corollary to freedom of expression, but it
is important to distinguish between the two concepts as well; while they are closely
connected, they are not the same. Freedom of expression protects the individual’s right to
express what is on his or her mind, but does not guarantee that these views reach a larger
audience and become politically relevant. The key to understanding press freedom in its
own right is the fact that the press possesses power that it draws from its mass audience
and its resulting status as the people’s surrogate and government oversight mechanism. It
thus protects the very core of the kind of govemment-citizen relationship that the human
rights framework is aiming to promote: a system in which the will o f the people is the
basis of the authority of the government.
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Despite these essential benefits, states are not very active when it comes to
protecting or promoting press freedom as a human right, or even as the basis o f other
rights. This might not come as much of a surprise in the case of Russia or China, but the
liberal Western states also do not treat freedom o f the press as a political priority. The
press freedom rankings support this observation, but they primarily show how states treat
press freedom at home. In order to assess the way states value freedom o f the press
internationally, this study examined in detail the treatment o f press freedom at the United
Nations.
Looking at the UN offers critical insights into the international treatment o f the
freedom of the press, since the UN is the central global fomm for the human rights
discourse and implementation. There is no other institution with comparable reach and
political power that works on behalf of press freedom and could elevate freedom o f the
press to an international human rights priority.
The analysis shows two things. First, press freedom is, at most, a marginal issue
in the international human rights discourse. The human rights regime on press freedom is
weak. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
specifically grant the right to a free press and press freedom related declarations from the
1970s and 1990s are not legally binding. The work o f the various UN human rights
bodies on the protection and promotion of press freedom is also limited. While the
Human Rights Committee and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection o f the
right to freedom of opinion and expression have made some progress in their efforts to
support press freedom, the topic is largely marginalized in the work o f the Human Rights
Council. This leaves UNESCO as the UN organ where most work on press freedom is
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done. The agency is tasked with many other issue areas that tend to carry a higher priority
than press freedom, and thus focuses its limited resources in this area mostly on media
development in developing countries and on drawing attention to press freedom issues
once a year on World Press Freedom Day.
Second, the findings show that press freedom historically has only garnered
significant attention when Western strategic interests were threatened. This demonstrates
that Western actions when it comes to press freedom are instrumental, rather than
normative. This is further underlined by the fact that when press freedom was introduced
to the human rights debate in the early days of the UN, and even prior, it did not take
much for the West to cave to demands from the Soviets that the press freedom debate
focus on the responsibilities of a free press. When the idea o f press freedom was brought
up by the West or its allies, pushback from the Soviets and the Non-Alignment
Movement would return the focus to the dangers of a free press and the need to regulate
it. While the West saw these attempts for what they were - authoritarian regimes trying to
consolidate their power - they barely went out of their way to pursue their opposing free
flow doctrine.
Furthermore, if the West had been pursuing a proactive policy on promoting press
freedom, the period following the Cold War should have seen continuing Western
initiatives on promoting press freedom. The Cold War was won, the Soviet Union
collapsed and many of the former Non-Alignment countries turned towards capitalism
and democracy. But instead of a Western agenda of promoting key civil and political
rights headed by the ‘right on which all other rights depend,’ the UN saw the fading of
press freedom from its human rights agenda.
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This neglect of press freedom, particularly by Western states, is surprising
because one would expect ideas to matter to the West and influence their interests and
politics, particularly when it comes to human rights. After all, the UN human rights
regime is a reflection of Western liberal ideals. Preventing abuses of power and
supporting individual self-determination, the basis for democracy and human rights, are
essentially guarded by press freedom. And yet, the liberal West treats freedom o f the
press like nothing more than a step child.
The academic literature on human rights has stressed ideational explanations not
only for the existence of a human rights regime, but also to shed light on why states
comply with human rights. Since realist explanations of the human rights phenomenon
reduce state behavior in this context to results of coercion or coincidence, constructivist
alternatives emphasizing the explanatory power of norms and identities have gained
traction.
According to ideational theories, norms and values matter because they influence
state preferences and interests. Since press freedom has a long tradition in Western liberal
thought, one might be forgiven the assumption that the ‘right on which all other rights
depend’ would have more of an effect on the human rights policies o f Western states than
this study finds. The evidence suggests, however, that when it comes to press freedom
state behavior is first and foremost guided by strategic interests and considerations of
power. This is not to say that Western foreign policy is free from normative concerns, but
it shows that the press freedom ideal has very limited influence on Western human rights
policy. This is surprising because the idea of press freedom has been around much longer
than gender or racial equality, for example. The Founding Fathers championed press
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freedom at a time when women and black people were still considered second-class
citizens.
What, then, accounts for this paradox? The answer comes down to power. No
politician really likes the press; even those who have praised the benefits of the free press
and wanted it included in the First Amendment tend to complain about the press once
they were in office and learned how inconvenient a government watchdog can be for
those in charge. The press, with its mass audience and mandate to provide a public good,
is a thorn in the side of every government that wants to sustain or consolidate its power.
But states are not the only ones who do not pay enough attention to press
freedom. There is no significant domestic constituency for press freedom in Western
states. Most people seem to look at championing press freedom as an issue that only
concerns people in places that are ruled by dictators, in which journalists are being
thrown in jail, otherwise harassed or straight out killed. But that is not so. Protecting and
promoting press freedom in the West is just as important as promoting it around the
world, because it is the basis for democracy.
The public does not fully appreciate the role of the press. The news media are
perpetually plagued by a bad reputation, but it has gotten particularly bad over the last
three decades.4 Increasing tabloidization of the news and perceived bias have caused the
public to lose trust in the media.
NGOs, too, are mostly focusing on freedom of expression issues, particularly
Internet freedom, instead of the protection of press freedom. And those that do, have
limited human and financial resources.

4 See section “The Public Attitude Towards the Press” in Chapter 5 for detailed statistics.
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Not even the media themselves are very successful in advocating press freedom.
For the most part, the media and journalists uphold the principle of press freedom
through their work, by adhering to journalistic standards of fairness, accuracy,
transparency and objectivity. But perhaps because they are sworn to these principles, they
rarely use their news outlets to campaign for press freedom.
Economic pressures have further contributed to the widespread notion that the
news media business is undermining the principle of press freedom all by itself, even
without the help of power-grabbing politicians. The public and many observers complain
about the increasing sensationalism of the news and obvious grabs for higher viewer- and
readerships, trends that are embodied by Fox News and MSNBC’s blatant bias, CNN’s
fascination with all things social media and touch screen, and the dumbing down of
newspapers in favor of more lifestyle rather than investigative reporting.
Even as a lobby, the organizations behind the news media are not very influential.
Although media organizations used to rally when their interests were at stake, as was the
case with the World Press Freedom Committee during the New World Information and
Communication Order debate, these interests are most important when they coincide with
business interests and with the political position of Western governments. The media
lobby might have been able to raise awareness of UN efforts to constrain press freedom,
but its overall success was limited. It was not the threat of media NGOs that incentivized
UNESCO to rethink its press freedom policy, but the withdrawal of the U.S. and UK
from the organization.
In short, the free press is not just under attack in authoritarian and developing
countries. It faces many challenges in the West itself and curiously lacks adequate
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support from the human rights community, NGOs and the public, considering that press
freedom is the basis of all other human rights.
The findings of this project have a variety of implications both for the idea and
implementation of press freedom and the idea of democracy and human rights in
International Relations, not only in developing countries, but in liberal democracies as
well.
Looking at press freedom, it becomes clear that power and interests still matter,
even when it comes to human rights. The fact that press freedom is only of marginal
concern to the human rights community and Western states, underscores the realist notion
that international organizations are, in fact, extensions of state interests. It also means that
there is a limit to the idea of universal human rights, as civil and political rights, and
press freedom at the core, are still contested. The more universal rights, like protecting
the innocent or making sure every person has enough food to survive, are the rights that
all states can, at least in theory, agree on. The crux of human rights, however, is still very
much subject to state interests, and state concerns of sustaining power and sovereignty.
Press freedom, and other civil and political rights, strike precisely at the core of these.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the impact of transnational actors on
promoting human rights, in this case the media and media NGOs, is limited. There is
neither a bottom-up nor a bottom-down movement when it comes to press freedom.
States avoid press freedom issues, and transnational and domestic actors have difficulty
framing press freedom in a way that allows them to mobilize for the issue, since it is not
even explicitly mentioned in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Additionally, the area of communication rights, with its related concepts
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of freedom of expression, freedom of information, press freedom and Internet freedom,
also continues to lack definition and clarification, which would make advocating for any
or all of these rights easier. What works for other human rights in the advocacy context,
does not work for press freedom, it seems. This raises the question of whether advocates
and the public have fully recognized the importance of promoting freedom of the press.
Further research in this context could illuminate the specifics of why press
freedom has largely disappeared from the human rights agenda. To do so, a closer look at
country cases like France and in Scandinavia to examine historic and contemporary
public attitudes towards press freedom would be insightful. Similarly, examining human
rights NGOs and their attitude and practices regarding press freedom in more detail
would shed more light onto why press freedom is not a higher priority for human rights
advocates. An analysis of how and why media companies and lobby organizations do or
do not fund research or advocacy efforts on press freedom would also provide more
insights into the peculiarities of the neglect o f press freedom in the human rights
discourse. While this project was aimed at opening up the debate on press freedom in the
context of human rights, further research on the issues raised in this dissertation could
help built an even stronger case for a renewed focus on press freedom.
The finding that press freedom is only of marginal concern in the context of
human rights has implications for the future of the Western liberal order as well. If not
even the most liberal democratic states think it necessary to stand up for core human
rights like press freedom, then how can the West expect to protect liberal values in an
international system that is increasingly characterized by ‘the rise of the rest’? China and
Russia are not exactly known for cherishing individual rights and personal freedoms, and
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other authoritarian states find the Chinese and Russian approach marked by centralized
power and the protection of state sovereignty at the expense of human rights appealing.
There are already new coalitions forming at the UN. China, Russia and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference join forces on issues of blasphemy, aimed at
curtailing freedom of expression rights and guarding ‘traditional values.’ Many o f the
states that are growing more powerful do not care about normative policies. It is unlikely
that human rights as a concept will disappear from international relations, since in overall
terms they have become an established norm. But there is nonetheless the danger that the
human rights discourse and implementation might stagnate if core human rights, like
press freedom, which truly challenge government power and encourage democratic
politics, are continued to be neglected.
In the 21 st century, the status of state-society relations first and foremost hinges
on communication rights. The events of the Arab Spring and the role o f the media, old
and new, have made this trend clear. But the implications of the power struggle between
state and society unfolds primarily in the West. Crackdowns on press freedoms in the
U.S. and the UK, along with unfettered data surveillance programs, have brought this
reality to the fore. What has been less discussed, however, is the fact that nothing short of
democracy and human rights is at stake.
The issue of press freedom lies at the heart o f democratic government. The French
revolutionaries and American Founding Fathers realized it. However, in the centuries
since, and particularly in recent years, the idea of press freedom has lost traction. Media
development in developing countries is something that is supported by the West and
international organizations, but attempts at repairing the free press in the West is largely
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the domain of journalists themselves. And normative discussions o f press freedom as
central to human rights are absent from the international discourse and in the West almost
entirely.
This can, in part, also be attributed to the rise of the Internet and the fact that
many regard new information technologies as a quick fix to eliminate traditional
gatekeepers, enhance diversity of voices, and generally protect the individual right to
freedom of expression. Freedom of expression or Internet freedom, however, is not the
same as press freedom. Press freedom is inherently political and a tool to foster
democratic governance.
Blogs and social media publish primarily information, not necessarily context.
Even less often they deal in political context. There are bloggers that investigate, factcheck, and explain. But there is no guarantee that they will be heard. It is easy to get
published online, but difficult to be heard and even more difficult to be heard by a critical
mass. And if political bloggers do gain a mass audience, it is likely that they face the
same restrictions as the mass media. Framing the press freedom debate within the context
of freedom of expression or Internet freedom, therefore, ignores the wider social and
political consequences of protecting the free press as a structural necessity of the modem
state, and underestimates its significance as the basis of other political and civil rights.
Governments are much more adept at drawing this distinction between freedom of
expression and of the press than the human rights community is. They recognize the
political power of the press, as increasing government crackdowns on journalists and
press freedoms demonstrate. They claim to uphold the universally recognized individual
right to freedom of expression, but only as long as it remains politically irrelevant. The
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free press is what takes free speech to the politically relevant level, however. Not (yet)
the Internet, but news media with the power to reach and mobilize a mass audience.
Since promoting press freedom clearly runs counter to government interests, more
than the promotion of probably any other human right would, it is unlikely that states can
be counted on to become serious about protecting the free press on their own. This
suggests that non-governmental actors need to take a more prominent role in the
promotion of the freedom of the press. Human rights NGOs should dedicate more
resources to press freedom and aim to elevate the issue to more than an annual talking
point on World Press Freedom Day. They should become more vocal about the important
functions the free press fulfills for politics and society. Media companies could support
this important NGO work by dedicating more o f their revenues to these human rights
organizations.
It is vital that the narrative that the Internet will cure all of our free speech issues
is challenged and that the public is made aware of the fact that the press is working in
their interest. What it comes down to in the end, is that the problem with press freedom,
is a problem with the public in Western societies. If the public does not want or cherish a
free press, there will not be one.
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APPENDIX
Media, communications and press freedom NGOs with consultative status at ECOSOC as
o f 1 September 2013

Inter-Press Service International Association (1991)
Feminist Press (1999)
Inter-American Press Association (1953)
International Eurasia Press Fund (2007)
International Press Institute (1993)
Press Council (2004)
Presse embleme campagne (2010)
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (2011)
European Alliance of Press Agencies (1969)
Union international des joumalistes et de la presse de langue francaise (2001)
Association for the Promotion of the International Circulation of the Press (UNESCO)
International Federation of the Periodical Press (UNESCO, WIPO)
International Press Telecommunications Council (ITU, UNESCO)
World Press Freedom Committee (UNESCO)
Afromedianet (2011)
Foundation for Responsible Media (2013)
International Association for Media and Communication Research (2008)
International Catholic Organisation of the Media (1951)
international Federation, oTMultimedia Associations (2004)
Morality in Media (2004)
Peace Family and Media Association (2011)
Population Media Center (2013)
Public Fund “Medialife” (2012)
Women in Media and Entertainment (2000)
PCI-Media Impact (1974)
Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (UNESCO)
International Research Institute for Media, Communication and Cultural Development
(UNESCO)
Dominican Union of Journalists for Peace (1995)
International Federation of Journalists (1953)
Reseau malien des joumalistes pour la lutte contre la corruption et la pauvrete (2004)
International Federation of Free Journalists (1969)
International Federation of Agricultural Journalists (FAO)
Latin American Federation of Journalists (UNESCO)
Reporters sans frontieres international (1993)
Article 19: International Centre against Censorship (1991)
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Japanese Association for the Right to Freedom of Speech (2012)
Freedom House (1995)
Amnesty International (1964)
Human Rights First (1991)
Human Rights Internet (1983)
Human Rights Watch (1993)
Internet Society (2010)

Source: UN Economic and Social Council, “List of non-governmental organizations in
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2013,”
E/2013/INF/6, 4 October 2013.
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